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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. Introduction: Crime Victims’ State Constitutional Rights Are Often 
Illusory 
In Maryland, a day care provider shook a young couple’s baby to 
death, but the couple was unable to attend the trial, despite the fact that 
all other nonwitness members of the public could do so.1 The young 
couple had state constitutional rights to attend the trial and address the 
court at sentencing, but the trial court denied their rights.2 In Utah, a 
child was seriously sexually abused, and the perpetrator was charged 
with felony sex crimes. But a plea deal and hearing went forward with no 
opportunity for the victim to address the court in opposition to the plea,3 
even though the mother of the little boy who was sexually abused had a 
state constitutional right to address the court to oppose the plea bargain.4 
 1. Rippeon v. State, No. 2554, (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 9, 2002), cert. denied, 810 A.2d 
962 (Md. 2002) (copy of unreported opinion on file with author). 
 2. Id. 
 3. State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756, 757–58 (Utah 2002). 
 4. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(1) (“To preserve and protect victims’ rights to justice and due 
process, victims of crime have these rights, as defined by law: (a) To be treated with fairness, 
respect, and dignity, and to be free from harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice 
process . . . .”). 
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The offender pled to a misdemeanor and was given a minimal sanction.5 
Similarly, in Florida, the victim of a multimillion dollar jewelry heist 
was not provided notice of, or the opportunity to speak at, the thief’s plea 
and sentencing hearing. The owner of the stolen jewelry had a 
constitutional right to speak at sentencing, but did not get that 
opportunity.6 Each court denied all of these victims their state 
constitutional rights. Their rights were illusory because the victims were 
unable to enforce them, as they lacked standing to enforce them, remedy 
for their violation, or review by a higher tribunal.7
The crime victims’ rights movement worked to enact rights in two 
waves. The first wave provided victims with statutory rights.8 
Unsatisfied with the response of the legal culture to statutory rights, the 
crime victims’ movement began to work to enact state constitutional 
rights.9 The achievements of these victims’ rights pioneers are nothing 
short of astonishing. The second wave resulted in thirty-three state 
constitutional amendments that contain some kind of victims’ rights 
provision.10 In the mid-1900s, before the advent of victims’ rights, 
victims were lawfully exiled from criminal processes and rarely notified 
of important events.11 Against an entrenched legal culture that 
 5. Casey, 44 P.3d at 757–58. 
 6. Ford v. State, 829 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
 7. Even illusory rights provide limited benefits. For instance, some government officials 
will probably ensure that many victims in their jurisdiction get rights. That some victims have rights 
is an improvement. Nevertheless, a study on the issue found that notice of a plea bargain was given 
to 63.4% of white victims and 42.5% of nonwhite victims in states deemed by that study to be strong 
victims’ rights states. See NAT’L VICTIM CTR., COMPARISON OF WHITE AND NON-WHITE CRIME 
VICTIM RESPONSES REGARDING VICTIMS’ RIGHTS (1997), reprinted in DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, 
VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 690–93 (1999). Thus, a remarkably high percentage of victims 
are not notified of their rights, much less given the opportunity to exercise them. Moreover, it 
appears that minority victims are less likely to have an opportunity to exercise their rights than other 
victims. This state of affairs is unacceptable. After all, the purpose of rights is to ensure that 
everyone has an equal opportunity to exercise them. 
 8. Don Siegleman & Courtney W. Tarver, Victims Rights in State Constitutions, in 1 
EMERGING ISSUES STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 163–73 (1988). 
 9. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 114 (1982), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/87299.pdf (recommending a 
federal constitutional amendment as necessary to change the legal culture). 
 10. See Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim 
Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289 app. A. 
 11. Former Federal Rule of Evidence 615, enacted in 1975, provided parties with the right to 
exclude all witnesses (including victims) from any criminal proceeding. Taking the lead of Rule 615, 
the states also typically gave parties the same right to exclude witnesses. For the history of victim 
attendance in criminal trials and Rule 615, see Douglas E. Beloof & Paul G. Cassell, Victim 
Attendance at Trial: The Re-emerging National Consensus, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 
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completely excluded victims from the criminal process,12 these pioneers 
established critical beachheads for the victims’ rights movement. As 
impressive a feat as securing these beachheads was, the first and second 
wave of statutory and constitutional victims’ rights have not been 
consistently successful in establishing real crime victims’ rights. Present 
victim rights’ laws (or courts’ interpretation of those laws) often severely 
curtail victim standing, remedy, or review. Thus, it is time to move 
inland. 
In this context, standing is the ability of victims to defend a denial of 
their rights in appellate courts. Differences in standing law appear among 
jurisdictions, but this Article does not examine various standing doctrines 
in all fifty-one jurisdictions. Right now, as illustrated by the stories in the 
introduction, victims are often without standing to vindicate the rights 
that the first and second waves of the victims’ rights movement secured 
for them. The third wave of victims’ standing, remedy, and review will 
transform these illusory rights into real rights. 
There are three main obstacles in the way of turning victims’ illusory 
rights into real rights: (1) government discretion to deny rights, (2) lack 
of a meaningful remedy to enforce rights, and (3) appellate court 
discretion to deny review. 
The language in some state constitutions permits state governments 
to exercise their discretion to infringe severely on or completely 
eliminate victims’ rights guaranteed by those state constitutions. 
Governments have the discretion to ignore constitutional rights that are 
not mandatory and, when constitutionally required, not reinforced with 
enabling legislation. Some victims’ constitutional rights are cast in 
discretionary language, and, with limited exceptions, victims have no 
standing to obtain review of these discretionary rights when the 
government disregards them. Also, broad victims’ constitutional rights 
provisions are vague. The vagueness of these provisions gives courts the 
discretion to narrowly apply them. 
Victims’ rights are also illusory when there is no adequate remedy. 
Without adequate remedy, victims cannot exercise their rights when 
prosecutors or trial courts deny them. In certain constitutions, voiding 
and reconsideration remedies for violations of victims’ rights are 
prohibited or unduly restricted.13 Because a prerequisite to standing is 
Fall 2005). 
 12. Except, of course, as witnesses. 
 13. See infra notes 287–322 and accompanying text for a discussion of these jurisdictions. 
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remedy, the absence of remedy precludes standing. Even in jurisdictions 
where such remedies are available, problems of mootness or lack of 
ripeness prevent remedy. Furthermore, some state constitutional victims’ 
rights deny the courts any authority to stay proceedings while a rights 
violation is on review. The unavailability of stays aggravates the 
mootness problem. 
Finally, victims’ rights are illusory unless there is a nondiscretionary 
review mechanism. When remedy is available and the violation fits 
within the scope of the rights, review by writ is expressly or implicitly 
available under all state constitutional victims’ rights provisions. But writ 
review is discretionary. Because review by writ is discretionary, it is 
improbable that courts will routinely review individual victims’ rights 
violations. 
Troubling too are appellate court deviations from conventional 
constitutional analyses that result in denials of victim standing. In states 
where courts should affirm victim standing, emerging judicial opinions 
deny standing. For example, constitutional rights must be mandatory 
before there can be standing, remedy, and review. Despite the existence 
of plain mandatory language in some states’ respective bills of rights, 
however, courts label constitutional rights “directory,” thus rendering 
them discretionary and eliminating potential enforcement.14 
Additionally, constitutional rights must be enabled before there can be 
standing and remedy. And, as Part II.B.1 explains, even when strong 
evidence exists that victims’ rights are self-enabled, courts have 
sometimes held that victims’ rights amendments are merely advisory and 
not binding. This reasoning is particularly unpersuasive when compared 
to courts’ vigorous enforcement of defendants’ constitutional rights. 
There are three legal mechanisms for bringing about victims’ 
standing, adequate remedy, and review. A federal constitutional 
amendment to the Bill of Rights providing victims’ rights, accompanied 
by standing, meaningful remedy, and review is, from the perspective of 
providing consistent national rights, the best option. It is also the best 
option from the perspective of ensuring that courts will conclude that 
victims’ rights are mandatory and enabled. Moreover, a federal 
constitutional amendment improves the chances that state courts will 
interpret and enforce the rights in a consistent manner, because the 
Supreme Court will be the ultimate arbiter of rights. But, as a practical 
 14. See infra notes 107–32 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial disregard of 
mandatory rights.
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matter, a federal constitutional amendment is the solution most difficult 
to attain. A second and considerably easier solution is to amend state 
constitutions to provide explicit protection of victims’ rights. Ultimately, 
a vote of the people of the state is required to approve the amendment, 
and voters have been historically very receptive to such victim 
amendments.15 Third and perhaps the most easily achieved solution is 
for states to enact legislation that would enable the victims’ rights 
already provided in their state constitutions. Where victims’ amendments 
presently permit, enabling legislation should be rapidly enacted to 
provide for or clarify victims’ standing, meaningful remedy, and review. 
Unfortunately, some states’ constitutional amendments will themselves 
need amendment before enabling legislation will succeed. In these 
circumstances legislatures could act to provide independent statutory 
victims’ rights with standing, remedy, and review provisions completely 
independent of the state constitution. Such statutes would be an interim 
measure until the state constitution was amended. 
Constitutional rights that do not grant people the standing to enforce 
them are so contrary to our legal traditions that they create a host of 
dysfunctions. These dysfunctions include: (1) turning judicial hierarchy 
upside down, (2) upsetting the hierarchy of laws, (3) corrupting the 
adversary process, (4) crippling rights enforcement, (5) constraining 
victims’ ability to advocate for defendants, and (6) diluting constitutional 
rights. Providing victims with standing to enforce rights violations along 
with voiding and reconsideration remedies and appellate review as a 
matter of right will resolve all of these dysfunctions. Providing for 
standing, remedy, and review makes victims’ rights directly enforceable 
by victims, brings victims’ rights into conformance with the conventional 
model of individual rights, signals courts’ intent to follow conventional 
constitutional analyses in interpreting victims’ rights, and enhances 
government compliance with these rights. This Article also argues that 
these results are best achieved by amending or legislatively enabling 
state constitutions and by enacting a federal constitutional victims’ rights 
amendment. 
Part I of this Article provides some helpful background in victims’ 
rights and the participant status of victims. Part II offers a comprehensive 
look at how states address victims’ rights, and how many state courts 
have wrongfully denied victims’ rights even when the rights are included 
in state constitutions. Part III explores the several dysfunctions of 
 15. See infra notes 19–23 and accompanying text for a discussion of these state amendments. 
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victims’ constitutional rights bereft of standing or meaningful remedy or 
review. Finally, Part IV identifies the need for state legislation and 
constitutional amendments and a federal victims’ rights constitutional 
amendment to allow victims to directly enforce their constitutional rights 
in appellate courts.16
B. Background 
In order to fully appreciate the significance of the third wave of 
victims’ rights, one should understand the scope of crime victims’ rights. 
This background provides the content of broad and specific victims’ 
rights, the personally held nature of these rights, and victims’ status as 
participants rather than full, or third, parties. Ultimately, this review 
makes apparent that victims’ rights, like other civil rights, are personally 
held civil liberties against the government. 
Victims’ rights sound in “fairness to the victim, respect for the 
victim, and dignity of the victim.”17 Including victims in the criminal 
justice system finally gives voice to a perspective that has for too long 
been ignored. As this Article will point out, victims’ interests are often at 
odds with those of the two traditional parties to criminal proceedings, the 
 16. This Article argues for standing, remedy, and review to enforce currently existing rights. 
Professor Abraham Goldstein was the first academic to suggest victim standing for the limited 
purpose of representing a victim in a restitution hearing. See Abraham Goldstein, Defining the Role 
of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 MISS. L.J. 515 (1982). Scholars have written about new 
and expanded rights, and standing to accompany those rights, but that is beyond the scope of this 
Article. See, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: PROTECTING VICTIMS RIGHTS IN 
CRIMINAL TRIALS 193–97 (1995) (suggesting, for example, that victims be able to ask questions of 
witnesses through the judge); Susan Bandes, Victim Standing, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 331, 333 (stating 
that, while not a supporter of victim standing, “[m]y thesis is that the sorts of victim initiatives that 
have been successful have been those, and only those, that advance the prosecution’s own agenda, 
while preserving the prosecution’s complete freedom from third-party interference” (citations 
omitted)); Douglas E. Beloof, Enabling Rape Shield Procedures Under Crime Victims’ 
Constitutional Privacy Rights, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2005) (urging that rape 
victims be allowed to directly enforce rape shield laws in trial courts and on pretrial review). 
This Article also does not address the important relationship of crime victims to substantive 
criminal law. See MARCUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF 
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 154 (2002) (warning against the rapid growth of state control through 
criminalization of victimless harm). Professor Dubber writes: “[T]he point of the entire criminal law, 
and not merely its procedural aspect, is to vindicate the victim’s right to autonomy.” Id.; see also 
Paul H. Robinson, Should the Victims’ Rights Movement Have Influence over Criminal Law 
Formulation and Adjudication?, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 749, 749 (2002) (arguing against victims’ 
procedural role, but stating, “[the victims’ rights movement] ought to have influence over criminal 
law formulation”). 
 17. Beloof, supra note 10, at 293. This Article provides a thorough discussion of the reasons 
to include victims in the criminal justice process. 
1BEL-FIN 8/9/2005 2:18:25 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
262 
 
state and the defendant.18 This Article does not offer a detailed defense 
of the need for victims’ rights; it assumes that they are relevant and 
useful, but it argues that further action is required to fully vindicate the 
victims’ rights that state codes and constitutions already describe. It is 
against this backdrop that this section outlines the history of the victims’ 
rights movement. 
Victims’ state constitutional rights can be either broad or specific 
rights. Broad rights include the victims’ rights to fairness, respect, 
dignity, privacy, freedom from abuse, due process, and reasonable 
protection.19 Nineteen state constitutions provide for “fairness” and/or 
 18. See infra Part III.C. 
 19. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“the right to be treated with dignity, respect, and fairness 
during all phases of the criminal and juvenile justice process”); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8(b)(1) (“the 
right to be treated with fairness and respect throughout the criminal justice process”); IDAHO CONST. 
art. I, § 22 (“the following rights: (1) to be treated with fairness, respect, dignity and privacy”); ILL. 
CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(1) (“[t]he right to be treated with fairness and respect for their dignity and 
privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b) (“the right to be treated 
with fairness, dignity, and respect throughout the criminal justice process”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 25 
(“shall be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect”); MD. CONST. art. 47(a) (“shall be treated by 
agents of the State with dignity, respect, and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice 
process.”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1) (“the right to be treated with fairness and respect for their 
dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process.”); MISS. CONST. art. III, § 26A (“shall 
have the right to be treated with fairness, dignity and respect throughout the criminal justice 
process”); N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 22 (“A victim of crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and 
respect by the criminal justice system.”); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(A)(1) (“the right to be treated 
with fairness and respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice 
process”); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a (“Victims of criminal offenses shall be accorded fairness, 
dignity, and respect in the criminal justice process . . . .”); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34 (“To preserve 
and protect the rights of victims to justice and due process, and ensure that victims are treated with 
fairness, respect and dignity, and are free from intimidation, harassment or abuse, throughout the 
criminal justice process, any victim or family member of a victim of a crime has the right to know . . 
. .”) (listing information rights); OR. CONST. art. I, § 42(1) (“[T]o accord crime victims due dignity 
and respect . . . the following rights are hereby granted . . . .”) (listing rights); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23 
(“A victim of crime shall, as a matter of right, be treated by agents of the state with dignity, respect 
and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice process.”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A) (“To 
preserve and protect victims’ rights to justice and due process . . . , victims of crime have the right 
to: (1) be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from intimidation, harassment, or 
abuse, throughout the criminal and juvenile justice process.”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“To 
preserve and protect the rights of victims of crime to justice and due process, victims shall be 
entitled to the following basic rights . . . . 2. the right to be free from intimidation, harassment and 
abuse.”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a) (“A crime victim has the following rights: (1) the right to be 
treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal 
justice process.”); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(1) (“To preserve and protect victims’ rights to justice 
and due process, victims of crime have these rights, as defined by law: (a) to be treated with fairness, 
respect, and dignity, and to be free from harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice 
process.”); VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A (“[I]n criminal prosecutions, the victim shall be accorded 
fairness, dignity and respect by the officers, employees and agents of the Commonwealth . . . .”); 
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“due process” to victims.20 One or more of the rights to “respect,” 
“dignity,” and “freedom from abuse” appear in twenty-one state 
constitutions.21 Six constitutions include the express right to victim 
“privacy.”22 Eight constitutions provide for a victim’s right to 
“reasonable protection.”23
With only one exception,24 state courts have interpreted these broad 
victims’ rights to have substantive meaning. For example, in the New 
Jersey case State v. Timmendequas, the state prosecuted Timmendequas 
for kidnapping, sexually assaulting, and murdering Megan Kanga.25 The 
New Jersey Constitution provides the broad guarantee that, “a victim of 
crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the 
criminal justice system.”26 The New Jersey Supreme Court held this 
broad language, coupled with a victim’s right to be present at public 
judicial proceedings, could be the lawful basis to deny a defendant’s 
motion to change venue.27 The court held that the victim possessed 
standing in the trial court to seek and obtain the empanelling of a foreign 
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“To ensure victims a meaningful role in the criminal justice system and 
to accord them due dignity and respect, victims of crime are hereby granted the following basic and 
fundamental rights.”) (listing rights); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“This state shall treat crime victims 
. . . with fairness, dignity and respect for their privacy.”). 
 20. Beloof, supra note 10, at 328–29, app. A. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“the right to be reasonably protected from the accused 
through the imposition of appropriate bail or conditions of release by the court”); CONN. CONST. art. 
I, § 8(b)(3) (“the right to be reasonably protected from the accused throughout the criminal justice 
process”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(7) (“[t]he right to be reasonably protected from the accused 
throughout the criminal justice process”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1) (“[t]he right to be reasonably 
protected from the accused throughout the criminal justice process”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32(1)(6) 
(“[t]he right to reasonable protection from the defendant or any person acting on behalf of the 
defendant”); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(A)(3) (“the right to be reasonably protected from the accused 
throughout the criminal justice process”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A)(6) (“[the right to] be 
reasonably protected from the accused or persons acting on his behalf throughout the criminal justice 
process”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“[the right to] reasonable protection from the accused 
throughout the criminal justice process”). 
 24. The sole exception is the ill-conceived opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in 
Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 587 (R.I. 1998). No opinion in any other state appellate court 
involving broad victims’ constitutional rights has found such a provision to be merely directory to 
the legislature. For a comprehensive discussion of Bandoni, see infra notes 173–202. 
 25. 737 A.2d 55, 64 (N.J. 1999). 
 26. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22. 
 27. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 76; see also In re K.P., 709 A.2d 315, 321 (NJ Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 1997) (holding under New Jersey’s broad rights that a victim had standing and an 
unarticulated right to oppose a petition by the press to open a juvenile proceeding). 
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jury in preference to a change of venue.28 In Arizona, intermediate 
appellate courts have held that victims’ broad rights to fairness, respect, 
dignity, freedom from abuse, and due process, coupled with more 
particular rights, rendered unlawful orders requiring victims to submit to 
fingerprinting29 or requiring state interviews of victims to be 
electronically recorded and made available to the defense.30
Several state courts have recognized victims’ broad constitutional 
rights only to find that the scope of the rights did not extend to the 
factual context of the cases. The Illinois Supreme Court held broad 
language providing that “[c]rime victims . . . shall have the following 
rights as provided by law . . . [, including] the right to be treated with 
fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy throughout the criminal 
justice process”31 did not alter the rule that a defendant’s death before 
final appeal abated the judgment below.32 The Maryland Supreme Court 
ruled that the broad language of the Maryland Constitution, which 
provides that “[a] victim of crime shall be treated by agents of the State 
with dignity, respect, and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal 
justice process,”33 did not grant a trial court the discretion to admit into 
evidence in-life photographs of the homicide victim.34 In a New Mexico 
case, the court refused to extend a crime victim’s constitutional “right to 
be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy 
throughout the criminal justice process” to alter a law concerning waiver 
of evidentiary privileges.35 In Wisconsin, the court declined to rely on 
broad provisions to give the victim an interest in the change of venue 
proceeding.36 The broad constitutional rights reviewed in these opinions 
plainly have substantive meaning or the courts would not have bothered 
to assess the scope of the right.37
 28. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 76. 
 29. Romley v. Schneider, 45 P.3d 685, 688 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002). 
 30. State v. O’Neil, 836 P.2d 393, 394 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). 
 31. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a). 
 32. People v. Robinson, 719 N.E.2d 662, 663 (Ill. 1999).
 33. MD. CONST. art. 47(a). 
 34. State v. Broberg, 677 A.2d 602, 612 (Md. 1996). 
 35. State v. Gonzales, 912 P.2d 297, 300 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996). 
 36. State v. Rymer, 2001 WI Ct. App. 31U, ¶ 16, 622 N.W.2d 770, cert. denied, 2001 WI 15, 
626 N.W.2d 807. 
 37. Moreover, absent some explicit restriction in the plain language, these broad rights are 
substantive for another reason. The substantive meaning is revealed by comparing victims’ explicit 
right of “privacy” in state constitutions with the federal Constitution’s penumbral right of privacy. In 
nonvictim contexts, the U.S. Supreme Court has implied a federal constitutional right to privacy. The 
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In contrast to broad rights, specific victims’ rights provide rights 
more focused than general “fairness.” They can be parsed into the 
categories of due process and protection. Due process rights include 
rights to be notified, present, and heard at particular stages of the 
criminal process. Typically, a victim’s right to be present is limited to 
critical stages of the criminal process or stages in which a defendant also 
has a right to be present.38 Victims have rights to receive notice of their 
rights and notice of criminal proceedings. While the most common 
term “privacy” is not expressly set out in the U.S. Constitution. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has gleaned a right to privacy from the penumbras of the Constitution. In the 1965 case of 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding a right to privacy in the penumbras of 
the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments), the Court, in finding a right to privacy in a 
marital relationship, determined that some fundamental rights are not enumerated in the Constitution 
but nevertheless exist. Since Griswold, the Court has relied upon the penumbral right to privacy to 
protect “decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child 
rearing and education.” Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted). As recently as 2003, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court expanded on the 
legitimacy of the penumbral right to privacy by holding that privacy protects the conduct between 
consenting homosexual adults in the home. 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). Accompanying this federal 
penumbral right to privacy is standing and remedy for the individual whose privacy rights are 
violated. If a constitutional right to privacy can be gleaned from constitutional penumbras, then an 
express right to “privacy” for crime victims clearly has substantive significance. 
 38. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“allowed to be present to all . . . proceedings where accused 
has the right to be present”); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(3) (“[t]o be present at, and, upon request, 
to be informed of all criminal proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present”); CONN. 
CONST. art. I, § 8(b)(5) (“shall have . . . [t]he right to attend the trial and all other court proceedings 
the accused has the right to attend, unless such person is to testify and the court determines that such 
person’s testimony would be materially affected if such person hears other testimony”); ILL. CONST. 
art. I, § 8.1(a)(8) (“shall have . . . the right to be present at the trial and all other court proceedings on 
the same basis as the accused, unless the victim is to testify and the court determines that the 
victim’s testimony would be materially affected if the victim hears other testimony at the trial.”); 
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1) (“shall have . . . [t]he right to attend trial and all other court proceedings 
the accused has the right to attend”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32(1)(1) (“shall have . . . the right to be 
present at all criminal justice proceedings at which the defendant has such right”); N.M. CONST. art. 
II, § 24(A)(5) (“shall have . . . the right to attend all public court proceedings the accused has the 
right to attend”); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34(A) (“right to be present at any proceeding where the 
defendant has a right to be present”); OR. CONST. art. I, § 42(1)(a) (“right to be present at and, upon 
specific request, to be informed in advanced of any critical stage of the proceedings held in open 
court when the defendant will be present”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A)(3) (“have the right to . . . be 
informed of and present at any criminal proceedings which are dispositive of the charges where the 
defendant has the right to be present”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35(3) (“[s]hall be entitled to . . . the 
right to be present at all proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present”); WA. CONST. 
art. I, § 35 (“[u]pon notifying the prosecuting attorney, . . . shall have the right to be informed of and, 
subject to the discretion of the individual presiding over the trial or court proceedings, attend trial 
and all other court proceedings the defendant has the right to attend”). 
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victims’ right allows the victim to speak at the defendant’s sentencing,39 
some constitutions provide for the right to speak at pretrial release or bail 
hearings and to be heard concerning a negotiated plea.40 Constitutions in 
certain states give victims a right to confer with the prosecution 
concerning charging or disposition.41 This is not a right to control the 
prosecution, but rather to gather information, to express concerns and 
preferences. Some constitutions grant victims the right to be heard at 
postconviction release hearings, such as parole hearings.42 Victims have 
rights to a speedy trial or prompt disposition,43 and the right to attend the 
 39. Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 282, 299–305, app. I (2003) (collecting constitutional and statutory rights of 
victims to speak at sentencing). 
 40. A right to be heard at sentencing can sometimes allow for the victim to be heard by the 
court concerning a proposed plea bargain. See, e.g., People v. Stringham, 253 Cal. Rptr. 484, 492 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
 41. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“to confer with the prosecution”); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 
2.1(A)(6) (“[t]o confer with the prosecution, after the crime against the victim has been charged, 
before trial or before any disposition of the case and to be informed of the disposition”); IDAHO 
CONST. art. I, § 22(5) (“[t]o communicate with the prosecution”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(3) 
(“shall have . . . the right to communicate with the prosecution”); IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b) (“shall 
have the right . . . to confer with the prosecution, to the extent that exercising these rights does not 
infringe upon the constitutional rights of the accused”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 25 (“shall have . . . the 
right to confer with the prosecution prior to final disposition of the case”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 
24(i) (“shall have . . . right to confer with the prosecution”); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(A) (“shall 
have . . . the right to confer with prosecution”); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37(i)(h) (“shall be entitled to . . 
. the right as prescribed by law to confer with the prosecution”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A)(7) 
(“have the right to . . . confer with the prosecution, after the crime against the victim has been 
charged, before the trial or before any disposition and informed of the disposition”); TENN. CONST. 
art. I, § 35(1) (“shall be entitled to . . . [t]he right to confer with the prosecution”); TEX. CONST. art. 
I, § 30(b)(1) (“on request . . . the right to confer with representative of the prosecutor’s office”); VA. 
CONST. art. I, § 8-A(7) (“[t]he right to confer with the prosecution”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“state 
shall ensure that crime victims have . . . the opportunity to confer with the prosecution”). 
 42. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(9) (“[t]o be heard at any proceeding when any post-
conviction release from confinement is being considered”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32(1)(2) (“[t]he 
right to be informed of and heard at . . . probation revocation hearings, and parole hearings, unless in 
the determination of the court the interests of justice require otherwise”); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 
8(2)(c) (“[h]eard at all proceedings for the . . . release of a convicted person after trial”); S.C. CONST. 
art. I, § 24(A)(10) (“have the right to . . . be informed of any proceeding when any post-conviction 
action is being considered, and be present at any post-conviction hearing involving a post-conviction 
release decision”). 
 43. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“timely disposition . . . following the arrest of the accused”); 
ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(10) (“a speedy trial or disposition and prompt and final conclusion of 
the case after the conviction”); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8(b)(2) (“timely disposition . . . following the 
arrest of the accused”); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (“timely disposition of the case”); ILL. CONST. art. 
I, § 8.1(A)(6) (“timely disposition . . . following arrest of the accused”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24 
(“timely disposition . . . following the arrest of the accused”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32 (“a speedy 
disposition and appellate review”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A) (11) (“prompt and final conclusion of 
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trial in many jurisdictions.44 Finally, rights of protection include notice 
of pretrial release, imprisonment, and postsentence release or escape.45
the case”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“to a speedy trial or disposition and a prompt and final 
conclusion of the case after the conviction.”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“timely disposition”). 
 44. ALA. CONST. amend. 557 (victim can attend all crucial stages of proceedings, to the 
extent attendance does not interfere with constitutional rights of defendants); ALASKA CONST. art. I, 
§ 24 (victim can attend all proceedings a defendant has the right to attend); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 
2.1(A)(3) (victim can attend all proceedings in which defendant, prosecutor, and general public have 
a right to attend); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a (victim can attend critical procedures); FLA. CONST. 
art. I, § 16(b) (victim can attend critical proceeding, to extent attendance does not interfere with 
defendant’s right); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (victim can attend criminal justice proceedings); ILL. 
CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(8) (victim can attend all court proceedings, unless victim’s testimony will be 
materially affected); IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b) (victim allowed to be present during public 
hearings); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15(a) (victim can attend to extent attendance does not interfere 
with rights of criminal defendants); LA. CONST. art. I, §25 (victim allowed to be present during all 
critical stages of preconviction and postconviction proceedings); MD. CONST. art. 47(b) (victim can 
attend criminal justice proceedings; victim must first testify); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1) (victim 
can attend trial and other court proceedings); MISS. CONST. art. III, § 26(A) (victim allowed to be 
present at all public hearings when authorized by law); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32 (victim can attend 
criminal justice proceedings); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28(1) (victim has the right to be present at trial 
unless the trial court finds sequestration necessary for a fair trial for the defendant); NEV. CONST. art. 
I, § 8 (victim has the right to be present at all public hearings involving the critical stages of a 
criminal proceeding); N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 22 (victim can attend judicial proceedings open to the 
public; court may sequester prior to testifying); N.M. CONST. art. I, § 24 (victim can attend all public 
court proceedings); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37(1)(a) (victim can attend court proceedings of 
defendant); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34(A) (victim has the right to be present at any proceeding at 
which the defendant has the right to be present); OR. CONST. art. I, § 42(1)(a) (passed by 
referendum) (victim can attend all critical proceedings); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24 (victim can be 
present at any criminal proceedings which are dispositive of the charges where the defendant has the 
right to be present); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35(3) (victim has the right to be present at any criminal 
proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(b)(2) (victim 
can attend all public proceedings, unless testimony materially affected); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 
28(1)(b) (victim can attend trial and related proceedings); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 35 (victim can 
attend after victim testifies; victim has right to testify first); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (victim can 
attend court proceedings; court can sequester to assure fair trial). 
 45. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“[c]rime victims . . . have the following rights . . . to be 
reasonably protected from the accused through the imposition of appropriate bail or conditions of 
release by the court”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(a) (“rights of victims . . . encompass[] . . . the more 
basic expectation that persons who commit felonious acts causing injury to innocent victims will be 
appropriately detained in custody, tried by the courts, and sufficiently punished so that the public 
safety is protected and encouraged”); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8(b) (“shall have . . . the right to be 
reasonably protected from the accused throughout the criminal justice process”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 
8.1(a)(7) (“shall have . . . [t]he right to be reasonably protected from the accused throughout the 
criminal justice process”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(i) (“shall have . . . the right to be reasonably 
protected from the accused throughout the criminal justice process”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32(1)(6) 
(“[t]he right to reasonable protection from the defendant or any person acting on behalf of the 
defendant”); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(A)(3) (“shall have . . . the right to be reasonably protected 
from the accused throughout the criminal justice process”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A)(6) (“have the 
right to . . . be reasonably protected from the accused or persons acting on his behalf throughout the 
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While victims have these specific rights, some courts have been 
reluctant to give specific rights an expansive interpretation in certain 
contexts. For example, under the Texas Constitution, the specific right to 
confer with the prosecutor coupled with the broad right to “fairness” did 
not grant the victim the right to discover evidence in the prosecutor’s file 
to facilitate a civil suit.46 Additionally, the Illinois appellate court held 
that “the [victims’ rights] Act and the [victims’ rights] amendment” did 
not alter the “fundamental principle” that a conviction based on illegally 
obtained, inadmissible evidence could not stand.47 In Arizona, a state 
constitutional right allows victims to refuse pretrial interviews, but does 
not implicitly include a right not to testify in a pretrial hearing48 or refuse 
to testify at presentence hearings.49 Concerning victims’ rights to attend 
trial, a Florida appellate court ruled that a victim’s right “to be present at 
all crucial stages of criminal proceedings”50 did not create a right for 
victims to sit at counsel table.51 Under California law, victims’ right to 
speak at sentencing does not mean that a victim alone can alter the terms 
of the sentence.52 In these jurisdictions, these specific rights have 
substantive meaning, although the scope of the rights did not encompass 
the facts of the cases. 
On the other hand, some courts have held that specific constitutional 
provisions have enough substantive force to alter lesser laws in certain 
contexts. For example, in Michigan, a victim’s constitutional right to 
criminal justice process”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(2) (“has . . . the right to be reasonably 
protected from the accused throughout the criminal justice process”); VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A(1) 
(“[t]he right to protection from further harm or reprisal through the imposition of appropriate bail 
and conditions of release”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“state shall ensure that crime victims have . . . 
reasonable protection from the accused throughout the criminal justice process”). 
 46. State ex rel. Hilbig v. McDonald, 839 S.W.2d 854, 855–56 (Tex. App. 1992). 
 47. People v. Nestrock, 735 N.E.2d 1101, 1109 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000), appeal denied, 742 
N.E.2d 332 (Ill. 2000). 
 48. State ex rel. Dean v. City of Tucson, 844 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). 
 49. A.H. ex rel. Weiss v. Superior Court, 911 P.2d 633, 636 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). 
 50. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b). 
 51. Hall v. State, 579 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). A victim’s ability to sit at 
the counsel table can be achieved in most jurisdictions by demonstrating that the victim will be of 
assistance to the prosecution. Beloof & Cassell, supra note 11. The victims’ presence at the counsel 
table allows the victim and the prosecution to confer, which may add an important aspect to the 
truth-finding process. See FED. R. EVID. 615. The old rule that a victim’s presence had to be 
“essential” is rendered obsolete in those jurisdictions where the victim has the right to attend trial. 
Essentiality should no longer be necessary because the victim will attend anyway. A certification by 
the prosecutor that the victim’s presence at the counsel table would be of assistance should now be 
sufficient. 
 52. Dix v. Superior Court, 807 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Cal. 1991). 
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restitution precludes abatement of a restitution order based on a criminal 
judgment. A Michigan constitutional amendment provides that “[c]rime 
victims . . . shall have . . . [t]he right to restitution.”53 The Michigan 
Supreme Court held that rules of abatement, which once voided 
defendants’ conviction and judgment upon death if death occurs before 
appeals are exhausted, were now modified by the victims’ constitutional 
rights.54 In an Arizona case, it was held proper to balance a victim’s right 
to a speedy trial with the defendant’s due process right to prepare for 
trial. The result was denial of a defense continuance when the defendant 
had fired his lawyer and desired to represent himself.55 As reviewed 
above, courts have coupled specific rights with broad rights and 
determined that these rights are powerful enough to alter procedural 
choices in favor of the victim.56
Specifically, victims’ constitutional rights are superior to and, where 
a conflict exists, trump statutes57 or court rules.58 For example, under the 
Arizona Constitution, “‘[v]ictim’ means a person against whom the 
criminal offense has been committed.”59 In State v. Roscoe, the Arizona 
Supreme Court held that an enabling statute narrowly defining the term 
“crime victim” to exclude police officers was unconstitutional because it 
conflicted with the broader meaning of “victim” set forth in the Victims’ 
Bill of Rights.60
When victims are exercising either their broad or specific rights, they 
are no longer merely witnesses or third parties in the criminal process. 
Rather, victims are “participants” in the criminal process. Being a 
participant means the “crime victim [has] rights of intermittent 
participation in the criminal [trial] process.”61 Victims are participants 
because they possess independent rights to participate at certain stages of 
the criminal process. For example, victims have an independent right to 
give impact statements at sentencing, typically including the right to give 
 53. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1). For an opinion that says a victim’s rights do not change 
abatement rules, see People v. Robinson, 719 N.E.2d 662, 663 (Ill. 1999). 
 54. People v. Peters, 537 N.W.2d 160, 164 (Mich. 1995). 
 55. State v. Lamar, 72 P.3d 831, 836–37 (Ariz. 2003); see also United States v. Broussard, 
767 F. Supp. 1536 (D. Or. 1991) (balancing defendant’s need for time to prepare for trial with 
statutory mandate to give docket priority to cases with child/victim witnesses). 
 56. See supra notes 19–55 and accompanying text. 
 57. See State v. Roscoe, 912 P.2d 1297, 1299–1302 (Ariz. 1996). 
 58. State v. O’Neil, 836 P.2d 393 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). 
 59. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(C).
 60. 912 P.2d at 1302. 
 61. Beloof, supra note 39, at 286. 
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a sentencing recommendation.62 Victims may address the court at 
sentencing regardless of whether they are called as witnesses by either 
party and despite the objection of either party.63 Thus, victims at 
sentencing are not witnesses called by parties to give victim impact 
testimony, but rather are independent participants at sentencing hearings 
with a right to present impact information and sentencing 
recommendations.64
Although victims are participants when exercising their rights in trial 
level courts, they are not full parties to felony criminal cases. For 
example, victims do not have the right to independently prosecute felony 
criminal trials,65 and their role at trial is generally limited to that of 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Defendants’ due process rights prevent the victim from being a private prosecutor in 
felony cases. See East v. Scott, 55 F.3d 996, 1001 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that if a private 
prosecutor in a felony case controlled the criminal prosecution, defendants’ due process rights would 
be violated); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 662–64 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Forsythe v. Walters, 
No. 00-3352, 2002 WL 1283400, at *2 (3d Cir. May 3, 2002) (finding that a victim impact statement 
did not violate ex post facto laws because the victim’s right to speak is not a right to punishment); 
Hall v. State, 579 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a victim’s right to be 
present at trial is not a right to actively participate in trial); Curry v. Commonwealth, No. 2001-SC-
0530-MR, 2003 WL 1193799 (Ky. Jan. 23, 2003) (determining that because the right to consult with 
the prosecutor is not a duty to obey, the exercise of such right does not violate any constitutional 
right of the defendant); State v. Adkins, 97-0219 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/29/97) (holding that a similar 
statute did not give right to determine who was in charge of the investigation or prosecution); State 
v. Harrison, 24 P.3d 936, 945 (Utah 2001) (limiting victims’ attorney participation to the limits of 
permissible victim participation in a guardian ad litem situation). 
The East and Person cases also held that a privately funded prosecutor could constitutionally 
assist in the prosecution as long as control of the prosecution remained with the public prosecutor. 
East, 55 F.3d at 1001; Person, 854 F.2d at 662–64. This is the law in most jurisdictions. See Robert 
M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecution of Crime in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 39 AM. 
J. LEG. HIST. 43, 49 (1995). Misdemeanor prosecutions are not subject to the due process limit. See, 
e.g., Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 867–68 (R.I. 2001). Professor George Fletcher 
has suggested a different kind of victim participation—that the victim should be able to pose 
questions to witnesses through the judge. See FLETCHER, supra note 16. 
Victims also do not control decisions traditionally made by courts. In State v. Barnett, 980 
S.W.2d 297, 308 (Mo. 1998), the Missouri Supreme Court held that victims’ “right to be heard” did 
not give the victims control over the judge’s sentencing decision. In Barnett, the defendant was 
sentenced to death against the victims’ wishes. The court opined that the requirements of the crime 
victims’ amendment were “fully satisfied by affording victims the opportunity for input at 
sentencing.” Id. The Missouri Supreme Court also held that the specific language in the Missouri 
Constitution granting a victim the right to speak at sentencing did not give the victim control over 
the disposition of a case. State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171, 179 (Mo. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 
1112 (1999). A South Carolina court held that a victim’s right to be informed of and discuss a plea 
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observer and witness.66 Victims do not need to be full parties or third 
parties, however, to exercise their participatory rights in trial courts. As a 
practical matter, independent participant status is limited to expressly 
legislated participation (with the exception of common law 
accommodations). Full parties, on the other hand, participate in the entire 
criminal process. Third parties, like nonvictim witnesses, are not victim 
participants. For purposes of determining victims’ procedural status, 
victims are full parties for purposes of defending their rights, even 
though they are only participants in the criminal process when exercising 
their rights. Thus, victims defending against a rights violation in trial or 
appellate courts are full parties to the rights litigation, while victims 
exercising rights in trial court are participants in the criminal process. 
The personal nature of victims’ rights is revealed by the plain 
language of the various constitutional provisions, as well as relevant 
court opinions. The titles of the constitutional sections clearly delineate 
the rights as “Victims’ Rights” or “Rights of Crime Victims.”67 The texts 
of the amendments also make apparent that the rights are personal to the 
bargain with the prosecutor did not give the victim a right to veto the plea bargain. Reed v. Becka, 
511 S.E.2d 396, 400 (S.C. App. 1999). 
 66. Victims in many jurisdictions have a right to attend the trial and other public criminal 
proceedings. See supra note 38. Additionally, victims may sit at the counsel table to assist the 
prosecution, either as a matter of right, see Crowe v. State, 485 So. 2d 351, 363 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1984), rev’d on other grounds, Ex parte Crowe, 485 So. 2d 373 (Ala. 1985), or upon a showing by 
the prosecutor that the victim will be of material assistance, see FED. R. EVID. 615. 
 67. ALA. CONST. amend. 557 (“Basic Rights for Crime Victims”); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 
24 (“Rights of Crime Victims”); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (“Victims’ Bill of Rights”); CAL. CONST. 
art. I, § 28 (“Legislative findings and declaration; rights of victims; restitution; safe schools; truth-in-
evidence; bail; prior convictions”); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a (“Rights of crime victims”); CONN. 
CONST. art. I, § 8(b) (“Rights of victims of crime”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (“Rights of accused 
and victims”); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (“Rights of crime victims”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1 
(“Crime Victim’s Rights”); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15 (“Victims’ rights”); LA. CONST. ART. I, § 25 
(“Rights of a Victim”); MD. CONST. art. 47 (“Crime Victims’ Rights”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24 
(“Rights of crime victims; enforcement; assessment against convicted defendants”); MISS. CONST. 
art. III, § 26A (“Victims’ rights; construction of provisions; legislative authority”); MO. CONST. art. 
I, § 32 (“Crime victims’ rights”); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28 (“Crime victims; rights enumerated; 
effect; Legislature; duties”); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8(2) (“rights of victims of crime”); N.J. CONST. 
art. I, §22 (“Rights of victims of crimes”); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24 (“Rights of crime victims”); 
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37 (“Rights of victims of crime”); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a (“Rights of 
victims of crimes”); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34 (“Rights of victims”); OR. CONST. art. I, § 42 
(“Rights of victim in criminal prosecutions, juvenile court, and delinquency proceedings”); R.I. 
CONST. art. I, § 23 (“Rights of victims of crime”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24 (“Victims’ Bill of 
Rights”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“Rights of victims of crimes”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30 
(“Rights of crime victims”); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28 (“Declaration of the rights of crime victims”); 
VA. CONST. art. I, § 8A (“Rights of victims of crime”); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“Victims of 
Crimes—Rights”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“Victims of crime”). 
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victim by expressly stating that “victims have the right to” or “victims 
have the following rights,” or similar language.68 Moreover, the rights 
are lodged in states’ bills of rights, revealing that the rights are individual 
rights against government. 
State court opinions confirm that victims’ rights are personal to the 
victim, and that only the victims may waive their own rights. For 
example, an Arizona appellate court held that a victim’s failure to assert 
a right to restitution within a reasonable time constituted a waiver.69 On 
the other hand, victims’ rights are not susceptible to waiver by the 
prosecutor.70 The state has no authority to waive victims’ right to 
restitution,71 and, additionally, prosecutors cannot waive victims’ right to 
make a separate sentencing recommendation.72 Thus, a victim did not 
waive the right to restitution when the probation officer failed in his 
statutory duty to contact the victim about monetary loss.73
Victims’ rights are protected against waiver by the state even when 
the state has authority to enforce the rights. Most victims cannot readily 
afford counsel, do not have a right to appointed counsel, or may not be 
able to be present at every proceeding. As a result, some jurisdictions 
allow prosecutors to enforce victims’ rights. But even when the state may 
enforce victims’ rights, the state has no authority to waive victims’ 
rights. In an action that consolidated three Arizona cases,74 the 
defendants sought to interview the victim. In two of the cases, the 
prosecutor’s paralegal made representations that an interview of the 
victim would occur.75 In the third case, the victim appeared at the motion 
to compel hearing and invoked her right not to be interviewed.76 In all 
three cases, the trial court ordered the victim interview.77 The appellate 
 68. See supra notes 19–23, 38, 41–45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rights 
guaranteed by state constitutions. 
 69. In re Alton D., 994 P.2d 402, 406 (Ariz. 2000). 
 70. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, No. C1-02-1957, 2003 WL 21694412, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Jul. 22, 2003) (holding that rights are personal to the victim, the prosecutor cannot waive rights on 
behalf of the victim, and the victim has no obligation to remain silent if the state has agreed to 
remain silent pursuant to plea agreement). 
 71. People v. Valdez, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4, 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); accord People v. Licon, No. 
F037140, 2002 WL 1767570, at *2 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 72. Robinson, 2003 WL 21694412, at *3. 
 73. State v. Contreras, 885 P.2d 138, 142 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). 
 74. State v. Warner, 812 P.2d 1079, 1081–82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). 
 75. Id. at 1081. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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court overturned the orders, holding that the state did not have authority 
to waive victims’ rights and the defendants did not have a right to rely on 
the paralegal’s representations as to the effect of the amendment on the 
cases.78 The personally held nature of victims’ rights is further evidenced 
by the exclusion of defendants from the benefits of victims’ rights 
amendments.79
In sum, the plain language and location of victims’ constitutional 
rights amendments establish that victims’ rights are personal to the 
victim. Furthermore, court opinions holding that victims can exercise or 
waive victims’ rights and that the state or nonvictims cannot waive such 
rights confirm that the rights are personal to the victim. Victims’ rights 
consist of broad rights to fairness, dignity, privacy, freedom from abuse, 
due process, and reasonable protection. Specific rights include rights of 
participation, privacy, and protection. Victims exercising their rights are 
participants in the criminal process, and victims enforcing rights 
violations are full parties to the rights enforcement action. 
II. HOW VICTIMS ARE DENIED STANDING 
This Part is divided into four sections. Section A undertakes an 
examination of how real rights require standing, adequate remedy, and 
review. It recognizes the fundamental constitutional principle that rights 
have remedies and uses the example of criminal defendants’ 
constitutional rights to demonstrate how real rights might work. 
Section B explores the problem that judicial discretion poses to 
victims’ rights, noting that, as a general matter, discretionary rights are 
unenforceable. It addresses three distinct discretion problems: (1) 
discretion that exists when rights are not mandatory or are not enabled, 
(2) discretionary language accompanying particular victims’ rights, and 
(3) judicial discretion in the interpretation of broad victims’ rights. 
Section C reveals that inferior remedies for victims’ rights violations, 
including monetary damages, injunctions, and administrative regulation, 
 78. Id. 
 79. Defendants typically cannot avail themselves of victims’ rights violations. See, e.g., N.C. 
CONST. art. I, § 37(3) (“No ground for relief in criminal case. The failure or inability of any person 
to provide a right or service provided under this section may not be used by a defendant in a criminal 
case, an inmate, or any other accused as a ground for relief in any trial, appeal, postconviction 
litigation, habeas corpus, civil action, or any similar criminal or civil proceeding.”); Herrera v. State, 
24 S.W.3d 844, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (holding that defendant charged with assaulting his wife 
did not have standing to assert victims’ rights of his wife or give his wife standing to participate as a 
party in the criminal prosecution). 
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are insufficient to enforce victims’ rights. To adequately vindicate 
victims’ rights, the superior remedies of voiding and reconsideration are 
necessary. These remedies actually allow victims to exercise their 
constitutional rights. This section also argues that the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy will not normally preclude a judge 
from voiding a criminal conviction for a violation of a victim’s rights.  
Finally, Section D reviews problems arising in appellate review, 
including the double bind of ripeness and mootness that hamper victims’ 
rights enforcement. It also addresses express limits imposed on review in 
victims’ constitutional provisions. 
A. Real Rights Require Standing, Adequate Remedy, and Review 
As John Marshall famously declared over 200 years ago, “The 
government of the United States has been emphatically termed a 
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve 
this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a 
vested legal right.”80 Some victims’ rights provisions deny remedy. 
Where remedy may exist, some courts have refused to follow Marshall’s 
advice and have denied victims the ability to vindicate their rights. A 
comparison of victims’ rights with criminal defendants’ rights—criminal 
defendants being the only other individuals with constitutional rights in 
the criminal process—will illustrate how this denial of victims’ rights is 
contrary to the American tradition described by Marshall.  
Crime victims’ state constitutional rights provisions equate victims’ 
and defendants’ rights in various ways. For example, victims’ rights to 
attend proceedings are often linked to those proceedings a defendant also 
has the right to attend.81 Victims’ rights, like defendants’ rights, can be 
 
 80. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 81. ALASKA CONST. art I, § 24 (victims are “allowed to be present at all . . . proceedings 
where the accused has a right to be present”); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(3) (victim has the right 
“[t]o be present at . . . all criminal proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present”); 
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8 (victim has “the right to attend the trial and all other court proceedings the 
accused has the right to attend”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(8) (victim has the right “to be present at 
trial and all other proceedings on the same basis as the accused”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1) 
(victim has the right “to attend trial and all other court proceedings the accused has the right to 
attend”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32 (victim has the right “to be present at all criminal justice 
proceedings at which the defendant has such right”); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24 (victim may “attend 
all public court proceedings the accused has the right to attend”); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37(1)(a) 
(victim has the right to “be present at court proceedings of the accused”); OR. CONST. art. I, § 
42(1)(a) (victim has the right “to be present at . . . any critical stage of the proceedings held in open 
court when the defendant will be present”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A)(3) (victim has the right to be 
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found in state bills of rights. Moreover, only the courts can ultimately 
vindicate the constitutional rights of both defendants and victims.  
Criminal defendants have real constitutional rights as well as 
standing and remedy to defend against violations of those rights. When a 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self- incrimination is 
violated, the defendant has standing to appeal from the final judgment. 
Thus, in Miranda v. Arizona,82 the failure to adequately inform the 
defendant of his constitutional right to remain silent was the legitimate 
basis for appeal. Moreover, upon finding a violation had occurred, the 
Supreme Court did not hesitate to remedy it. The Court voided the 
judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for proceedings 
conforming to the defendant’s constitutional rights. Similarly, when a 
defendant’s right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment is violated, the 
defendant has the right to appeal and seek a remedy. For example, in 
Katz v. United States,83 the defendant had standing to appeal a violation 
of his Fourth Amendment right to privacy when the government tapped 
and recorded his conversation in a public telephone booth. The Court 
remedied the violation by voiding the judgment. Likewise, when a 
defendant is denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, he has 
standing to enforce the right. Thus, in Gideon v. Wainwright,84 the 
defendant had standing to enforce his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
The Court voided the conviction and sentence. 
Defendants’ due process rights are also inseparable from defendants’ 
standing to obtain review of rights violations. If the right is violated, 
remedy is available. For example, defendants have standing to appeal a 
sentence and have the sentence voided when they are denied the 
opportunity to speak at sentencing. In Green v. United States, the 
Supreme Court held that criminal defendants must be given an 
opportunity to speak at sentencing.85 A trial court’s “failure to ask the 
defendant if he had anything to say before sentence” is imposed requires 
reversal.86
“present at any criminal proceedings which are dispositive of the charges where a defendant has the 
right to be present”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35(3) (victim has the right “to be present at all 
proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present”); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 (victim has 
the right “to . . . attend trial and all other court proceedings the defendant has the right to attend”). 
 82. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 83. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 84. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 85. 365 U.S. 301 (1961). 
 86. Id. 
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Defendants’ rights are accompanied by standing and usually 
characterized by an absence of government discretion to comply with the 
right. Adequate remedies and appellate review mechanisms are typically 
available to enforce defendants’ rights violations. One would expect 
something similar for victims’ rights. In stark contrast, however, many 
crime victims’ rights are unaccompanied by standing, remedy, or 
nondiscretionary review. Such deficient constitutional provisions cannot 
credibly be identified as anything other than illusory rights. 
B. The Discretion Problem 
Government discretion typically curtails victim standing to enforce 
constitutional rights. Ultimately, a discretionary right is an illusory right: 
if government compliance is optional, victims do not have standing to 
enforce rights. When the government opts to deny the right, problems of 
discretion in victims’ rights can be reduced to three categories. First, 
there are the standing prerequisites of mandatory and enabled 
constitutional rights. A right that is not mandatory is called, 
interchangeably, an “advisory” or “directory” right. There is no standing, 
remedy, or review to enforce advisory rights. Second, certain particular 
victims’ “rights” are written in discretionary language. This second type 
of discretionary right can be further divided into: (1) those in which 
government discretion is broad and largely unfettered, and (2) those that 
provide a test that must be met before the government can choose not to 
enforce the right. When the government has broad discretion, the right is 
illusory because the government may lawfully choose not to honor the 
right. Additionally, discretionary rights that require the government to 
meet certain conditions before it can ignore the right are illusory if the 
victim does not have standing to challenge the trial court determination 
that the government has met its burden. These rights can also become 
illusory if standards of review are so lax that there is no meaningful 
appellate court oversight. Third, a distinct discretion issue arises when 
vague, broadly worded victims’ rights are interpreted in an unduly 
restrictive manner by courts in their otherwise proper role as final 
arbiters of constitutional meaning. 
1. Discretion: mandated and enabled rights 
Constitutional rights must be mandatory before the victim has 
standing in appellate court. Mandatory rights are rights the state is 
without discretion to disregard. The mandatory nature of a constitutional 
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right is typically made clear by use of the word “shall.”87 The vast 
majority of victims’ rights are, plainly, mandatory rights. The phrase 
“shall have the following rights,” or similar language, is present in the 
victims’ constitutional rights provisions of seventeen states.88 Other state 
constitutions have slightly different variations with the same effect. Five 
states provide that “victims have rights” (or that a victim “has a right”).89 
Four states provide that victims “are entitled to rights.”90 Two states 
“grant” victims’ rights.91 Maryland has mandatory language with 
conditions on notice of the rights. The Maryland constitution states that 
victims “shall have the right to be informed . . . and if practicable, to be 
notified of [listing rights].”92 Furthermore, the mandatory nature of 
constitutional rights is also established by placement in states’ bills of 
rights.93 Victims’ state constitutional rights are likely to be mandatory 
 87. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 97 (1998) (collecting state cases). 
 88. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“[s]hall have the following rights”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 
28(b) (“shall have the right”); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a (“shall have the right”); CONN. CONST. 
art. I, § 8b (“shall have the following rights”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a) (“[c]rime victims . . . shall 
have the following rights”); IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b) (“[v]ictims of Crime . . . shall have the 
right”); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15 (“[v]ictims of crime . . . shall be entitled to certain basic rights”); 
LA. CONST. art. I, § 25 (“shall be treated with . . . shall be informed of the rights . . . shall have the 
right”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1) (“[c]rime victims . . . shall have the following rights”); MISS. 
CONST. art. III, § 26A(1) (“[v]ictims of crime . . . shall have the right”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32(1) 
(“Crime Victims . . . shall have the following rights”); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28(1) (“[a] victim of 
crime . . . shall have”); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8(2) (“[t]he legislature shall provide by law for the 
rights of victims of crime”); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24 (“[a] victim of [listing specific crimes] shall 
have the following rights”); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a (“shall be accorded rights”); R.I. CONST. art. I, 
§ 23 (“[a] Victim of crime, as a matter of right . . . shall be entitled to receive . . . shall have the 
right”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“[t]his state shall treat crime victims . . . [t]his state shall ensure 
that crime victims have all of the following privileges and protections”). 
 89. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (“a victim of crime has a right”); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 
(“[a] crime victim . . . has the following rights”); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34(A) (“The victim . . . has 
the right to”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24 (“victims of crime have the right to”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30 
(“a crime victim has the following rights”); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(1) (“victims of crime have 
these rights”). 
 90. ALA. CONST. amend. 557 (“[c]rime victims . . . are entitled to the right to”); FLA. CONST. 
art. I, § 16(b) (“are entitled to the right to”); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37 (“[v]ictims of crime . . . shall be 
entitled to the following basic rights”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“victims shall be entitled to the 
following basic rights”). 
 91. OR. CONST. art. I, § 42(1) (“The following rights are hereby granted to victims . . . .”); WASH. 
CONST. art. I, § 35 (“[V]ictims of crime are hereby granted the following basic and fundamental 
rights . . . .”). 
 92. MD. CONST. (Declaration of Rights) art. 47(b). 
 93. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 98 (1998) (collecting state cases). 
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because they are, in fact, present in the respective bill of rights of many 
states.94
Like other individual constitutional rights, most state constitutional 
rights of victims are silent about available review and remedies. The 
absence of specific remedies in a constitutional provision “is not 
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing.”95 
The idea that “where there is a right there is a remed[y] . . . is as old as 
the law itself . . . and ‘would tend to tip the balance in favor of 
vindicating constitutional rights.’”96 It is usual for express rights 
provisions to be silent about available remedies and to still be enforced 
as mandatory rights by the courts. For example, the rights in the United 
States Constitution’s Bill of Rights typically have no express remedies. 
The absence of such express remedies has not prevented the Court from 
exercising its constitutional responsibility to grant standing and fashion 
remedies for rights violations.97 Thus, silence about remedy should not 
lead to the conclusion that rights are not mandatory. Instead, the well-
established convention of courts is to provide judicially created remedies 
for constitutional violations. 
While the absence of remedial provisions is not a substantial 
indicium that rights are not mandatory, the presence of express review or 
standing provisions is strong evidence of mandatory rights. In rights 
provisions with express review and standing provisions, victims’ rights 
are all but certainly mandatory rights. 
Legislative history can also certainly inform whether rights are 
mandatory or self-enabling. As a general matter, courts refer to 
legislative history to interpret rights only when plain meaning is not 
discernable from the text of the Amendment.98 Most amendments are 
self-enabled by their plain language. 
On the other hand, laws that by their plain language are advisory are 
unenforceable. The term “victims’ rights” is often generically used to 
 94. The sole exception is Alabama. Alabama appears to have a unique way of sequentially 
numbering constitutional amendments. It is nevertheless plainly intended to provide individual rights 
to crime victims. Indeed, in many states, victims’ rights and criminal defendants’ rights are placed in 
the same section of the state constitution but listed as separate subsections. See ALA. CONST. amend. 
557. 
 95. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 104 (1998) (collecting state cases). 
 96. Id. (quoting Valenti v. Mitchell, 790 F. Supp. 555, 557 (E.D. Pa. 1992)). 
 97. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. 
 98. See, e.g., State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756, 760 (Utah 2002) (“We need not inquire beyond the 
plain meaning of the amendment unless we find it ambiguous.”). 
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describe all laws that accommodate victim participation, privacy, and 
protection in the criminal process. A good example of advisory rights, 
albeit statutory rather than constitutional, is found in the former federal 
victims’ rights statute.99 Under the former federal statute, executive 
branch agencies and officers “engaged in the detection, investigation or 
prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that crime 
victims are given [their] rights.”100
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals explored the limits that the “best 
effort” language impose on victim standing in an appeal and petition for 
mandamus brought by victims in the Oklahoma City bombing 
prosecution of Timothy McVeigh. In United States v. McVeigh,101 
victims attempted to enforce the federal victims’ “right” to be “present at 
all public court proceedings related to the offense.”102 The district court 
judge denied the rights and ruled that the victims would be excluded 
from the trial.103 The crime victims filed both an appeal and a mandamus 
action.104 The mandamus sought to preserve an alternative method of 
review should the appeal be deemed procedurally improper.105 The 
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (2004), repealed by Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–405, 
§ 102, 118 Stat. 2260, 2264: 
(a) Best efforts to accord rights 
Officers and employees of the Department of Justice and other departments and 
agencies of the United States engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution 
of crime shall make their best efforts to see that victims of crime are accorded the 
rights described in subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) Rights of crime victims 
A crime victim has the following rights: (1) The right to be treated with fairness and 
with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy. (2) The right to be reasonably 
protected from the accused offender. (3) The right to be notified of court 
proceedings. (4) The right to be present at all public court proceedings related to the 
offense, unless the court determines that testimony by the victim would be 
materially affected if the victim heard other testimony at trial. (5) The right to 
confer with attorney for the Government in the case. (6) The right to restitution. (7) 
The right to information about the conviction, sentencing, imprisonment, and 
release of the offender. 
(c) No cause of action or defense 
This section does not create a cause of action or defense in favor of any person 
arising out of the failure to accord to a victim the rights enumerated in subsection 
(b) of this section. 
 100. Id. (emphasis added). 
 101.  106 F.3d 325 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 102. Id. at 334 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(4)). 
 103. Id. at 328. 
 104. Id. at 328–29. 
 105. Id. 
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Tenth Circuit quickly determined that the rights were unenforceable by 
appeal or mandamus because the “statute charily pledges only the ‘best 
efforts’ of certain executive branch personnel to secure the rights 
listed.”106 Implicit in the court’s analysis is that courts cannot enforce 
these rights because they are advisory, rather than mandatory. The 
consequence of advisory victims’ rights is that victims do not have 
standing in appellate courts. Compared with concrete rights that are 
enforceable on review, federal statutory victims’ rights were illusory. 
Fortunately, no state constitutional victims’ rights provision contains 
such advisory language. Nevertheless, contrary to the plain meaning of 
their constitutions, two state courts have declared that plainly mandatory 
rights are, instead, advisory rights. In the Kansas case of State v. Holt,107 
the trial judge refused to delay a judicial probation hearing of a 
misdemeanant to allow the victim to be heard.108 Under the Kansas 
Constitution, victims are entitled to “certain basic rights . . . including the 
right to be informed of and to be present at public hearings, as defined by 
law . . . and to be heard at sentencing.”109 Because victims’ rights under 
the Kansas Constitution apply only to public hearings, the case squarely 
presented the issue of whether a misdemeanor probation hearing is a 
“public hearing.” Ultimately, the Kansas Supreme Court held that 
“[t]here is nothing in our . . . law which requires a public hearing” in 
misdemeanor probation hearings.110  
Under Kansas’ precedent, constitutional questions are only addressed 
when unavoidable.111 In Holt, the constitution was not implicated 
because the hearing was not a “public hearing” and victims have no 
rights at nonpublic hearings. There was no legitimate reason for the court 
 106. Id. at 335. 
 107. 874 P.2d 1183 (Kan. 1994). 
 108. Id. at 1184. 
 109. Id. at 1185 (citing KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15). 
 110. Id. at 1187. 
 111. The Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Childs, 64 P.3d 389 (Kan. 2003), an opinion 
authored after Holt, but citing to pre-Holt precedent, stated that 
it is a familiar rule that courts will not decide a constitutional question if there is some 
other ground upon which to decide or dispose of the case . . . . Only in cases where it is 
virtually impossible to decide the issue on the merits without considering the 
constitutionality will this court entertain the question of constitutionality . . . . We should 
address constitutional questions raised for the first time in this court only when ‘[w]e 
cannot intelligently dispose of this litigation without considering and discussing’ those 
constitutional questions. 
Id. at 392 (quoting McKay v. Rich, 874 P.2d 641, 641 (Kan. 1994) (quoting Van Sickle v. Shanahan, 
511 P.2d 223, 225 (Kan. 1973) (quoting State v. Nelson, 502 P.2d 841, 845 (Kan. 1972)))). 
1BEL-FIN 8/9/2005 2:18:25 PM 
255] The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights 
 281 
 
to extend itself to address other constitutional issues because the 
constitution was not implicated. 
Nevertheless, the Holt court went out of its way to render illusory 
what are transparently mandatory state constitutional victims’ rights. In 
dicta, the court declared the entire victims’ rights amendment to be 
advisory.112 In Kansas, victims’ rights are set forth in mandatory 
language. The Kansas Constitution provides that “[v]ictims of crime . . . 
shall be entitled to certain basic rights.”113 As discussed above, 
conventional interpretation is that mandated language means mandatory 
rights. Furthermore, the conventional interpretation of rights in bills of 
rights is that they are mandatory, and victims’ rights are placed within 
the Kansas Bill of Rights.  
There are other persuasive reasons why Kansas’ constitutional rights 
are mandatory. The constitutional provision takes pains to assert that in 
the case of conflict between victims’ rights and defendants’ rights, 
defendants’ rights prevail.114 Absolutely no reason exists to include this 
language if it was not the clear intent that these were mandatory rights. 
The constitutional provision also states that the legislature “may” provide 
for other remedies.115 This enforcement provision does not strip the 
rights of their mandatory nature, but rather allows the legislature, as well 
as the courts, to establish remedies for adequate enforcement. What is 
more informing about this language is that the Kansas amendment 
clearly anticipates rights enforcement. Such enforcement is not possible 
in an advisory rights scheme. 
Additional evidence that these rights are mandatory is found in 
language limiting the civil liability of the state if rights are violated. The 
Kansas victims’ rights provision reads: “Nothing in this section shall be 
construed as creating a cause of action for money damages against the 
state, a county, a municipality, or any of the agencies, instrumentalities, 
or employees thereof.”116 Clearly this provision is to limit state judicial 
 112. 874 P.2d at 1186 (“Although Art. 15, § 15 was adopted by the voters in 1992, it appears 
that the constitutional provision does not provide any greater rights than those already granted by 
statute. . . . Although K.S.A. 74-7333(a) states that ‘victims of crime shall have the following rights,’ 
there is nothing in the statute that actually creates any mandatory rights for crime victims, and the 
provisions are merely directive or permissive.”). 
 113. KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15(a) (emphasis added). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. § 15(b). 
 116. Id. 
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creation of Bivens.117 type actions—torts derived from violations of 
mandatory constitutional rights. It would be pointless to limit Bivens 
actions for advisory rights, as no mere advisory right could be the basis 
of such a suit.118 This is because the government cannot be held liable 
for acting within lawful discretion that exists when rights are advisory. 
Moreover, other remedies are expressly precluded in the victims’ rights 
provision of the Kansas Constitution. For example, the constitution 
prohibits reversal of a guilty finding as a remedy to comply with victims’ 
rights.119 Such a restriction is completely unnecessary unless remedial 
enforcement of mandatory rights was contemplated. 
Furthermore, the Holt court implies that because the constitution and 
the statute share the same language, there is no legally significant 
distinction between the two: “Although [the victims’ rights constitutional 
amendment] was adopted by the voters in 1992, it appears that the 
constitutional provision does not provide any greater rights than those 
already granted by statute.”120 To imply that a constitutional right is the 
equivalent of a statute is a fundamental constitutional error. 
Constitutional, rather than statutory, conventions become determinative 
of whether the right is mandatory and enabled because “[t]he rules 
distinguishing mandatory and directory statutes are of little value and are 
rarely applied in ruling upon the provisions of a constitution.”121 Only by 
defying important constitutional canons and ignoring a handful of others 
could the Kansas Supreme Court reach its ill-conceived result—that 
victims’ rights are not mandatory. The unprincipled result in Holt strips 
Kansas victims of standing despite the overwhelming weight of 
constitutional canons to the contrary. 
In California, intermediate appellate courts are split as to the 
mandatory or advisory nature of victims’ state constitutional rights. In 
People v. Superior Court (Thompson), the victim was assaulted.122 A 
California appellate court ruled that victims’ rights to notice of and to 
speak at sentencing under the California Constitution and statutes were 
merely advisory.123 This ruling was made with little analysis, other than 
 117. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395–
96 (1971). 
 118. Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 586–87 (R.I. 1998). 
 119. KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15(c). 
 120. State v. Holt, 874 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Kan. 1994). 
 121. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 95 (2003) (collecting state cases). 
 122. 202 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 123. Id. at 586–87. 
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the observation that neither the constitution nor the statute provided 
express remedy or implementing procedures.124
Under the same constitution and statute, however, another California 
intermediate appellate court reached the opposite result. In Melissa J. v. 
Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting a 
small child.125 His probation included a restitution order that he pay a 
monthly amount for the victim’s therapy.126 Later, the defendant moved 
to terminate the restitution requirement, and the court obliged without 
notifying the victim or providing an opportunity to object.127 The 
appellate court allowed a petition for mandamus and issued a writ 
vacating the order terminating restitution.128 The writ was based on a 
holding that the requirement for notice and an opportunity to be heard 
was a mandatory constitutional and statutory right.129
The Thompson and Melissa J. rulings are in conflict. While the 
Melissa J. court attempted to distinguish Thompson,130 the fact that 
Melissa J. involved the vacating of an originally imposed restitution 
order without notice to the victim, and the Thompson court involved 
failure to notify the victim of sentencing, is of little import given the 
same mandatory language of the law framing both cases.131 The 
California Supreme Court has yet to resolve the conflict between 
Thompson and Melissa J, thus leaving unresolved the ultimate 
 124. Id. at 586. 
 125. 237 Cal. Rptr. 5, 5–6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). 
 126. Id. at 6. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. The court noted that in the future, the victim would have to return to the trial court and 
ask for the order to be voided there before bringing a mandamus action. Id. 
 129. Id. at 6–7. 
 130. Id. 
 131. The California Penal Code provides: 
The victim of any crime, or the parents or guardians of the victim if the victim is a minor, 
or the next of kin of the victim if the victim has died, have the right to attend all 
sentencing proceedings under this chapter and shall be given adequate notice by the 
probation officer of all sentencing proceedings concerning the person who committed the 
crime. The victim, or up to two of the victim’s parents or guardians if the victim is a 
minor, or the next of kin of the victim if the victim has died, have the right to appear, 
personally or by counsel, at the sentencing proceeding and to reasonably express his, her, 
or their views concerning the crime, the person responsible, and the need for restitution. 
The court in imposing sentence shall consider the statements of victims, parents or 
guardians, and next of kin made pursuant to this section and shall state on the record its 
conclusion concerning whether the person would pose a threat to public safety if granted 
probation. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (West 2004). 
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determination of whether the rights are mandatory or advisory.132 In the 
meanwhile, the Thompson court opinion remains as precedent that is 
destructive to real victims’ rights. 
There is no bigger judicially created problem for victims’ 
constitutional rights than a holding that the rights are “advisory.” The 
tragedy of such radical judicial opinions is that they render victims’ 
rights permanently impotent. Victims cannot enforce advisory rights. 
Advisory constitutional rights are illusory and cannot be resurrected by 
legislative action into real rights.133
Before a participant can have standing on review, the mandatory 
right must also be enabled. Constitutional rights that are not enabled do 
not have the force of law.134 Enabled rights are either self-enabling (also 
called self-executing) or legislatively enabled by statute.135 It is possible 
for a rights scheme to be partly self-enabling and partly left to the 
legislature to enable.136
Conventional constitutional analysis reveals that victims’ state 
constitutional rights are self-enabled. Modern state constitutions “have 
been generally drafted upon the principle that all provisions of a 
constitution are self-enabling.”137 Because all victims’ state 
constitutional rights amendments are “modern,”138 the presumption is 
that they are self-enabling. Presumably, the legislatures of these states 
would have had to limit self-enabling in the language of the victims’ 
rights provision to avoid enabling. Furthermore, state constitutional 
victims’ rights are placed within bills of rights.139 Individual rights 
 132. See Dix v. Superior Court, 807 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Cal. 1991) (determining that no victims’ 
rights were actually violated in the case, noting that there were conflicting lower court opinions in 
California, neither foreclosing nor endorsing the possibility that standing may be present for 
violations of victims’ rights). 
 133. To achieve mandatory rights, an entirely new constitutional amendment must be enacted. 
However, in these jurisdictions legislatures can create a separate set of statutory rights accompanied 
by standing, even when appellate courts have eviscerated the mandatory nature of constitutional 
rights. 
 134. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 98 (2004) (collecting state cases). Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines enabled as “conferring new powers.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (7th ed. 
1999). 
 135. Id. 
 136. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 108 (2004). 
 137. Id. § 100 (citing to relevant cases). 
 138. California passed the first victims’ state constitutional amendment in 1982. See CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 28. 
 139. The exception to this is Alabama, which has a peculiar way of incorporating 
Amendments by sequential number. However the title of the Alabama Amendment is “Basic Rights 
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provisions in bills of rights are generally self-enabling.140 Most victims’ 
rights amendments do not provide for specific remedies, but, as noted 
earlier, this is not determinative. 
As a general proposition, the more a constitutional provision 
describes how it is to operate, the more likely it is to be self-enabling.141 
However, individual rights placed in bills of rights are an exception to 
the general rule that a less descriptive provision is less likely to be self-
enabling.142 Civil rights are usually written in general terms and are 
for Crime Victims,” which indicates that victims’ rights are basic individual rights found in bills of 
rights. Specific victim rights sections appear in the following articles of their respective state 
constitutions: ALASKA CONST. art. I (“Declaration of Rights”); ARIZ. CONST. art. II (“Declaration of 
Rights”); COLO. CONST. art. II (“Bill of Rights”); CAL. CONST. art. I (“Declaration of Rights”); 
CONN. CONST. art. I (“Declaration of Rights”); FLA. CONST. art. I (“Declaration of Rights”); IDAHO 
CONST. art. I (“Declaration of Rights”); ILL. CONST. art. I (“Bill of Rights”); IND. CONST. art. I 
(“Bill of Rights”); KAN. CONST. art. XV (“Misc.” within the Kansas “Bill of Rights”); LA. CONST. 
art. I (“Declaration of Rights”); MD. CONST. art. 47 (appears within a “Declaration of Rights”); 
MICH. CONST. art. I (“Declaration of Rights”); MISS. CONST. art. III (“Bill of Rights”); MO. CONST. 
art. I (“Bill of Rights”); NEB. CONST. art. I (“Bill of Rights”); NEV. CONST. art. I (“Declaration of 
Rights”); OHIO CONST. art. I (“Bill of Rights”); N.J. CONST. art. 1 (“Rights and Privileges”); N.M. 
CONST. art. II (“Bill of Rights”); N.C. CONST. art. I (“Declaration of Rights”); OKLA. CONST. art. II 
(“Bill of Rights”); OR. CONST. art. I (“Bill of Rights”); R.I. CONST. art. I (“Declaration of Certain 
Rights and Principles”); S.C. CONST. art. I (“Declaration of Rights”); TENN. CONST. art. I 
(“Declaration of Rights”); TEX. CONST. art. I (“Bill of Rights”); UTAH CONST. art. I (“Declaration of 
Rights”); VA. CONST. art. I (“Bill of Rights”); WASH. CONST. (“Declaration of Rights”); WIS. 
CONST. art. I (“Declaration of Rights”). 
 140. In conventional constitutional analysis, rights placed in a Bill of Rights “are usually 
considered self-executing.” 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 98 (2003). See Medina v. People, 
387 P.2d 733, 736 (Colo. 1964) (“The Bill of Rights is self-executing; the rights therein recognized 
or established by the Constitution do not depend upon legislative action to become operative.”); 
State v. Christensen, 195 P.2d 592, 595 (Kan. 1948) (“the self-executing provisions of the bill of 
rights”); State v. Bachelder, 403 A.2d 758 (Mass. 1979) (“[P]rovisions of our constitutional Bill of 
Rights are self-executing and do not depend upon enabling legislation to be effective.”); Quinn v. 
Buchanan, 298 S.W.2d 413, 418 (Mo. 1957) (“This provision is a declaration of a fundamental right 
of individuals. It is self-executing to the extent that all provisions of the Bill of Rights are self-
executing.”); Ex parte Berman, 87 N.E. 2d 716, 720 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949) (“The provisions 
contained in the Bill of Rights . . . are self-executing and require no legislative or statutory authority 
to support or implement them.”); Coats v. State, 212 P.2d 141, 143 (Okla. Crim. App. 1949); Smith 
v. City of Philadelphia, 516 A.2d 306, 315 (Pa. 1986) (noting that a provision can “take effect 
without the aid of legislation, and being contained in the ‘bill of rights’ is by its very nature self-
executing”); Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 381 (Tex. App. 2001) (“[A]ny provision of the Bill 
of Rights is self-executing.”), rev’d on other grounds, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Robb v. Shockoe Slip 
Found., 324 S.E.2d 674, 676 (Va. 1985) (“A constitutional provision is self-executing when it 
expressly so declares . . . . Even without benefit of such a declaration, constitutional provisions in 
bills of rights . . . are usually considered self-executing.”).  
 141. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 102 (2004) (collecting state cases). 
 142. Id. § 104 (collecting state cases). 
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typically self-enabling.143 Analogously, as discussed in Part II.A, some 
criminal defendants’ rights are specific, others are general, but all are 
self-enabled. 
While victims’ rights are typically self-enabling, not all of them are. 
For instance, when the legislature is mandated by the word “shall” to 
enable the rights, the rights are not self-enabling.144 Similarly, if the 
legislature is given the exclusive authority to enact remedies, the rights 
are not self-enabling.145 For example, the Nebraska Constitution 
provides that “there shall be no remedies other than as specifically 
provided by the Legislature for the enforcement of the rights granted in 
this section.”146 Correctly, the Nebraska Supreme Court refused to 
remedy a violation of a victim’s constitutional rights when the legislature 
had not yet enacted remedies.147
Interestingly, only Idaho has a victims’ rights amendment that 
expressly states, within the victims’ constitutional rights provision, that it 
“shall be self-enacting.”148 However, in order for a constitutional 
amendment to be self-enabling it is not necessary that it contain enabling 
language. Indeed such language is rare. 
On the other hand, several state constitutions do not provide for any 
legislative involvement.149 In these states, absent other express 
limitations, mandatory rights provisions should be self-enabling because 
the legislature has not been given a role in enabling by the constitution. 
 143. For example, there is no case holding that any of the civil rights in the federal bill of 
rights require enabling legislation. 
 144. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b) (“The Legislature shall adopt provisions to implement this 
section during the calendar year following adoption of this section.”); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28(2) 
(“The Legislature shall provide by law for the implementation of the rights granted in this section.”); 
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(C) (“The provisions of this amendment shall not take effect until the 
legislature enacts laws to implement this amendment.”). 
 145. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8(b) (10) (“The General Assembly shall provide by law for 
enforcement of this subsection.”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 25 (“Remedies to enforce this Section shall be 
provided by law.”); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28(2) (“There shall be no remedies other than as 
specifically provided by the Legislature for the enforcement of the rights . . . .”); WIS. CONST. art. I, 
§ 9m (“The legislature shall provide remedies for the violation of this section.”). 
 146. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28. 
 147. State ex rel. Lamm v. Neb. Bd. of Pardons, 620 N.W.2d 763, 768 (Neb. 2001). 
 148. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22(10) (“This section shall be self-enacting. The legislature shall 
have the power to enact laws to define, implement, preserve, and expand the rights guaranteed to 
victims.”). 
 149. This does not, however, prevent these legislatures from promulgating procedures to 
facilitate the rights or legislatively expand rights beyond the constitutional floor. See FLA. CONST. 
art. I, § 16; OR. CONST. art. I, § 42; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; WASH. CONST. 
art. I, § 35. 
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However, most crime victims’ constitutional rights give the 
legislature certain kinds of authority concerning rights. These 
constitutions allow the legislature to facilitate the implementation of the 
amendment on a nonexclusive basis, leaving intact courts’ traditional 
authority concerning constitutional rights. This means all, or some, of 
victims’ rights are self-enabling. This shared enabling responsibility 
between courts and legislatures is achieved by permissive language that 
grants the legislature an option to exercise its enabling authority—that is, 
legislatures may enable core rights but cannot disable them.150 Typically, 
provisions contain language to the effect that the legislature “may” create 
legislation to facilitate the rights.151 The use of the word “may” is 
permissive and does not prevent a constitutional right from being self-
enabled.152 As a result, courts may enforce core provisions of the 
constitution, which do not require legislative action, because it is 
understood that they will be remedied by courts. 
The Alaska Court of Appeals addressed this issue correctly in 
Landon v. State when it held that victims’ constitutional right to attend 
trial was self-enabled.153 The amendment was self-enabled even though 
 150. State v. Roscoe, 912 P.2d 1297 (Ariz. 1996) (finding unconstitutional enabling legislation 
excluding peace officers from definition of victim unconstitutional because it was narrower than the 
constitutional definition of victim). 
 151. ALA. CONST. amend. 557(b) (“Nothing in this amendment . . . shall be construed as 
creating a cause of action against the state . . . .”); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(D) (“The legislature, or 
the people by initiative or referendum, have the authority to enact substantive and procedural laws to 
define, implement, preserve and protect [victims’ rights].”) ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(b) (“The general 
assembly may provide for enforcement of this section.); KAN. CONST. art. XV, sec. 15(b) (“The 
legislature may provide for other remedies to ensure adequate enforcement.”); MD. CONST. art. 47(b) 
(“as these rights are implemented and the terms ‘crime’, ‘criminal justice proceeding’ and ‘victim’ 
are specified by law”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(2) (“The legislature may provide by law for the 
enforcement of this section.”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32(1) (“Crime victims, as defined by law, have 
the following rights, as defined by law . . . .”); N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 22 (“A victim of crimes . . . shall 
be entitled to those . . . remedies as may be provided by the legislature”); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37 
(“as prescribed by law”); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34 (“The legislature, or the people by initiative or 
referendum, has the authority to enact substantive and procedural laws to define, implement, 
preserve and protect the rights . . . .”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(C)(3) (“The General Assembly has 
the authority to enact substantive and procedural laws to define, implement, preserve and protect the 
rights . . . .”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35h (“The General Assembly has the authority to enact laws to 
define, implement, preserve, and protect the rights guaranteed to victims . . . .”); UTAH CONST. art. I, 
§ 28 (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a cause of action for money damages . . . 
.”); VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A (“This section . . . does not . . . create a cause of action for money 
damages.”). 
 152. Landon v. State, No. A-6479, 1999 WL 46543, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1999) 
(holding that a core right is enabled without legislative action). 
 153. Id. 
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it called upon the legislature to define the term “crime victim” and even 
though victims “shall have the following rights as provided by law,”154 
including “the right . . . to be present at all criminal or juvenile 
proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present.”155 The 
Alaska Constitution has a clause separate from the victims’ rights 
provision that explicitly directs that provisions, if possible, should be 
construed as “self-executing.”156
In Landon, the convict challenged the decision of the trial court to 
comply with the plain meaning of the constitution by allowing the victim 
to attend trial because the legislature had not yet statutorily defined the 
term “crime victim.”157 The Alaska Court of Appeals rejected the 
convict’s argument, concluding that “it is possible—and thus 
constitutionally necessary—to construe the section as self-executing.”158 
The court noted that the constitution gives victims the “right to be 
present at criminal proceedings when the defendant has a right to be 
present.”159 The court acknowledged that the constitution “allows the 
legislature to define ‘crime victim’ by ‘law’—that is, by legislation . . . 
thus presumably authorizing the legislature to enact procedures to govern 
crime victims’ exercise of the listed rights—and perhaps to define the 
scope of those rights in particular situations.”160 Despite the absence of 
legislation defining “victim” the court opined that “there can be no 
reasonable dispute that A.B. qualified as the ‘victim’ of Landon’s crimes, 
and no reasonable dispute that Landon (and thus A.B.) had the right to be 
present.”161 Because a victim’s right to be present is a core right under 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. (quoting ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24). 
 156. ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 9 (“[P]rovisions of this constitution shall be construed to be 
self-executing.”). In a few other states, the language is worded somewhat differently, but to the same 
permissive effect. For example, in Oklahoma the “[l]egislature, or the people by initiative or 
referendum, has the authority to enact substantive and procedural laws to define, implement, 
preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims.” OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34(C). Such language 
should not prevent courts from finding that constitutional provisions are self-enabling because the 
language does not place all enabling authority exclusively in the legislature. 
 157. Landon, 1999 WL 46543, at *2. 
 158. Id.; accord State ex. rel. K.P, 709 A.2d 315, 321 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1997) (implicitly 
determining a core provision of the New Jersey Victims’ Rights Amendment did not require 
legislative enabling to be judicially enforceable). The New Jersey Constitution provides that “[a] 
victim of crime shall be entitled to those rights and remedies as may be provided by the legislature.” 
N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22. 
 159. Landon, 1999 WL 46543, at *2. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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the Alaska Constitution, the court concluded that the constitutional rights 
provided adequate legal authority for Judge Wanamaker’s decision to 
allow a victim to attend the trial “even though the legislature had not yet 
enacted the Victims’ Rights Act.”162
On the other hand, when the legislature has complete authority to 
define a relevant term that is essential to enabling, this may translate into 
legislative control over all aspects of the amendment, making the 
victims’ amendment not self-enabled. If not self-enabled, the legislature 
must enable the provision before victims can have standing. For 
example, the Colorado Constitution sets forth the right to “be heard when 
relevant, informed, and present at all critical stages of the criminal justice 
process,” and that “[a]ll terminology, including the term ‘critical stages,’ 
shall be defined by the general assembly.”163 This provision was 
correctly interpreted in the Colorado case of Gansz v. People.164 In 
Gansz, the criminal case was dismissed pretrial.165 The court did not 
notify the victim of the dismissal hearing and the victim was not given an 
opportunity to be heard.166 The victim claimed that his constitutional 
right to be present and be heard at the dismissal hearing was violated.167 
The court disagreed, noting that the legislature had express authority to 
define the critical stage and, in enabling legislation, had not included 
dismissal as a “critical stage.”168 Because the legislature had express 
authority to define “critical stage” and had not included dismissal in that 
definition, no right to speak at dismissal had been enabled.169
Landon and Gansz are readily reconciled. In Landon, the constitution 
had core provisions that the legislature could not disable through 
enabling legislation. Furthermore, the Alaska Constitution expressly 
provided for a right to be heard at sentencing. On the other hand, in 
Gansz, the constitution gave the legislature express control over defining 
the critical stage at which a victim had the right to be heard. In Gansz, 
because the legislature had not defined dismissal proceedings as critical 
 162. Id. 
 163. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a. 
 164. 888 P.2d 256 (Colo. 1995). 
 165. Id. at 257. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 258–59. 
 169. Id. at 257–58. 
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stages, the victim did not have an enabled right to object to dismissal.170 
In Landon, the legislature’s failure to define the term “victim” did not 
prevent the court from interpreting the right as self-enabled because the 
person in the case at issue was a victim under the Alaska Constitution.171 
The cases also illustrate that unless the legislature is expressly delegated 
the exclusive authority to enable victims’ rights, core rights are self-
enabled.172
 170. ALA. CONST. amend. 557(a) (“[c]rime victims, as defined by law”); ALASKA CONST. art. 
I, § 24. (“[c]rime victims, as defined by law, shall have the following rights as provided by law”); 
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8(b) (“a victim, as the general assembly may define by law, shall have the 
following rights”); IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b) (“Victims of crime, as defined by law, shall have the 
right to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect throughout the criminal justice process; and, as 
defined by law, to be informed of and present during public hearings and to confer with the 
prosecution.”); MD. CONST. art. 47(b) (“as these rights are implemented and the terms ‘crime’, 
‘criminal justice proceeding’, and ‘victim’ are specified by law”); MO. CONST. art. 1, § 32 (“[a] 
Crime Victim, as defined by law.”); MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 24 (“[c]rime victims, as defined by 
law”); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28(1) (“[a] victim of crime, as shall be defined by law”); N.C. CONST. 
art. I, § 37(1) (“[v]ictims of crime, as prescribed by law”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(c) (“The 
legislature may enact laws to define the term ‘victim’ and to enforce these and other rights of 
victims.”); WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 9m (“[t]he state shall treat crime victims, as defined by law”). 
 171. Other constitutions provide the legislature with permissive definitional authority of varied 
scope. Absent violations of an enabled right, there is no injury in fact. Among other state 
constitutions, legislative authority to define terms varies. Some constitutions allow the legislature to 
define the term “victim.” See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24. (“Crime victims, as defined by law, shall 
have the following rights as provided by law . . . .”); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(D) (“The legislature, 
or the people by initiative or referendum, have the authority to enact substantive and procedural laws 
to define, implement, preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims by this section.”); IND. 
CONST. art. I, § 13(b) (“Victims of crime, as defined by law, shall have the right to be treated with 
fairness, dignity, and respect throughout the criminal justice process; and, as defined by law, to be 
informed of and present during public hearings and to confer with the prosecution . . . .”); LA. 
CONST. art. I, § 25 (“[a]s defined by law, a victim of crime shall have the right to”); MD. CONST. art. 
47(b) (“as these rights are implemented and the terms ‘crime’, ‘criminal justice proceeding’, and 
‘victim’ are specified by law”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1) (“shall have the following rights, as 
provided by law”); MISS. CONST. art. III, § 26A(3) (“The Legislature shall have the authority to 
enact substantive and procedural laws to define, implement, preserve and protect the rights 
guaranteed to victims by this section.”); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a (“as the general assembly shall 
define and provide by law, shall be accorded the rights to”); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34 (“The 
Legislature, or the people by initiative or referendum, has the authority to enact substantive and 
procedural laws to define, implement, preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims by this 
section.”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(C)(3) (“The General Assembly has the authority to enact 
substantive and procedural laws to define, implement, preserve, and protect the rights guaranteed to 
victims by this section.”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“The general assembly has the authority to 
enact substantive and procedural laws to define, implement, preserve and protect the rights 
guaranteed to victims by this section.”); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(4) (“The Legislature shall have the 
power to enforce and define this section by statute.”); VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A (“The General 
Assembly may define and provide by law . . . .”). 
 172. Also, when the plain language is ambiguous, legislative history may be referenced to 
assist the interpretation. See State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756, 761 (Utah 2002). In the context of victims’ 
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court opinion in Bandoni v. State173 
abandoned constitutional canons to declare that victims’ rights were not 
self-enabled.174 The Bandoni court opined that the specific constitutional 
right of a victim to speak at sentencing was not accompanied by a 
“sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and 
protected, or the duty imposed be enforced.”175 One plausible 
interpretation is that the court found that victims’ constitutional rights 
were not self-enabled in order to preserve governmental immunity from 
civil suit. 
In Bandoni, the victims were a husband and wife injured by a drunk 
driver.176 The wife requested and was given assurance that they would 
be informed of criminal proceedings.177 Instead, the criminal case 
proceeded quickly to disposition without the victims’ knowledge and in 
violation of the victims’ constitutional right to speak at sentencing.178 
The Bandonis sued under both negligence and constitutional rights 
deprivation theories, but both theories were rejected by the court.179 For 
the constitutional claim to be valid, the rights had to be self-enabling.180 
Relevant here is that the court found that no civil rights tort could lie 
because this remedy was not expressly spelled out in the constitution.181 
Without remedy, the court held that the right was not self-enabled.182 
The court did not discuss conventional constitutional analysis, which 
does not require express remedies to be provided in order for mandatory 
rights placed in bills of rights to be self-enabled.183 For example, 
violations of criminal defendants’ constitutional rights under the Rhode 
Island Constitution are self-enabled, despite the lack of an express 
remedy.184
rights, the Utah Supreme Court has determined that “we need not inquire beyond the plain meaning 
of the [victims’ rights] amendment unless we find it ambiguous.” Id. at 761. 
 173. 715 A.2d 580 (R.I. 1998). 
 174. Id. at 587. 
 175. Id. at 586. 
 176. Id. at 582–83. 
 177. Id. at 583. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 582. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 587–96. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Landon v. State, No. A-6479, 1999 WL 46543, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1999). 
 184. See, e.g., State v. Jeremiah, 696 A.2d 1220, 1220–21 (R.I. 1997) (noting that suppression 
is the proper remedy for evidence obtained in violation of the Rhode Island Constitution). 
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The court used ambiguous legislative history and the absence of an 
express remedy185 in the constitution to trump canons of constitutional 
analysis. These canons, discussed below, plainly establish that this 
constitutional provision allowing victims to speak at sentencing is self-
enabled. This disregard of constitutional canons led Justice Flanders, in 
dissent, to aptly characterize the nature of the majority opinion: “This is 
a dark day for state constitutional law and judicial independence in 
Rhode Island. For crime victims in particular, this day will doubtless live 
in legal infamy.”186
In darkening the hope of victims’ rights, the Bandoni majority 
abandoned several canons of constitutional interpretation. The Bandoni 
majority initially decided that the broad rights of the amendment 
providing that “[a] victim of crime shall, as a matter of right, be treated 
by agents of the state with dignity, respect and sensitivity during all 
phases of the criminal justice process” were merely general principles 
and therefore not self-enabled.187 The denigration of these rights began 
when the court relied upon the victims’ attorney’s concession that these 
broad rights were not substantive rights.188 The Bandoni decision is 
somewhat based on an idiosyncratic concession of the victim litigant.189 
Such a concession has no support in the opinions of other state courts. 
Victims’ broad constitutional rights are typically rights with substantive 
content.190 Indeed, no other state appellate court opinion involving broad 
victims’ rights has held that the rights have no substantive meaning. 
In relying on the generalization that the less specific a constitutional 
provision is, the less likely it is to be self-enabling, the Bandoni court 
implicitly rejected the more particularized constitutional convention that 
civil rights placed in bills of rights are self-enabling.191 Such a holding 
was particularly ill-advised in the Bandoni case when the broad rights 
were not even directly litigated by the parties, but rather, only the 
specific right to speak at sentencing was at issue.  
The Bandoni opinion spurned other fundamental conventions of 
constitutional analysis. The majority rejected the plain meaning of the 
 185. Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 583. 
 186. Id. at 601 (Flanders, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 587. 
 188. Id. at 584. 
 189. Id. at 587. 
 190. See supra notes 19–37 and accompanying text for a discussion of broad rights. 
 191. See supra note 136 and accompanying text for a discussion of this principle. 
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amendment.192 Later in the opinion, the court conveniently performed a 
complete about face and twisted a clause in the amendment beyond 
reason to implicitly find that the victim’s rights amendment mandated 
legislative enabling.193 In a final bit of cynicism, the majority used the 
fact that the legislature has not yet enabled the amendment as proof that 
the amendment is not self-enabling, despite the fact that such legislative 
inaction in the absence of any directive to the legislature instead leads to 
the opposite conclusion.194  
The Bandonis sought monetary damages under the constitution for 
the prosecutor’s failure to notify them of sentencing. Ultimately, the 
Bandoni majority preserved the traditional sovereign immunity of 
prosecutors and judges over remedying victims’ rights violations: 
We are mindful of the difficulty in attempting to impose tort liability on 
judges and prosecution officers who enjoy immunity, as well as the 
difficulty in defining the scope of liability for state officials who are 
responsible for complying with the victim’s rights statute. 
Notwithstanding the departure from blind adherence to the concept of 
sovereign immunity, which has been accomplished through both 
legislation and judicial decisions, the concept of judicial and 
prosecutorial immunity remains alive and well . . . .195
The Bandoni majority opinion sits on slender reeds. In contrast, the 
dissent uses time-honored constitutional canons and finds the rights both 
mandatory and self-enabling. Rebutting the majority’s use of the absence 
of an express remedy as the reason for holding victims’ rights 
unenforceable, Justice Flanders aptly observed that, “one searches the 
Federal and State constitutions in vain to find specific causes of action 
and remedies provided therein for any violations of the bill-of-rights 
provisions . . . .”196 Disturbed by the constitutionally unprincipled 
opinion of the majority, Justice Flanders avers the following: “What 
vexes me is the majority’s remarkable refusal to enforce the plain 
language of the victims’ rights amendment to our state constitution.”197 
And, furthermore, 
 192. Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 605 (Flanders, J., dissenting). 
 193. Id. at 604 (Flanders, J., dissenting). 
 194. Id. at 605 (Flanders, J., dissenting). 
 195. Id. at 595. 
 196. Id. at 604 (Flanders, J., dissenting). 
 197. Id. at 601 (Flanders, J., dissenting). 
1BEL-FIN 8/9/2005 2:18:25 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
294 
 
[b]y means of the Court’s decision in this case the constitutional right 
of crime victims to address the court before sentencing of the criminal 
who injured them “regarding the impact which the perpetrator’s 
conduct has had upon the victim,” has been judicially emasculated. As 
a result, a right that our Constitution declares to be “essential and 
unquestionable,” has been rendered nonessential and questionable; a 
right that our Constitution decrees is to be “established, maintained, 
and preserved,” has been disestablished, dismembered, and disserved; 
and a right that our Constitution proclaims to be “of paramount 
obligation in all . . . judicial . . . proceedings,” has been judicially 
subordinated to a vision of legislative hegemony over the protection of 
constitutional rights. And I especially regret that Rhode Island’s 
Supreme Court, charged by the Constitution to say what that law is, to 
be the guardian of our constitutional rights, and to uphold these 
paramount provisions in all judicial proceedings, has relegated itself to 
the sidelines in this case when it comes to enforcing the State’s 
Constitution. Instead of functioning as a key player in the protection of 
constitutional rights, the Court has withdrawn from the field to cower 
in the shadows of its intended constitutional role. Instead of serving as 
“an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the 
Legislative or Executive . . . [and] resist[ing] every encroachment upon 
rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of 
rights,” the Court has allowed itself to become a penetrable bullseye for 
those who would shoot down crime victims’ constitutional right. 
Instead of independently enforcing and protecting these constitutional 
rights against all violations (whether they come from within or without 
the government), the Court has consigned the Judiciary in this 
constitutional case to serving as the liveried footservants of the General 
Assembly, waiting for some sign on high that it is permissible for this 
Court to enforce the constitutional rights that are so dear to the People 
of this State but which, says the majority, this Court is powerless to 
uphold without express legislative authorization to do so. I 
emphatically disagree with this shrunken and withered vision of 
judicial power, responsibility, and independence.198
Justice Flanders goes on to urge that “just because . . . ‘the form and 
extent of [legal remedies] is necessarily subject to the legislative power,’ 
this does not mean that legal remedies cannot be awarded by the courts 
for the violation of constitutional rights” until the legislature acts.199 He 
identifies the absurd consequences of ruling the opposite way, which 
 198. Id. at 602 (internal citations omitted) (Flanders, J., dissenting). 
 199. Id. at 604 (Flanders, J., dissenting). 
1BEL-FIN 8/9/2005 2:18:25 PM 
255] The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights 
 295 
 
would “turn Rhode Island into a topsy-turvy jurisdiction where people 
who trip on municipal sidewalks may sue their government for damages 
but individuals whose fundamental constitutional rights have been 
violated by the government are powerless to do so.”200
Ultimately, the vast majority of state constitutional victims’ rights 
amendments are drafted as mandatory rights. Nevertheless, in the three 
states where appellate courts have expressly ruled on whether victim 
standing is implicit in victims’ constitutional rights, two state supreme 
courts have refused to imply standing; in a third state, the intermediate 
appellate courts are split. The Kansas Supreme Court defied 
constitutional conventions to conclude that victims’ rights are not 
mandatory rights.201 The Rhode Island Supreme Court abandoned 
constitutional conventions to rule that victims’ rights were not enabled 
rights.202 Intermediate appellate courts in different appellate districts in 
California have come to opposite conclusions.203 As the Holt, Thompson, 
and Bandoni opinions demonstrate, courts are abandoning their 
constitutional role in favor of denigrating victims’ constitutional rights. 
The unfortunate judicial precedent of these cases undermines the legal 
protections that assure the vitality of other civil liberties. If courts 
establish precedent that compromises canons in one context, such bad 
precedent may be extended to other civil liberties. Finally, these opinions 
erode public and victim confidence in the constitutional system. For 
victims, the bottom line is that their rights are held to be advisory or not 
enabled.  
2. Discretion and particular victims’ rights 
There are both discretionary and mandatory victims’ rights. Victims 
do not have standing when rights are discretionary. In a few state 
constitutions, particular victims’ rights are written in discretionary 
language. There are two types of particular discretionary rights. First, 
there are provisions in which government discretion is broad and largely 
unfettered. For example, under the Kansas Constitution, the victims’ 
 200. Id. 
 201. State v. Holt, 874 P.2d 1183 (Kan. 1994). 
 202. Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 580. 
 203. Melissa J. v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Superior 
Court (Thompson), 202 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that absent legislative 
discretion on how to implement the victims’ rights amendment, “the court has no authority to afford 
any relief”). 
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right to speak at sentencing is not discretionary, but at all other 
proceedings the victim may speak “at any other time deemed appropriate 
by the court.”204 The language, “deemed appropriate,” almost certainly 
gives the court unfettered discretion. The Missouri Constitution provides 
victims the mandatory right to information and the right to be heard 
“unless in the determination of the court the interests of justice require 
otherwise.”205 The interests of justice standard is not readily bounded. 
As a result, the Missouri exceptions are close to unfettered discretion. As 
another example, in Idaho, victims have the right to be heard “unless 
manifest injustice would result.”206 Victims’ rights are illusory when 
accompanied by unfettered government discretion to deny rights. 
Second, there are mandatory rights that provide a more precisely 
defined legal standard to be met before rights can be lawfully denied. 
Essentially, these are mandatory rights accompanied by a narrowly 
defined exception. With these rights, the court has the authority to deny a 
right, upon proof, only in specified circumstances. For example, in the 
Connecticut Constitution, a victim has the right to attend “unless such 
person is to testify and the court determines that the person’s testimony 
would be materially affected if such person hears other testimony.”207 
Because a court must determine that testimony would be “materially 
affected” before the victim can be excluded, the sequestration of victims 
from trial is an exception to the otherwise mandatory right of 
attendance.208
 204. KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15(a). 
 205. MO. CONST. art. I, § 32(2). 
 206. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22(6). 
 207. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8(b)(5). 
 208. In Illinois, New Jersey, Texas, and Wisconsin, the right to be present is also 
discretionary. See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(8) (“unless the victim is to testify and the court 
determines the victim’s testimony would be materially affected if the victim hears other testimony at 
trial”); N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 22 (“A victim of crime shall not be denied the right to be present . . . 
except when . . . the victim is properly sequestered.”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(2)(b)(2) (“unless . . . 
the court determines the testimony would be materially affected if the victim hears other testimony 
at the trial”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“unless the trial court finds sequestration is necessary to a 
fair trial for the defendant”). Because credible evidence must be presented establishing that 
testimony would be materially affected, victims will rarely be excluded from the trial. The 
possibility of exclusion is made rarer still by the ability to call the victim as the first witness, thus 
allowing them to be present for the rest of the trial. See Gabriel v. State, 925 P.2d 234, 236 (Wyo. 
1996) (upholding the decision of the trial court to allow the victim to observe the trial after the 
victim testified first and had a lengthy pretrial statement). There are other examples. In California, 
the right to restitution is required unless “compelling and extraordinary reasons exist to the 
contrary.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b). In Idaho, a victim’s constitutional right to refuse an interview 
is subject to existing law. See IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22. In New Mexico, a victim’s right to have her 
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Even these mandatory rights become illusory rights when victims are 
denied standing to challenge erroneous trial court rulings. Even if victims 
can challenge such rulings, standing is of little use if the review standard 
is too lax. If, for instance, such determinations are overturned only when 
the court abuses its discretion, victims’ rights are left without meaningful 
appellate court oversight.209 Instead, a standard like clear and convincing 
proof that testimony would “be materially affected” provides a concrete 
basis for appellate review. 
3. Discretion and broad victims’ rights 
Fundamentally, courts have the authority to interpret constitutions, 
including victims’ broad constitutional rights.210 Broad victims’ rights 
are vague rights. To the extent that the original intent is unclear, courts 
may interpret these broad rights either narrowly or expansively. Judicial 
discretion is a problem for victims when broad constitutional rights are 
interpreted to provide no additional, or unduly restricted, constitutional 
accommodations beyond those provided for in more specific victims’ 
rights. 
The courts of New Jersey have been the most expansive in 
addressing broad rights. The New Jersey Constitution provides that “a 
victim of crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by 
the criminal justice system.”211 As noted in Part I.B, in State v. 
Timmendequas,212 the New Jersey Supreme Court held this broad 
language, coupled with the victims’ right to be present at public judicial 
proceedings, could be a lawful basis to deny a defendant’s motion to 
change venue. Further, the court held that the victim possessed trial court 
access to seek and obtain the empanelling of a foreign jury in preference 
to a change of venue.213
Outside of New Jersey, state courts have used broad rights to inform 
more specific rights.214 It is probable that some state courts will follow 
the New Jersey courts’ example of applying broad rights in expansive 
property returned promptly is subject to “compelling evidentiary reasons for retention.” N.M. 
CONST. art. II, § 24(11). 
 209. See infra Part II.D.2 for a discussion of how victims can be left without meaningful 
appellate court oversight. 
 210. See notes 19–37 and accompanying text for examples of victims’ broad rights. 
 211. N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 22. 
 212. 737 A.2d 55, 76 (N.J. 1999). 
 213. Id. at 74–75. 
 214. See supra notes 25–28. 
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ways, while some states courts will not. For example, in Wisconsin, a 
court declined to rely on broad provisions to give the victim an interest in 
the change of venue proceeding.215  
C. The Remedies Problem 
Remedies for victims’ rights violations consist of superior and 
inferior remedies. Superior remedies allow for victims to exercise their 
rights. For example, a victim who was precluded from testifying at 
sentencing can have the sentence voided and the defendant would then 
be resentenced with the benefit of the victims’ testimony. An inferior 
right, however, attempts to compensate victims for the loss of their rights 
in place of directly enforcing the rights. In the context of victims’ rights, 
inferior remedies are essentially dysfunctional because they do not leave 
victims in the position to exercise their rights. The more specific 
dysfunctions of inferior remedies are reviewed below. On the other hand, 
the superior remedies of voiding and reconsideration, which are also 
available for violations of criminal defendants’ constitutional rights, 
ultimately do allow victims to exercise their rights. If victims’ rights are 
to be real rights, like defendants’ rights, then the remedies of voiding and 
reconsideration must be available to victims. 
1. The inferior remedies 
Inferior remedies do not put victims in a position to exercise their 
rights. Instead, inferior remedies attempt to give victims something in 
place of their rights, to compensate them for the loss of use of the rights 
and to generally deter government violations of their rights. But inferior 
rights do not satisfy even these limited goals because they are available 
only to certain victims in certain limited circumstances. 
One potential inferior remedy is to make constitutional torts 
available to compensate victims for rights violations. Citizens have this 
monetary damages remedy available in other contexts, for example, 
when their Fourth Amendment right to privacy is violated by the 
police.216 While many states ban money damages for victims’ rights 
violations, constitutions could be amended to allow for this remedy. 
 215. State v. Rymer, 2001 WI Ct. App. 31U, 622 N.W.2d 770, cert. denied, 2001 WI 15, 626 
N.W.2d 807. 
 216. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 397 (1971). 
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Nevertheless, there are at least two significant obstacles to money 
damages as a satisfactory remedy. First, victims’ rights are typically 
violated by prosecutors and judges who are shielded by sovereign 
immunity and, therefore, cannot be sued for most types of rights 
violations. “It is always agreed that an immunity protects . . . judges . . . 
so long as their acts are ‘judicial’ in nature and within the very general 
scope of their jurisdiction,”217 even “in civil rights cases.”218 Judges are 
even immune from actions when they act maliciously.219 Judicial 
immunity also extends to prosecutors,220 although prosecutors may be 
liable for civil rights violations done maliciously.221 Moreover, these 
immunities are unlikely to be modified. Bandoni provides a good 
example of how highly courts can value judicial and prosecutorial 
immunity. The majority of the Rhode Island Supreme Court cast aside 
many conventions of constitutional analysis to rule that victims’ rights 
were not self-enabled in large part to protect these immunities.222  
Second, even if monetary damages were available, it is unlikely 
victims would collect sufficient damages to satisfy them or deter 
government misconduct. Substantial damages are intuitively appropriate 
when a home is wrongfully invaded and searched, a suspect is beaten, or 
a person falsely arrested. On the other hand, damages for the violation of 
a victims’ right to speak at sentencing are far harder to quantify. 
Moreover, a judge who violated a plaintiff’s rights could readily testify 
in the civil trial that exactly the same sentence would have been imposed 
if the victim’s right had been honored. This likely would eliminate 
damages, or at least reduce the damages award to relative insignificance. 
Even if the measure of damages did not rest on whether there was a 
different sentence, but on the lost opportunity to be heard, it is unlikely 
substantial damages would be awarded for such a loss. In addition to 
failing to adequately compensate the victim, these small damages would 
be unlikely to deter future rights violations. 
 217. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS § 132, at 1056–69 (5th ed. 
1984). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 1060. 
 220. Id. at 1058. 
 221. Id. at 1060–61. 
 222. See supra notes 173–202 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bandoni. 
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State constitutional civil rights injunctions are another possibility for 
victims whose rights have been violated by prosecutors.223 As a general 
rule, however, such injunctions are only available when the prosecutor 
acts maliciously, and to achieve an injunction, the victim would need to 
demonstrate an ongoing pattern of rights violations.224 This is a 
substantial undertaking. Such an effort would require access to the names 
of large numbers of crime victims to gather sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate the pattern. Even if such an investigation were practically 
feasible or lawful, such intrusions on the privacy of crime victims run 
completely counter to ensuring the values of dignity and privacy of 
victims that underlie victims’ rights. Moreover, a victim must establish 
that his rights will again be violated in the future.225 Outside the context 
of whether there is a pattern, it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict 
when in the future an individual victim’s right will be violated. Because 
“[a]n injunction may not be issued to halt that conduct absent a great and 
immediate threat that the named plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury” 
and because it is so difficult to establish an immediate threat, injunctions 
will rarely, if ever, be available to enforce victims’ rights violations.226
Administrative review of victims’ rights violations might also 
provide victims with an avenue of recourse. But, like all inferior 
remedies, this does nothing to ensure that aggrieved victims actually 
have the opportunity to exercise their rights in the case involving their 
victimization. Furthermore, there are severe limits on what 
administrative bodies can accomplish. For example, it is unlikely that the 
judicial branch, attorneys general, and county prosecutors will support 
the creation of a separate agency that exercises actual authority over 
them. Moreover, separation of powers problems would hamper executive 
branch administrative authority over judges. Finally, any hope that such a 
body could discipline ethical violators of victims’ rights is unrealistic. 
Because transgressors are lawyers and judges, only state supreme courts 
and their authorized processes can lawfully discipline bar members for 
improper conduct falling within the purview of prosecutorial and judicial 
ethics. Left without any real authority over judicial and prosecutorial 
agencies, administrative bodies could not insist on any systemic 
 223. 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 73 (2003) (“A plaintiff may seek injunctive relief to guard 
against continuing (or future) governmental misconduct.”) (collecting state cases). 
 224. Id. (noting injunction cases involving a “pattern” of constitutional violations). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. § 74. 
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improvements to ensure rights compliance. Such an agency might add 
value by bringing prosecutors and judges together to cure systemic 
violations,227 but the agency would likely face too many hurdles to 
provide even an effective inferior remedy. 
Ethical discipline itself is plainly an insufficient remedy. No reported 
opinion has disciplined prosecutors; one opinion for judges; and one 
opinion for defense counsels.228 Two cases in twenty-three years since 
the first victim constitutional amendment came into being reflects the 
inadequacy of ethics as a remedy for victims’ rights violations. 
Internal administrative remedies in prosecutors’ offices could help 
curb rights violations in future cases. However, Congress correctly 
structured this as supplementary to victims’ direct enforcement of their 
rights.229 Internal discipline is not a remedy that allows victims whose 
rights have been violated to actually exercise their rights in the case 
involving their victimization. Moreover, such internal discipline for 
violation of victims’ rights is only as good as each local jurisdiction’s 
commitment to it. At best, internal discipline sets up unequal 
enforcement depending upon the county in which the violation occurs 
and each district attorney’s commitment to compliance. Moreover, 
internal discipline in prosecutors’ offices does not address the problem of 
judicial disobedience of victims’ rights. 
In sum, a review of inferior remedies for victims’ rights reveals them 
to be sorely wanting. In order for victims to have real rights, the superior 
remedies of voiding and reconsideration must be available for victims’ 
rights violations. 
2. The superior remedy of voiding 
The superior remedy for failure to comply with victims’ rights is 
voiding. An entire court proceeding and its result can be voided, and 
once voided, the hearing can be repeated in compliance with victims’ 
rights. Analogously, criminal convictions are voided when defendants’ 
rights are violated.230 In fact, state appellate courts have vacated results 
and ordered judges and parole boards to comply with victims’ rights. In 
 227. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 
COMPLIANCE EFFORTS: EXPERIENCES IN THREE STATES (Nat’l Criminal Justice Ass’n ed., 1998). 
 228. Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 815 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio 2004) (disciplining judge for this 
and other ethical violations); In re Thompson, 98 P.3d 366 (Or. 2004). 
 229. See Appendix I. 
 230. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
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Melissa J., for example, the trial court modified a restitution order in 
violation of the victim’s constitutional and statutory right to notice and to 
be heard.231 On appeal, the California intermediate appellate court 
voided the trial court’s order.232 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Arizona 
vacated a parole board order when a victim had failed to request notice 
of hearings because the state had failed to comply with its lawful 
obligation to inform the victim of the hearing.233 In the Florida case of 
Ford v. State,234 victims petitioned for certiorari challenging a restitution 
order entered in violation of the victims’ constitutional right to address 
the court at sentencing. The Florida intermediate appellate court voided 
the restitution portion of the judgment and remanded the case for a 
resentencing.235 The appellate court granted the writ, ordering that 
restitution be divided in proportion to the victims’ loss rather than in 
equal shares.236 As these cases reveal, courts are correctly beginning to 
utilize the voiding remedy to enforce victims’ rights. 
Voiding an entire proceeding is typically accompanied by rejection 
of all evidence gathered in that proceeding—a relatively inefficient 
measure. A more limited remedy than voiding the proceeding is voiding 
the result. Voiding the result alone, without voiding the original 
proceeding, may be available to enforce victims’ rights in some 
circumstances. For example, voiding the result is permissible after a 
motion and hearing on reconsideration. This reconsideration of the result 
is possible in the context of some victims’ rights violations because 
victims do not have the right to cross-examine witnesses. Because 
victims do not lose any right to cross-examination, courts can reconsider 
decisions without throwing out all the evidence gathered at prior hearings 
and still be in compliance with victims’ rights to notice and to be heard. 
Where reconsideration is available, the main threat to efficiency—a 
complete rejection of the previously vetted evidence—is unnecessary. Of 
course, the victim needs a second hearing to accommodate the victim’s 
right. At a reconsideration hearing, a victim can exercise her right to 
address the court, and the court will affirm or void the prior ruling or 
order. The full parties would be present and have the opportunity to 
 231. Melissa J. v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 5, 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). 
 232. Id. at 6–7. 
 233. State ex rel. Hance v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 875 P.2d 824, 830 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1993). 
 234. 829 So. 2d 946 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
 235. Id. at 948. 
 236. Id. 
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participate as well. Courts would reconsider the result in light of the 
victim’s information. 
Some state courts have already reconsidered rulings when victims’ 
rights have been violated. In the Utah case of State v. Casey,237 a state 
appellate court upheld reconsideration but declined to order voiding of 
the proceeding when the court had initially denied the victim his 
rights.238 In Casey, the court violated a victim’s rights to receive 
notification of a plea hearing and to address the court in opposition.239 
The victim argued that the plea and sentence were in error because the 
plea and sentence resulted in a violation of the victim’s rights.240 The 
trial court treated the objection as a motion to reconsider, heard the 
victim’s opposition to the plea bargain, and decided to leave undisturbed 
the original plea and sentence.241 On review, the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that the procedure of reconsideration undertaken by the trial 
court was sufficient to remedy the rights violation.242
While reconsideration is efficient, it is easy for courts to engage 
improperly in reconsideration as merely a pro forma matter, with no 
genuine intention of changing the earlier decision regardless of what 
information the victim provided. Nonetheless, when done with integrity, 
reconsideration is a useful procedure for remedying some victims’ rights 
violations. 
 
a. Double jeopardy limits on voiding and reconsideration. Voiding 
or reconsideration remedies are not available to a prosecutor or victim 
when barred by federal or state double jeopardy. The Double Jeopardy 
Clause, incorporated against the states by the Supreme Court in 1969,243 
provides: “nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”244 Double jeopardy prevents the 
state from undertaking multiple prosecutions against a defendant for the 
 237. 44 P.3d 756 (Utah 2002). 
 238. Id. at 758. 
 239. Id. at 760. 
 240. Id. at 759. 
 241. Id. at 766. 
 242. Id. at 760. A troubling aspect of the Casey majority opinion was its approval of the trial 
court’s “informal” procedure to allow victim input. See id. at 756. The concurrence correctly 
chastised the sanctioning of such informal procedures. Id. at 766 (Wilkins, J., concurring). Had the 
trial court voided the plea, it is doubtful that such an informal procedure would have been tolerated 
by the court. 
 243. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). 
 244. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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same offense, thus “subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and 
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and 
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent 
he may be found guilty.”245
The impact of double jeopardy is largely limited to preventing the 
voiding of trials. In other procedural contexts, double jeopardy poses 
little threat to voiding and reconsideration remedies for victims’ rights 
violations. Double jeopardy protects defendants in certain procedural 
stages and not others. Jeopardy attaches when “a defendant is ‘put to trial 
before the trier of facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.’”246 
Furthermore, double jeopardy does not attach to pretrial procedures of 
motions to quash and demurrers to indictments,247 refiling of affidavits 
in support of arrest warrants,248 or grand jury proceedings.249
As participants, crime victims have procedural rights in certain 
pretrial settings. For example, in some jurisdictions, participants are 
entitled to the rights to notice and to address the court at pretrial release 
hearings and the right to prompt disposition.250 Double jeopardy presents 
no bar to voiding and reconsideration of pretrial hearings or rulings for 
failure to afford victims their due rights. Thus, for example, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit reconsideration of a release order 
where a victim’s right to receive notice of, or the opportunity to speak at, 
a release hearing is violated. The trial court can readily remedy the 
violation by convening a reconsideration hearing to present the victim’s 
information and opinion. The court can then consider whether to modify 
the earlier decision. As another example, if trials are unduly delayed, 
victims can assert their rights to a prompt disposition without running 
afoul of double jeopardy. 
Double jeopardy protects defendants most strongly at the trial stage. 
Double jeopardy attaches at trial when the jury is selected and sworn, or, 
if a bench trial, when first witness is sworn in.251 The victim’s right at 
 245. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957). 
 246. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 
U.S. 470, 479 (1971)). 
 247. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 130–31 (1904). 
 248. Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426, 429–30 (1923). 
 249. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 49 (1992); Respublica v. Shaffer, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 
236, 237 (1788). 
 250. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text for a list of states that guarantee the right 
to be heard at pretrial release hearings and the right to a speedy disposition. 
 251. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978); Serfass, 420 U.S. at 388.  
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trial is the right to attend. Should victims fail to get adequate notice of 
the right or of the trial date, or if the court refuses attendance, double 
jeopardy will nevertheless attach as trial begins. The verdict, be it 
conviction or acquittal, cannot be altered, absent limited exceptions. 
Because the verdict cannot be altered, victims will not be able to exercise 
their constitutional right to attend the trial. Federal double jeopardy in all 
likelihood prohibits victims from voiding the trial or verdict in the hope 
of attending a retrial. However, as the right to attend trial is an ongoing 
right, the victim could seek expedited review until the trial is over. 
Nevertheless, because most criminal trials are fairly brief, it is unlikely 
that even an expedited writ procedure would conclude before the trial 
was finished. 
There are a few exceptions to the double jeopardy limitations on 
reconsidering a verdict. For example, the defendant may appeal a 
conviction, which, if reversed, may result in retrial. If the court excluded 
the victim in the last trial, she can seek a writ of prohibition to prevent a 
similar order in the second trial. If the victim misses the new trial 
because she is not notified of the trial date, jeopardy attaches and the 
victim is again without remedy. 
Assuming the defendant himself does not eliminate double jeopardy 
by successfully securing a mistrial in the trial court252 or retrial after 
appeal,253 the only way for the state to get a retrial after a mistrial is for 
manifest necessity,254 and this exception is available only during the 
course of the trial. Manifest necessity exists where “prejudice to either 
the defendant or the state may be found.”255 Standing alone, the denial of 
a trial attendance right does not necessarily result in prejudice to victims 
or the state in the crucial sense that the absence of a victim is likely to 
alter the result of the trial. However, it is possible that a victim’s 
presence might actually change the outcome of the trial. For example, if 
the victim hears something she knows to be false in the trial and is able 
 252. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98–99 (1978) (explaining that there is no double 
jeopardy if mistrial is declared on defendant’s own motion). This is not true in all cases. If a 
defendant is goaded into moving for a mistrial because of prosecutorial misconduct, double jeopardy 
bars retrial. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982). 
 253. Defense appeals, which successfully secure an overturn of the conviction, are considered 
“waivers” of double jeopardy or, alternately, “the same jeopardy which attached at the first 
trial [that] did not come to an end” because there was no acquittal or conviction. Green v. United 
States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957). Accord Scott, 437 U.S. at 88–89; Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 
662 (1896). 
 254. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1973). 
 255. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 383 (2003). 
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to reveal the truth. If the parties are unaware of the falsehood, a victim 
may be the only one capable of revealing it.256 In this context, the 
victim’s presence improves the truth finding function of the trial. 
Nevertheless, as victims have no other rights at trial relative to the truth-
finding function, presently it is unlikely that manifest necessity can be 
the basis for voiding a trial when a victim’s right to attend is violated.257
Victims have the right to speak at entry of plea hearings. The right to 
speak at sentencing expressly or implicitly provides for this.258 In a plea 
bargain, double jeopardy generally attaches when a court unconditionally 
accepts the plea.259 However, the procedural manner in which a plea is 
given is critical to the legality of the plea. Pleas of guilty may be voided 
in certain circumstances. First, a guilty plea is void if the plea is a sham 
or if a court is without jurisdiction to take the plea.260 Pleas of guilty are 
shams when the state is not present or is uninvolved in the disposition.261 
The theme running through these cases is that the defendant should not 
become his own prosecutor and confess guilt without the state’s 
involvement, thus avoiding proper prosecution. Victims denied their 
right to oppose the plea could allege that the plea was a sham. For 
example, it would be a sham if the prosecutor and the defense attorney 
proceeded in knowing violation of constitutional sentencing procedure. 
The second basis for overturning a plea is that courts lack 
jurisdiction to take a plea when the in-court proceedings lack 
fundamental prerequisites to validity.262 The central distinction between 
a sham proceeding and lack of jurisdiction is that the sham proceedings 
reflect fraud. The similarities between the denial of state participation 
 253. Beloof & Cassell, supra note 11. 
 257. While victims have no voiding remedy because of double jeopardy, this does not 
necessarily preclude appellate review of the rights violations. While double jeopardy may render 
victims’ objection to exclusion moot once the trial is over, victims can seek review for rights 
violations because the violations are capable of repetition, yet evade review. However, review is far 
from assured as both writs and mootness exceptions are in the reviewing court’s discretion. See, e.g., 
Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976) (“[I]ssuance of the writ is in large part a 
matter of discretion with the court to which the petition is addressed.”). 
 258. People v. Stringham, 253 Cal. Rptr. 484, 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
 259. Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 51 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 260. See, e.g., United States v. Combs, 634 F.2d 1295, 1300 (10th Cir. 1980) (McKay, J., 
concurring) (“Where there is no plenary trial because the defendant pleads guilty, the case law 
clearly indicates that jeopardy attaches upon the court’s acceptance of the guilty plea, unless the plea 
is made in a sham proceeding or the court lacks jurisdiction.”). 
 261. F.M. English, Annotation, Plea of Guilty as Basis of Claim of Double Jeopardy in 
Attempted Subsequent Prosecution for Same Offense, 75 A.L.R.2D 683, §§ 4–5 (2004). 
 262. Id. § 5.  
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and victim participation are significant. Victims, like the state, have an 
independent right to notice of, and to address the court at, a plea hearing. 
The violation of victims’ constitutional right to speak means the plea is 
given in a constitutionally improper manner. Similar to cases in which 
the state has no notice of defendants’ guilty pleas—absent compliance 
with the victims’ right to speak—the plea lacks a fundamental 
prerequisite to validity and could be voided by the court without running 
afoul of double jeopardy. 
In the Florida intermediate appellate court case of Ford v. State,263 
the victims sought to vacate pleas and a restitution order. The victims 
had losses ranging from $63 to $3.4 million.264 The plea and restitution 
order were accepted and entered in violation of the victim’s right under 
the Florida Constitution to “be present, and to be heard when relevant, at 
all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent these rights do 
not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused.”265 Florida 
statutes enable the constitutional mandate requiring state agencies to 
provide notification to the victim.266 The court, unaware of the lack of 
notice and of the victim’s objection to both the plea arrangement and 
restitution conditions, entered the defendant’s guilty plea into the record 
and imposed sentence.267 The victim filed a petition for writ of certiorari, 
which the court issued as to the restitution condition of sentencing but 
denied as to the request to vacate the plea.268
The Ford opinion contains little analysis to illuminate either the 
result or the distinction between restitution and the rest of the sentence. 
While the court does not explicitly state that double jeopardy prevented 
the court from vacating the plea, this is the most likely explanation 
because the only state argument cited by the court was that vacating the 
plea would violate double jeopardy.269 If, indeed, double jeopardy bars 
voiding a plea when victims’ rights are violated, it would at first blush 
seem to apply to restitution as well. The answer might be that in Florida 
restitution is not considered criminal punishment but, rather, is civil in 
 263. 829 So. 2d 946 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
 264. Id. at 947. 
 265. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b); Ford, 829 So. 2d at 948. 
 266. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.001(1)(e)(3), (j) (West 2004). 
 267. Ford, 829 So. 2d at 948. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
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nature.270 Because, in Florida, restitution is not punishment, double 
jeopardy principles are inapplicable to restitution. 
However, the Ford court implied that double jeopardy prevented a 
rehearing and, therefore, that a sentence taken in violation of a victim’s 
rights did not deny the court of jurisdiction to accept the plea. Inherent in 
such a conclusion might be the assumption that a remedy is available 
only to full parties because victims as third parties have no interest in 
punishment. However, this reflects faulty logic. The state has an interest 
in punishment, revealed in its statutory right to address the court at 
sentencing. Double jeopardy is no barrier to resentencing when the state 
has been denied the opportunity to speak at sentencing. Likewise, victims 
clearly have an interest in punishment rooted in their harm, an interest 
implicit in, and inseparable from, victims’ rights to address the court at 
disposition. Victims’ interest in punishment is reflected in victims’ rights 
to speak at plea and sentencing hearings. In most jurisdictions, victims, 
as participants and like full parties, have a completely independent right 
to address the court at sentencing.271 Victims do not need the permission 
of the parties or the court to exercise this right. The right itself is the 
essential proof that victims have an interest in punishment. It makes no 
sense to provide a right to speak at sentencing if there is no interest in 
punishment. Moreover, the contents of victims’ sentencing remarks are 
not limited to information about the crime or its impact upon the victim. 
Just like the state, victims may give sentencing recommendations, 
essentially prayers for relief, concerning what the ultimate sentence 
should be.272 There is no coherent way to reconcile this right with the 
view that victims have no interest in punishment. 
The California case People v. Stringham explains that victims have a 
real interest in punishment.273 In Stringham, pursuant to a victim’s right 
to be heard at sentencing, the victim objected to the trial court’s 
acceptance of a plea agreement to a reduced charge in a homicide 
 270. Bunch v. Florida, 745 So. 2d 400, 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (citing cases and 
explaining that the purpose of restitution “is to make victims of crime whole by restoring them to the 
value of that which they have lost as a result of the crime, rather than to punish the wrongdoer”); see 
also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(1)(a) (West 2004) (“In addition to any punishment, the court shall 
order the defendant to make restitution to the victim.”). 
 271. See Beloof, supra note 39, at app. I (listing the states that give victims the right to address 
the court at sentencing). 
 272. Beloof, supra note 39, at 299. 
 273. People v. Stringham, 253 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
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case.274 The trial court was persuaded by the victim’s opinion that the 
plea agreement was inappropriately lenient and scheduled the case for 
trial.275 The appellate court understood that the purposes behind the 
victim’s right to address the court “are to acquaint the court with the 
victim’s unique perspective of the case, and require consideration of the 
victim’s statement by the court.”276 The Stringham court averred: 
Our obligation . . . is to adopt a construction . . . that will effectuate the 
voters’ intent . . . and avoid absurd results. It would be difficult to 
conceive of a more absurd result than to . . . [deny] a victim . . . a 
meaningful opportunity to protest a plea bargain that will allow a 
defendant to escape the punishment which the victim 
. . . feels is appropriate to the crime.277
The Stringham court eloquently affirmed that victims have an 
interest in punishment founded in their right to speak at sentencing. This 
interest in punishment is part and parcel of the right to oppose (or 
support) a plea or sentence. Because of the victims’ right to speak at 
sentencing, and their interest in punishment that is inseparable from this 
right, pleas and sentences taken in violation of victims’ rights are taken 
in excess of trial courts’ jurisdiction. Voiding sentences under these 
circumstances does not violate double jeopardy any more than voiding 
the sentence where the state’s interest in punishment and opportunity to 
speak at sentencing is denied. Victims, like the state, have an interest in 
punishment and a right to be heard at sentencing. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a victim’s interest 
in a criminal’s punishment even when there was no express victims’ 
right at issue. In Calderon v. Thompson,278 the Court addressed 
substantial delay in the postconviction process, explaining that for delay 
to unsettle expectations in the execution of moral judgment “is to inflict a 
profound injury to the ‘powerful and legitimate interest in punishing the 
guilty,’ an interest shared by the state and victims of crime alike.”279 The 
Court’s language supports victims’ interest in punishment. 
 274. Id. at 486. 
 275. Id. at 487. 
 276. Id. at 491. 
 277. Id. (citations omitted). 
 278. 523 U.S. 538 (1998). 
 279. Id. at 556 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 421 (1993) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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It cannot be credibly argued that defendants’ federal constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy forbids any contemplation of victims’ 
interest in punishment. Indeed, victims’ interest in punishment is more 
firmly rooted in American legal history than the states’ interest.280 At 
common law, victims were private prosecutors, and only by enacting 
statutes authorizing public prosecution was the states’ interest in 
punishment newly legitimized.281 Victims’ state constitutional rights 
relegitimize what has always been crime victims’ constitutionally 
permitted interest in punishment. Put another way, there was no “original 
intent” that double jeopardy exceptions should not apply to violations of 
crime victims’ rights. 
In light of victims’ interest in punishment, when victims’ right to 
speak at sentencing is denied, trial courts do lose jurisdiction to sentence. 
The contrary view in Ford.282 puts formalism over substance by 
implicitly assuming that victims, as third parties, cannot seek the voiding 
remedy. Yet even the Ford formalism is no longer relevant and its 
implied premise is wrong. While victims may still not be full parties in 
felony criminal prosecutions, victims are also no longer merely third-
party outsiders in relation to exercising state constitutional rights. 
Victims’ rights grant them participant status for pleas and sentencing. 
Thus, the formalism of third-party status in contexts other than victims’ 
rights can no longer credibly be used to deny victims the remedy of 
voiding pleas and sentences because, like the state, the victims have an 
interest in punishment and a right to speak at sentencing. 
The Ford court’s implicit holding that double jeopardy bars voiding 
when victims’ rights are violated is fundamentally flawed. Moreover, the 
Ford opinion is troubling because the same court reached the opposite 
result in the same case in an earlier, and later withdrawn, unpublished 
opinion. In the earlier opinion, the court held: “We cannot agree with the 
state that only the order of restitution should be revisited, however, and 
accordingly quash the pleas and remand for further proceedings with 
adequate notice to the petitioner and remaining victims.”283 Of course, 
appellate courts engaged in ongoing deliberation are free to reformulate 
 280. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 127–28 (1998) (Stevens, J., 
concurring); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 96 (J.P. Mayer ed., Doubleday & 
Co. 1969) (1838). 
 281. See Beloof, supra note 10, at 291 n.16. 
 282. See supra notes 263–72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ford holding. 
 283. Ford v. State, No. 4D01-4165, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 10815, at *4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
July 31, 2002). 
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their views. But certainly such a significant shift in a constitutional rights 
case of first impression resulting in the denial of the voiding remedy 
should be accompanied by explanation. Instead, the lack of analysis in 
Ford is representative of judicial denigration of victims’ rights. The 
critical remedial issue concerning victims’ constitutional rights was, 
perhaps, too insignificant to the court for the court to undertake a 
comprehensive analysis of its dubious demise. At bottom, Ford, in both 
its result and the short shrift given the issue, stubbornly affirms the very 
criminal justice culture that victims’ rights were meant to change—a 
culture that suppresses victims’ interests. 
Most state constitutions also expressly grant victims the right to 
speak at sentencing. Double jeopardy, however, does not prohibit 
voiding a sentence when victims are denied their right to address the 
court at sentencing. The two exceptions to double jeopardy include, first, 
illegal sentences and, second, sentences conducted in an illegal manner. 
Illegal sentences are those that fail to comply with a substantive statutory 
requirement of the sentence itself, rather than violating a procedural 
prerequisite to imposing sentence. For example, a sentence that flies in 
the face of a statutorily mandated sentence is an illegal sentence because 
it conflicts with the statutory sentencing requirements. The failure to 
impose mandatory restitution is an example of such an illegal sentence. 
Likewise, sentences taken in violation of either the defendants’ right 
or the states’ statutory authority to speak at sentencing are plainly 
sentences taken in an illegal manner. Again, comparison to defendants’ 
rights highlights how courts should treat victims’ rights. The Supreme 
Court, despite the absence of express language granting the right, has 
held that criminal defendants must be given an opportunity to speak at 
sentencing.284 A trial court’s “failure to ask the defendant if he had 
anything to say before sentenc[ing]” requires reversal.285 Absent explicit 
limitations, sentencing in violation of the victims’ right to speak occurs 
in a similarly illegal manner. 
Denial of prosecutors’ right to speak at sentencing is also a denial of 
a necessary prerequisite to sentencing and double jeopardy that does not 
prevent resentencing. In United States v. Crawford,286 for example, the 
sentencing court stopped the government from attempting to speak and 
 284. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961). 
 285. Id. 
 286. 769 F.2d 253, 256 (5th Cir. 1985) (superseded in part by statute as stated in United States 
v. Lopez, 26 F.3d 512, 522 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
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proceeded to sentence without informing government counsel of the right 
to be heard. The government had a right to speak under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 32(a)(1)(C), which provided, “[t]he attorney for the 
government shall have an equivalent opportunity [to the defendant] to 
speak to the court.”287 Defendants, or at least their counsel, knew that a 
sentence taken in an improper manner is unlawful, and they knew that 
the sentence is subject to reversal and can have no legitimate expectation 
of finality in the sentence.288
Victims’ rights to speak at sentencing are similar to defendants’ 
rights and the governments’ statutory authority. For example, the 
Arizona Constitution provides, “[t]o protect and preserve victims’ rights 
to justice and due process, a victim of crime has a right . . . [t]o be heard 
at any proceeding involving . . . a negotiated plea[] and sentencing.”289 
Because the state and defendant know that a sentence taken in an 
improper manner is unlawful, they have no legitimate expectation of 
finality in sentences where the constitutional rights of crime victims are 
violated. Furthermore, the victims’ interest in punishment, discussed 
above, and the victims’ interest in exercising their rights, makes the 
voiding remedy available and appropriate for violation of their rights. 
Double jeopardy should rarely bar courts from vindicating victims’ rights 
by implementing the voiding remedy.  
 
b. Express state, constitutional, and court-placed limits on voiding 
and reconsideration. While voiding and reconsideration remedies are the 
only superior remedies available to crime victims, these remedies are 
sometimes denied to victims in the very constitutional provisions that 
give victims rights. In particular, some victims’ rights provisions 
establish very restrictive limits on voiding and reconsideration remedies. 
These restrictions eliminate standing because remedy is a prerequisite to 
standing. This section summarizes the different state constitutional 
limitations on victims’ rights and also examines how some state courts 
illegitimately use these limitations to infringe further upon victims’ 
rights. 
In Oregon and Virginia, for example, there is no victim standing to 
ensure that rights can be exercised in criminal cases because there is no 
voiding or reconsideration remedy available. The Oregon Constitution 
 287. Id. at 255 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(1)(c)). 
 288. Id. at 255–56.  
 289. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(4). 
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provides that the section may not “be used to invalidate . . . [a] ruling of 
a court, conviction or adjudication.”290 The Virginia Constitution 
similarly provides, “[t]his section does not confer upon any person a 
right to appeal or modify any decision in a criminal proceeding.”291 
These constitutional provisions do not provide for real rights because the 
rights can be violated egregiously and even intentionally, without 
meaningful redress.292 In these two states, the only hope to achieve the 
remedies of voiding and reconsideration is amendment of the state 
constitutions or redress to current and completely independent statutory 
rights and remedies. 
Kansas,293 Missouri,294 and Idaho295 prohibit setting aside a “finding 
of guilty or not guilty.” However, to the extent that federal double 
jeopardy limits already prohibit voiding a verdict, these state provisions 
have little additional practical effect on victims’ standing. To the extent 
these limitations exceed double jeopardy, they have an additional effect 
of preventing voiding and reconsideration remedies. Nevada,296 
 290. OR. CONST. art. I, § 42(2). 
 291. VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A. 
 292. In these jurisdictions, until and unless the victims amendments are changed, only inferior 
remedies can be established by the legislature for rights violations. Inferior remedies are discussed in 
Part II.C.1. 
 293. KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15(c) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize a 
court to set aside or to void a finding of guilty or not guilty or an acceptance of a plea of guilty or to 
set aside any sentence imposed or any other final disposition in any criminal case.”). 
 294. MO. CONST. art. I, § 32(4) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize a 
court to set aside or to void a finding of guilt, or an acceptance of a plea of guilty in any criminal 
case.”). 
 295. The Idaho Constitution provides:  
Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize a court to dismiss a case, to set 
aside or void a finding of guilt or an acceptance of a plea of guilty, or to obtain appellate, 
habeas corpus, or other relief from any criminal judgment, for a violation of the 
provisions of this section; nor be construed as creating a cause of action for money 
damages, costs or attorneys fees against the state, a county, a municipality, any agency, 
instrumentality or person; nor be construed as limiting any rights for victims previously 
conferred by statute. 
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22. 
 296. The Nevada Constitution provides: 
3. Except as otherwise provided for in subsection 4, no person may maintain an action 
against the state or any public official or employee for damages or injunctive, declaratory 
or other legal or equitable relief on behalf of a victim of crime as a result of a violation of 
any statute enacted by the legislature pursuant to subsection 2. No such violation 
authorizes setting aside a conviction or sentence or continuing or postponing a criminal 
proceeding. 
4. A person may maintain an action to compel a public officer or employee to carry out 
any duty required by the legislature pursuant to subsection 2.  
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Illinois,297 and Oregon298 prohibit “setting aside the conviction,” and 
Idaho,299 Kansas,300 and Missouri301 prohibit setting aside a “plea of 
guilty.” Idaho,302 Utah,303 and Oregon304 prohibit challenging a 
“criminal judgment.” Nevada and Connecticut prohibit setting aside a 
“sentence.”305 In these eight states, once the judgment is entered, neither 
a conviction nor a sentence can be voided because the remedy is 
foreclosed by the victims’ rights provisions themselves. Courts cannot 
order a plea or sentence undone if there are express limitations on such a 
remedy in the constitutional rights provisions. 
On the other hand, Arizona, South Carolina, Nebraska, and Texas do 
not prevent a victim from contesting a violation of victims’ rights. The 
Arizona Constitution provides that “[a] victim’s exercise of any right 
granted by this section shall not be grounds for dismissing any criminal 
proceeding or setting aside any conviction or sentence.”306 South 
NEV. CONST. art. I, § (8)(3)–(4). 
 297. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(d) (“Nothing in this Section or in any law enacted under this 
Section shall be construed as creating a basis for vacating a conviction or a ground for appellate 
relief in any criminal case.”). 
 298. The Oregon Constitution provides: 
Nothing in this section reduces a criminal defendant’s rights under the Constitution of the 
United States. Except as otherwise specifically provided this section supercedes any 
conflicting section of this Constitution. Nothing in this section is intended to create any 
cause of action for compensation or damages nor may this section be used to invalidate 
an accusatory instrument, ruling of a court, conviction or adjudication or otherwise 
suspend or terminate any criminal or juvenile delinquency proceedings at any point after 
the case is commenced or on appeal. 
OR. CONST. art. I, § 42(2). 
 299. See supra note 295. 
 300. See supra note 293. 
 301. See supra note 294. 
 302. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (prohibiting victims’ rights from creating appellate relief “from 
any criminal judgment”). 
 303. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(2) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a 
cause of action for money damages, costs, or attorney’s fees, or for dismissing any criminal charge, 
or relief from any criminal judgment.”). 
 304. See supra note 298. 
 305. See supra note 296; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8b(10) (“Nothing in this subsection or in any 
law enacted pursuant to this subsection shall be construed as creating a basis for vacating a 
conviction or ground for appellate relief in any criminal case.”). On the other hand, ARIZ. CONST. 
art. II, § 2.1(B) provides that “[a] victim’s exercise of any right granted by this section shall not be 
grounds for dismissing any criminal proceeding or setting aside any conviction or sentence.” By its 
language, this provision would appear to allow victims in Arizona, however, to seek to void a plea or 
sentence if victims were denied the opportunity to exercise their rights. Taken in context, the 
limitation was plainly aimed at preventing the defendant’s use of the right to void. 
 306. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(B) (emphasis added). 
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Carolina has a similar provision that states that “[a] victim’s exercise of 
any right granted by this section is not grounds for dismissing any 
criminal proceeding or setting aside any conviction or sentence.”307 By 
the plain language of these provisions, victims in Arizona and South 
Carolina can seek to void a plea or sentence if they were denied the 
ability to exercise their rights. 
Nevertheless, in refusing to void a plea bargain, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court held that state victims’ rights expire as a matter of law 
after the defendant is sentenced: 
Once a criminal case has been resolved and the defendant is sentenced, 
the alleged victim loses his status under the Victims’ Bill of Rights. 
The trial court cannot use the Victims’ Bill of Rights to re-open a 
completed criminal proceeding. Further, even if the solicitor fails to 
honor the Victims’ Bill of Rights during a criminal proceeding, this 
Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to reopen a criminal proceeding 
once it is resolved.308
Such a harsh opinion, imposing a judicial barrier to review and 
remedy well beyond double jeopardy or the plain language of the South 
Carolina Constitution, reveals the judicial commitment to keeping 
victims’ rights illusory.309 In fact, the South Carolina Constitution 
provides that “[a] victim’s exercise of any right granted by this section is 
not grounds for dismissing any criminal proceeding or setting aside any 
conviction or sentence.”310 This constitutional language does not limit 
voiding of pleas and sentences as a remedy when victims are prevented 
from exercising their rights. Plainly the provision means a victim cannot 
challenge a sentence imposed after the victim had an opportunity to 
exercise his rights. Faced with this reality, the court created its own 
roadblock to remedy through the artifice of eliminating victim status 
upon disposition. Of course, unless waived, criminal defendants do not 
lose their ability to contest rights violations upon sentencing. The court 
posited no reason, much less a credible reason, in creating this double 
standard for victims’ rights. A victim should retain victim status and 
standing at least until the litigation concerning a rights violation is final 
on review. To rule otherwise creates an “Alice in Wonderland” process 
 307. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(C)(1). 
 308. Ex parte Littlefield, 540 S.E.2d 81 (2000). 
 309. For an enumerated list of the rights rendered illusory, see S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24. 
 310. Id. § 24(C)(1) (emphasis added). 
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in which the rights violation itself is concurrent with the termination of 
victims’ status and rights, thus eliminating any hope of redress. 
As in Arizona and South Carolina, in Nebraska and Texas, victims 
cannot contest sentences taken in a lawful manner that complied with 
victims’ rights. Nebraska and Texas prohibit “contest[ing] the disposition 
of any charge.”311 This language does not, however, appear to prohibit 
victims from contesting a violation of their rights.312 In State ex rel. 
Sistrunk, the victim appealed a violation of a right to speak at 
sentencing.313 The case should have been readily disposed of since the 
Texas Constitution prohibits appeals for violations of victims’ rights—
because appeal was barred for victims’ rights violations, the proper 
review mechanism was writ.314 Instead, the Texas intermediate appellate 
court went out of its way to reach constitutional issues to deny the victim 
standing entirely. Specifically, the court focused on the provision of the 
Texas Constitution providing that a victim cannot “challenge a 
disposition.”315 Thus, in its rush to deny standing, the court failed to 
differentiate between lawful and unlawful disposition. The constitution 
does not prevent victims from contesting a rights violation. Indeed, the 
constitution expressly permits it, providing that a “victim has standing to 
enforce the rights enumerated in this section but does not have standing 
to participate as a party.”316 Read together, a better interpretation of the 
standing language and the prohibition on challenging a disposition is that 
victims cannot contest a lawful disposition. When victims have been 
granted their rights to speak at sentencing, the compliance renders the 
sentence lawful, at least relative to the victim. The constitutional 
 311. NEB. CONST. art. I, §28(3); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(e). 
 312. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28(3) (“Nothing in this section shall constitute a basis for error in 
favor of a defendant in any criminal proceeding, a basis for providing standing to participate as a 
party to any criminal proceeding, or a basis to contest the disposition of any charge.”); TEX. CONST. 
art. I, § 30(e) (“The legislature may enact laws to provide that a judge, attorney for the state, peace 
officer, or law enforcement agency is not liable for a failure or inability to provide a right 
enumerated in this section. The failure or inability of any person to provide a right or service 
enumerated in this section may not be used by a defendant in a criminal case as a ground for appeal 
or post-conviction writ of habeas corpus. A victim or guardian or legal representative of a victim has 
standing to enforce the rights enumerated in this section but does not have standing to participate as 
a party in a criminal proceeding or to contest the disposition of any charge.”). 
 313. 142 S.W.3d 497, 499–500 (Tex. App. 2004). 
 314. For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court properly dismissed a victim appeal because 
appeals are prohibited under the Connecticut Constitution. State v. McCahill, 811 A.2d 667, 672–73 
(Conn. 2002). 
 315. Sistrunk, 142 S.W.3d at 502. 
 316. Id. 
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proscription makes more sense under this interpretation. In Texas, 
victims should not be able to challenge conditions of sentence, but may 
challenge an unlawful disposition that has been rendered unlawful by the 
denial of victims’ rights.
In addition to judicially inserting unlawful sentences into the term 
“disposition,” the Sistrunk court also demonstrated its complete 
misunderstanding of the nature of crime victims’ rights. As one of its 
rationales for refusing to void the sentence, the court opined “if 
noncompliance with victim impact statements does not provide a ground 
for a defendant to set aside his sentence, such noncompliance surely 
provides no ground for the victims to challenge the sentence.”317 The 
only explanation for this dramatically erroneous analysis is that the court 
was simply unaware that victims’ rights are personal to the victim, not 
the defendant. 
Unfortunately, this is yet another case in which the victim’s lawyer 
made an ill-considered concession. The victim’s lawyer conceded that 
“the law does not provide a remedy for victims when their rights are 
violated.”318 To the contrary, nothing in the Texas Constitution prohibits 
voiding unlawful dispositions.319
Another limitation on reconsideration and voiding occurs when the 
constitutional rights leave exclusive remedial authority to the legislature 
and the legislature fails to enact remedies. For example, the Nebraska 
Constitution provides that “there shall be no remedies other than as 
specifically provided by the Legislature for the enforcement of the rights 
granted by this section.”320 Correctly, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
refused to remedy a violation of a victim’s constitutional rights when the 
legislature had not yet enacted remedies.321 Without legislative action in 
Nebraska, victims in Nebraska can only enforce their rights through 
another constitutional amendment. Fortunately, this dilemma does not 
exist in most other state constitutions, because unlike Nebraska, most 
other state constitutions state that the legislature “may” provide for 
remedies. In these states, legislatures and courts share remedial 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30. 
 320. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28. 
 321. State ex rel. Lamm v. Neb. Bd. of Pardons, 620 N.W.2d 763, 769 (Neb. 2001). 
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responsibility, and courts can enforce core provisions of their 
constitutions, including voiding and reconsideration remedies.322
The Alabama Constitution contains another type of limitation by 
expressly limiting “causes of action” and prohibiting the legislature from 
establishing causes of action under the victims’ rights amendment.323 
This causes a problem for victims’ rights, because as the Tenth Circuit 
pointed out in the McVeigh case, if all causes of action by any person are 
prohibited, then victims may not even resort to writs to enforce their 
rights.324 However, the prevalence of restrictions against monetary 
causes of action in many other state constitutions325 may indicate that the 
 322. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text for a discussion of constitutions with 
language that allows legislatures to take part in enabling victims’ rights. 
 323. The Alabama Constitution provides that “[n]othing in this amendment or in any enabling 
statute adopted pursuant to this amendment shall be construed as creating a cause of action against 
the state or any of its agencies, officials, employees, or political subdivisions.” ALA. CONST. art. I, § 
6.01(b). Of course, the Alabama Legislature could create a statutory scheme independent of the 
constitution that provided rights, standing, and remedies. Otherwise, it would take a constitutional 
amendment to provide judicial remedies. 
 324. United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325, 335 (10th Cir. 1997). The court stated: 
Finally, and in any event, Congress explicitly instructed that the Act “does not create a 
cause of action or defense in favor of any person arising out of the failure to accord to a 
victim the rights enumerated in subsection (b).” The excluded witnesses argue this 
provision relates only to independent enforcement actions and does not bar appeal or 
mandamus challenges within the criminal proceeding itself, but this facially 
uncompelling contention is undercut further by a decision of this court in an analogous 
standing context. In United States v. Kelley, 997 F.2d 806, 807–08 (10th Cir. 1993), we 
joined a line of authority holding that crime victims do not have standing under the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663, to appeal unfavorable 
restitution orders. Significantly, this case law rejects victims’ arguments for standing 
under the VWPA because the history and plain language of the VWPA “do not indicate 
that Congress, either explicitly or implicitly, intended to provide a private cause of action 
to victims.” A fortiori, the Victims’ Rights Act, which explicitly denies any private cause 
of action, does not grant standing to seek review of orders relating to matters covered by 
the Act.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 325. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.01(b) (“The Legislature may from time to time enact enabling 
legislation to carry out and implement this amendment.”); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“Crime 
victims, as defined by law, shall have the following rights as provided by law 
. . . .”); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22(10) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed . . . as creating a 
cause of action [against the state].”); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15(b) (“Nothing in this section shall be 
construed as creating a cause of action for money damages against the state . . . .”); LA. CONST. art. 
I, § 25 (“Nothing in this section shall be the basis of . . . any cause of action for compensation or 
damages against the state . . . .”); MD. CONST. art. 47(C) (“Nothing in this Article permits any civil 
cause of action for monetary damages for violation of any of its provisions . . . .”); MISS. CONST. art. 
III, § 26A (“Nothing in this section . . . shall be construed as creating a cause of action for damages 
against the state . . . .”); MO. CONST. art I, § 32(3) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as 
creating a cause of action for money damages [against the state].”); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8(3) (“[N]o 
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Alabama “no cause of action” clause was included to prohibit civil suits 
for monetary damages, rather than victims’ standing to enforce their 
rights. If this is not the case, Alabama victims have no standing in 
appellate courts to enforce their constitutional rights. If there are no 
causes of action available, it would require an amendment to the 
Alabama Constitution to provide any cause of action. 
Thus, victims faced with express constitutional elimination of a 
remedy have no standing to defend their rights. In the words of Justice 
Wilkins of the Utah Supreme Court, “we cannot impose any corrective 
action on the failure of the prosecutor to inform the court of the request 
to speak . . . with all due formality, thereby according [the victim] his 
constitutional right to actually be heard.”326 In fact, Justice Wilkins goes 
on to recognize that victims’ rights “may be made illusory by the 
intentional or unintentional mishandling of the situation by the 
prosecutor or the trial court, all without meaningful remedy.”327 To 
become real rights, victims’ rights must be accompanied by the voiding 
remedy. 
D. The Review Problem  
There are three types of review problems concerning victims’ rights. 
First, the jurisdictional barriers of mootness and ripeness curtail review 
of rights violations. Furthermore, a problem arises from the prohibition 
of stays on review that renders many victims’ rights cases moot. Second, 
some constitutions have express limits on review. Third, while rights 
violations can be redressed by writ, writ review is merely discretionary, 
rather than granted as a matter of right, and thus courts may ignore 
violations of victims’ rights. 
1. Ripeness and mootness problems and the problem of prohibiting stays 
Problems of ripeness and mootness plague victims’ rights. 
Specifically, constitutional victims’ rights provisions that prohibit 
person may maintain an action against the state . . . for damages . . . .); N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 37(2) 
(Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a claim of money damages against the state . 
. . .”); OHIO CONST. art I, § 10a (“This section . . . does not create any cause of action for 
compensation or damages against the state.”); S.C. CONST. art I, § 24(B) (“Nothing in this section 
creates a civil cause of action on behalf of any person against . . . the State . . . .”); TEX. CONST. art. 
I, § 30(e) (“The legislature may enact laws to provide that a judge [or] attorney for the state . . . is 
not liable for a failure or inability to provide a right enumerated in this section.”). 
 326. State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756, 767 (Utah 2002) (Wilkins, J., concurring). 
 327. Id. 
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voiding eliminate the potential for remedy and render the rights violation 
moot. Because cases are not ripe when they are not yet ready for 
adjudication or review,328 victims are often limited in their ability to 
obtain a pretrial appellate review of rights violations. For example, 
victims might seek to have a court determine well in advance of trial that 
the victims can exercise their right to attend the trial, but courts are 
presently free to put off any decision regarding victims’ rights until 
trial—a delay that makes it difficult to challenge any ruling because 
double jeopardy proscriptions render the issue moot. The issue is mooted 
if the trial is over before the victim can engage an appellate court to 
review the violation and the jurisdiction does not allow for a voiding 
remedy. This double bind of ripeness and mootness works to eliminate 
victim standing to enforce violations of victims’ rights. 
An express restriction on review that promotes mootness is 
manifested in three constitutions, those of Maryland, Nevada, and 
Oregon, which deny stays for review of denial of victims’ rights. While 
allowing for appeal, the Maryland Constitution provides, “[n]othing in 
this article . . . authorizes a victim of crime to take any action to stay a 
criminal justice proceeding.”329 Similarly, the Nevada Constitution, 
while allowing for an action to compel, provides that violations of 
victims’ rights cannot be the basis of “continuing or postponing a 
criminal proceeding.”330 Finally, the Oregon Constitution provides that 
victims’ rights may not be used to “suspend . . . any criminal or juvenile 
delinquency proceedings.”331 These types of “no stay” provisions do not 
expressly prevent review—but they do encourage mootness.332 Mootness 
is encouraged because, absent the ability to stay, the criminal case may 
conclude before the victim issue is resolved on review. As Justice 
Wilkins remarked about the no stay provision in Utah enabling 
statues,333 when a no-stay provision is “juxtaposed with the rights of the 
criminal defendant to a speedy trial and the necessity to move forward 
 328. See, e.g., Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967), overruled on other grounds 
(“[I]t is fair to say that its [ripeness’] basic rationale is to prevent courts, through avoidance of 
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . .”). 
 329. MD. CONST. art. 47(c). 
 330. NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8(3). 
 331. OR. CONST. art. I, § 42(2). 
 332. State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756, 767 (Utah 2002) (Wilkins, J. concurring). 
 333. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-11(2)(b) (1999). 
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with the criminal process . . . appellate relief for [the victim] is a 
practical impossibility.”334  
2. Express limits on review 
Victims can generally obtain review of rights violations through 
writs. Only the Idaho Constitution arguably denies writ relief for 
unlawfully obtained criminal judgments: “Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to authorize a court to dismiss a case, to set aside or void a 
finding of guilt or acceptance of a plea of guilty, or to obtain appellate, 
habeas corpus or other relief from any criminal judgment . . . .”335
Though some states’ constitutional amendments do foreclose the 
opportunity for appellate review, this does not foreclose the use of writs 
to vindicate victims’ rights. For example, the Connecticut Constitution 
precludes appeal of victims’ constitutional rights violations.336 The state 
constitutional amendment provides that nothing in the enabling legislation 
“shall be construed as creating a . . . ground for appellate relief in any 
criminal case.”337 Likewise, the Illinois Constitution states: “[n]othing in 
this Section or in any law enacted under this Section shall be construed 
as creating a ground for appellate relief in any criminal case.”338 
However, these and other similar provisions do not foreclose 
enforcement of the right via writ, because writs are not appeals and 
actions on writs are not criminal matters. The Connecticut Supreme 
Court explained that: “It is well established law that appellate rights are 
 334. Casey, 44 P.3d at 767 (Wilkins, J. concurring). An exception to the rule prohibiting 
review of cases that are moot is cases that are “capable of repetition yet evading review.” Sosna v. 
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399–400 (1975). For example, when courts deny the victim the right to attend 
the trial, and the trial commences without the victim, double jeopardy prohibits retrial. Because the 
trial cannot be voided, there is no remedy and the case is moot. However, a court has discretion to 
review the case even though it cannot remedy the violation, by applying the “capable of repetition 
yet evading review” exception. Opinions issued under this exception create binding precedent 
directing future actions of lower courts. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 
596 (1981) (ruling that a criminal conviction rendered a newspaper’s suit to gain access to the 
courtroom moot but reviewing as capable of repetition yet evading review and establishing binding 
precedent on First Amendment issues and public trial issues). However, this exception cannot 
accurately be described as a solution. The exception is used sparingly and is applied only at the 
discretion of the court. Thus, victims cannot rely on the exception as a consistent way to achieve 
review. 
 335. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (emphasis added). 
 336. CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8(b) (“Nothing in this subsection . . . shall be construed as 
creating a basis for vacating a conviction or ground for appellate relief in any criminal case.”).  
 337. Id. 
 338. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(d). 
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established by statute . . . . [Thus, a] victim seeking appellate vindication 
of [their constitutional rights under the victims’ rights amendment] 
must[, therefore,] proceed, if at all, by writ of error.”339
Other states do not constitutionally mandate appellate review, but 
also do not foreclose legislative action that would allow for appellate 
review. For example, the Louisiana Constitution states, “[n]othing in this 
Section shall be construed to . . . confer upon any person the right to 
appeal or seek supervisory review of any judicial decision made in a 
criminal proceeding.”340 The Virginia Constitution also expressly denies 
that the constitutional amendment provides for appellate review, stating 
that “[t]his section does not confer upon any person a right to appeal . . . 
[in] any decision in a criminal proceeding.”341 So, as in Illinois and 
Connecticut, writs are not foreclosed even absent enabling legislation; 
but, unlike the situations in Illinois and Connecticut, the Louisiana and 
Virginia legislatures remain free to legislatively enable appeal 
procedures for victims. 
Presently, only Maryland and Utah expressly provide for appellate 
review of a trial court’s violation of victims’ rights.342 To date, other 
state courts ruling on this issue have denied victim appeals from final 
judgment in the absence of an express authorizing statute. For example, 
in Colorado and California, courts have ruled that appeals are 
unavailable to victims because they are not considered parties.343 Of 
course, absent constitutional prohibitions, these legislatures could readily 
grant victims the statutory right to appeal. 
On the other hand, writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition are 
available to victims when there is a voiding remedy, whether or not the 
constitutional provisions expressly make writs available. A petition for a 
writ is the method of seeking writ review. The writ remedy is the 
issuance of a writ, accompanied by a command to prosecutors or judges 
 339. State v. McCahill, 811 A.2d 667, 672–73 (Conn. 2002). 
 340. LA. CONST. art. I, § 25. 
 341. VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A. 
 342. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-11 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-103(b) 
(2004) (“A victim of violent crime . . . may file an application for leave to appeal . . . from an 
interlocutory or final order . . . .”). 
 343. See Dix v. Superior Court, 807 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Cal. 1991); People v. Gansz, 888 P.2d 
256, 257 (Colo. 1995) (holding that the victim had no right to appeal because the victim was not a 
party and hence had no standing). 
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to comply with the law.344 Such an order is frequently accompanied by 
the voiding of a hearing or result. Petitions are accepted and writs issued 
in the discretion of reviewing courts.345 If the petition is based on 
government conduct outside the scope of the victim’s right, however, the 
writ will not lie. For example, when a victim’s right to speak at 
sentencing was honored, mandamus did not lie for the victim to 
challenge the lawful sentence ultimately imposed by the court.346 
Furthermore, if the petition seeks a remedy that is barred in the victims’ 
rights provisions or is otherwise beyond the court’s authority to impose, 
a writ will not lie. For example, when a constitution provided that a 
conviction could not be voided despite violation of the victim’s right to 
speak at sentencing, a writ of mandamus did not lie.347
Neither full party status nor standing to appeal is required for victims 
to obtain review by writ. The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. McVeigh, 
denied the victim mandamus because former federal victim procedures 
are discretionary, rather than mandatory.348 However, in dicta, the court 
acknowledged that mandamus is available to victims to compel a 
government official to comply with mandatory law despite nonparty 
status and no right to appeal: 
We do not hold that the lack of what is often called “appellate 
standing” necessarily precludes mandamus review. Standing 
encompasses “constitutional considerations related to the ‘case or 
controversy’ limitation of Article III and also prudential concerns ‘that, 
apart from Art. III’s minimum requirements, serve to limit the role of 
the courts in resolving public disputes.’” Article III authority is a 
 344. See, e.g., Cantu v. Longoria, 878 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex. 1991) (“Mandamus issues only 
to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no 
adequate remedy by appeal.”). 
 345. See, e.g., Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976) (“[I]ssuance of the 
writ is in large part a matter of discretion with the court to which the petition is addressed.”). 
 346. Dix, 807 P.2d at 1063; see also Schroering v. McKinney, 906 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. 1995). In 
Schroering, the defendant was convicted of reckless homicide and ultimately granted shock 
probation. Id. at 350. On appeal by the defendant to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the court held that 
although the widow had a personal interest in the outcome, she did not have standing to seek 
mandamus because she was not a party to the case. Id. The Kentucky court is mistaken that only 
parties can bring mandamus in a criminal case. However, the court accurately found that the victim 
had no standing to bring a mandamus action because no right of the victim had been violated. Id. at 
351. Instead, the trial court fully complied with the victim’s right to give an impact statement. Id. at 
350. Because victims have the right of control over a lawful sentence rendered after their rights have 
been complied with, mandamus did not lie. Id. at 351. 
 347. Ex parte Littlefield, 540 S.E.2d 81 (2000). 
 348. 106 F.3d 325, 336 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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prerequisite to judicial review, however sought. In contrast, a 
prudential concern, such as nonparty status, counseling uniquely or 
primarily against the propriety of appeal, need not bar a petition for 
mandamus review. We emphasize that our standing analysis turns on 
constitutional considerations, not the excluded witnesses’ nonparty 
status.349
Mandamus review has taken place in several situations. For example, 
it has taken place when a victim was not given notice or an opportunity 
to be heard at a hearing in which a California trial court vacated a 
previously entered order of restitution.350 It has taken place when the 
petitioner sought to be classified as a “victim” under federal law351 and 
when a victim challenged an Oregon trial court’s jurisdiction to order 
defendant’s counsel into the victims’ homes.352 Also, it has taken place 
when a Texas trial court had ordered a psychological evaluation of a 
child sexual assault victim by the defendant’s expert.353
The writ of certiorari is available when other means of review are 
not. Appellate courts retain their inherent authority to consider petitions 
for, and issue writs of, certiorari directing lower courts to obey the law. 
Certiorari is also available for violations of victims’ rights. 
In Ford v. State,354 the trial court sentenced the defendants pursuant 
to a plea agreement even though the victims were not notified of the 
hearing as required by the Florida Constitution. The trial court granted 
certiorari review of the victims’ right to restitution.355 The intermediate 
appellate court noted that “this is a violation of a constitutional right for 
which there is no appellate remedy, [and] we agree that the petitioner has 
 349. Id. at 334 n.7 (internal citations omitted). If anything, the enhanced status of crime 
victims as participants, rather than witnesses or third parties, at least in the context of victims’ rights, 
should operate to ensure the availability of writs, particularly because writs are available to victims 
in their lesser, non-constitutional status of witnesses or third parties. 
 350. Melissa J. v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). 
 351. Saum v. Windall, 912 F. Supp. 1384, 1397 (D. Colo. 1996) (issuing a peremptory writ 
because “‘crime victim’ status [under Victim’s Rights and Restitution Act] is reviewable, states a 
valid claim and is not subject to dismissal”). 
 352. State ex rel. Beach v. Norblad, 781 P.2d 349, 350 (Or. 1989) (issuing a peremptory writ 
because the court had no jurisdiction over victim as to order widow to allow search of home in 
which husband was murdered). 
 353. State ex rel. Holmes v. Lanford, 764 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. App. 1989) (issuing writ 
because neither the prosecution nor the court had “authority to force a complaining witness to submit 
to such an invasion of her right to privacy”). 
 354. 829 So. 2d 946, 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
 355. Id. at 947. 
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demonstrated certiorari jurisdiction.”356 On review, petitioners sought to 
void the restitution order and have it changed to divide payments in 
proportion to each victim’s loss, rather than to be evenly split among the 
victims.357 The court issued a writ so ordering.358 Similarly, in the Iowa 
case of State v. West,359 victims petitioned for a writ of certiorari 
alleging that the trial court erroneously denied their claims to share in a 
restitution fund.360 The court reviewed the petition because the victims 
did not have standing to appeal and they were injured financially in a 
way different from the public generally.361 Ultimately, the court denied 
the writ only because the petitioner was not a victim under the state’s 
legal definition.362
Like other forms of writ, writs of prohibition prevent trial courts 
and—when they are acting in a quasi-judicial capacity—prosecutors 
from acting without jurisdiction. For example, in State ex rel. Miller v. 
Smith,363 the West Virginia Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition, 
petitioned for by the crime victim to prevent the prosecutor from 
interfering with the victim’s access to a state grand jury.364 The 
prosecutor had violated the constitutional rights of the people, in this 
case the victim, to report crimes to the grand jury.365 The court issued 
the writ under its inherent authority to uphold constitutional rights.366 In 
Missouri, a trial court sought to close the courtroom to the press and 
public.367 The victim, however, applying a state constitutional provision 
allowing the victim to attend trial, sought a writ of prohibition to prevent 
the court from excluding the victim from the courtroom.368 The appellate 
court accepted review on the writ but ultimately determined that the 
 356. Id. at 948. 
 357. Id. at 947. 
 358. Petitioners also asked the court to void the plea and reinstate the charges. The court 
denied the writ based upon particular language in the victims’ constitutional rights providing that 
victims’ rights must “not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused.” Id.; FLA. CONST. 
art. I, § 16(b). 
 359. 320 N.W. 2d 570 (Iowa 1982). 
 360. Id. at 571. 
 361. Id. at 573. 
 362. Id. at 574–75. 
 363. 285 S.E.2d 500 (W. Va. 1981). 
 364. Id. at 506–07. 
 365. Id. at 501–02. 
 366. Id. at 506–07. 
 367. State ex rel. Pulitzer Inc. v. Autry, 19 S.W.3d 710 (Mo. App. 2000). 
 368. Id. at 711. 
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victim was not a subject of the trial court’s order excluding the press and 
the public.369 Other modern victims’ constitutional rights should also be 
enforceable by writ of prohibition.370
Thus, even in jurisdictions where there is no express provision for 
review, writs are available to crime victims. Writs of certiorari, 
mandamus, and prohibition have been properly utilized by victims to 
challenge unlawful government action in criminal cases. It is 
unnecessary for constitutional provisions or statutes to expressly provide 
victims with review via writ in order for such writs to be available to 
victims. Writs are available for victims’ rights violations only when the 
rights are not discretionary, the violation is within the scope of the rights, 
and voiding or reconsideration remedies properly accompany the 
issuance of writs. 
However, writs are issued only at the discretion of the reviewing 
court.371 Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only in rare 
cases,372 and courts will proceed with great caution before granting relief 
in the nature of mandamus.373 This means that in jurisdictions without 
review as a matter of right, courts are never forced to review victims’ 
rights violations, and, in all likelihood, courts rarely will. Moreover, 
courts are not required to provide any reason for declining to review writ 
petitions. Even if victims’ rights have successfully jumped all other 
hurdles in the race towards enforcement, the odds are that unlimited 
appellate court discretion will prevent them from ever reaching the finish 
line. Thus, discretionary writs are not reliably available review 
mechanisms for victims seeking to enforce their rights. 
Part II has revealed the challenges faced in achieving real victims’ 
rights. In sum, there are three general problems: (1) discretion, (2) 
inadequate remedies, and (3) review problems. Discretion issues include: 
the problems discretion poses to achieving mandatory and enabled rights 
which are necessary to standing; the inability to achieve standing where a 
particular right is accompanied by government discretion to ignore the 
right; and the problem of judicial discretion to interpret rights narrowly. 
 369. Id. at 717. 
 370. See also Burdette v. Lobban, 323 S.E.2d 601, 603 (W. Va. 1984) (issuing a writ of 
prohibition to overturn order requiring child victim to be interviewed by defense outside the 
presence of the victim’s attorney). 
 371. LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). 
 372. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949). 
 373. Laughlin v. Reynolds, 196 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1952). 
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Next, inadequate remedies, remedies other than voiding and 
reconsideration, were revealed to be inferior because they do not provide 
victims the opportunity to exercise their rights in cases involving their 
own victimization. Furthermore, these inferior remedies are unlikely to 
have sufficient force to deter government rights violations. Voiding and 
reconsideration remedies are superior remedies to ensure compliance 
with victims’ rights. 
Finally, the discretionary nature of writ review, the most commonly 
available method of review, means that enforcement of victims’ rights 
violations will be rare. 
These ways in which victims are denied standing do not only create 
challenges for victims, but impose significant dysfunctions in law and 
undermine conventional canons of civil rights. 
III. THE MANY DYSFUNCTIONS OF ILLUSORY RIGHTS 
Without standing, the remedy of voiding, and nondiscretionary 
review, crime victims’ rights are illusory rights. The most significant 
problem with illusory rights is that crime victims cannot enforce their 
rights in a way that ensures they will be able to exercise those rights. 
Instead, the very governments against whom the rights are meant to be 
exercised remain free to ignore, and even intentionally violate, victims’ 
rights. Many significant problems stem from victims’ rights without 
standing. Without victim standing to enforce victims’ rights, judicial 
hierarchy is turned upside down because the trial courts are allowed to 
usurp appellate courts’ traditional authority, hierarchy of laws is upset, 
adversity is corrupted, rights enforcement is crippled, victim advocacy in 
favor of defendants is constrained, and constitutional rights are degraded. 
A. No Standing Turns Judicial Hierarchy Upside Down 
Given that victims’ rights are routinely exercised at the trial court 
level, significant dysfunctions arise when victims are denied appellate 
standing. No state appellate court has ever denied access at the trial court 
level to victims exercising their rights. In People v. Stringham, the court 
held that a victim had trial court access to make a statement regarding a 
plea bargain.374 Trial-level access was based upon the state statutory 
right to speak at sentencing and also upon the proposition that a plea 
 374. 253 Cal. Rptr. 484, 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
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bargain necessarily involves sentencing issues.375 In rejecting the 
argument that the victim did not have access to the trial court, the 
appellate court held that “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of a more 
absurd result than to . . . prevent a victim . . . from having a meaningful 
opportunity to protest a plea bargain [in the trial court] that will allow a 
defendant to escape the punishment which the victim . . . feels is 
appropriate to the crime.”376 For the Stringham court, the cost of denying 
trial-level access is unacceptable because it denies victims an opportunity 
to exercise their rights. 
Even a state court taking an excessively restrictive view of appellate 
court access has required trial court access. The Massachusetts Supreme 
Court held that a statutory provision providing a victim with a right to 
“prompt disposition” did not extend beyond the initial sentencing 
hearing.377 Nevertheless, the court went on: “We conclude . . . that a 
victim asserting the right 
. . . should be provided with an opportunity to address the [trial] court 
when that right is jeopardized.”378 For this court, the cost of denying the 
victim trial court access to defend rights was unacceptable. 
A thorough treatment of victim trial-level standing under a state 
constitution is found in the New Jersey case of In re K.P.379 The decision 
was based on victims’ broad constitutional right to “fairness” and 
“respect” in conjunction with victims’ specific right to be present at 
trial.380 In K.P., the trial court faced the issue of whether a crime victim 
has standing to oppose a newspaper’s motion to open to the public a 
closed juvenile proceeding.381 The court thoroughly reviewed United 
States Supreme Court law on standing, as well as New Jersey’s 
constitutional and statutory crime victim law.382 The court held that “a 
victim has standing [in trial court], and an unarticulated right to oppose a 
petition by the press to open a juvenile proceeding.”383 These cases make 
clear that victims have access to trial courts in order to exercise their 
rights.  
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. at 491. 
 377. Hagen v. Commonwealth, 772 N.E.2d 32, 34 (Mass. 2002). 
 378. Id. 
 379. 709 A.2d 315 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997). 
 380. Id. at 319–22. 
 381. Id. at 319. 
 382. Id. at 319–22. 
 383. Id. at 322. 
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With real rights, like defendants’ rights, appellate courts are the 
ultimate arbiters of the meaning of constitutional rights. On the other 
hand, illusory victims’ rights—with trial-level standing and no appellate 
court standing—turn judicial hierarchy upside down. In this upside down 
process, trial courts are the ultimate arbiters of victims’ constitutional 
rights. Each trial court can arrive at unique conclusions about the 
meaning and scope of victims’ rights. Moreover, these trial courts can 
apply their disparate interpretations of constitutional rights without fear 
of reversal. The result is different rights for different victims based on 
which trial judge presides over the case. Such a process erodes the 
meaning of victims’ rights, confidence in the judicial system, and time 
honored judicial hierarchies of constitutional authority. This would never 
be tolerated for criminal defendants’ rights. It should not be tolerated for 
victims’ rights. 
B. No Standing Upsets the Hierarchy of Laws 
In our hierarchy of laws, statutes are lesser laws than constitutions. 
Providing victims’ standing to enforce statutes, but not constitutional 
rights, contradicts this hierarchy of laws. In a variety of statutory 
contexts, victims have standing, remedy, and review. First, crime victims 
have standing to seek review of the denial of a personally held 
evidentiary privilege. For example, crime victims have evidentiary 
privileges to keep their crisis counseling records confidential.384 With 
personally held privileges, victims can seek appellate court review of a 
denial of these statutory privileges.385  
Standing has been granted to victims in other contexts as well. Thus, 
mandamus was allowed when a victim challenged an Oregon trial court’s 
jurisdiction to order defendant’s counsel into the victim’s home386 and 
when a Texas trial court ordered a psychological evaluation of a child 
sexual assault victim by defendant’s expert.387
 384. See Euphemia L. Warren, She’s Gotta Have It Now: A Qualified Rape Crisis Counselor-
Victim Privilege, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 141, 146 (1995) (listing sixteen states with crisis counselor 
privileges). 
 385. See infra notes 385–402 and accompanying text. 
 386. State ex rel. Beach v. Norblad, 781 P.2d 349, 350 (Or. 1989) (issuing a peremptory writ 
since the trial court had no jurisdiction over the victim as to order a widow to allow search of home 
where husband was murdered). 
 387. State ex. rel. Holmes v. Blanford, 764 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (issuing 
writ because neither the prosecution nor the court had “authority to force a complaining witness to 
submit to such an invasion of her right to privacy”). 
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Victims have been granted standing in the statutory rape shield 
context. In a Fourth Circuit decision, Doe v. United States, the court 
granted an interlocutory appeal to a rape victim from a district court’s 
pretrial denial of the protections of the federal rape shield law.388 In Doe, 
the defendant asserted that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal.389 First, the court observed that “[t]he text, purpose, and 
legislative history of [the rape shield law] clearly indicate that Congress 
enacted the rule for the special benefit of the victims of rape.”390 The 
court observed that the rule made no reference to appeal.391 Regardless, 
the circuit held that the “remedy [was] implicit as a necessary corollary 
of the [rape shield] rule’s explicit protection of the privacy interests 
Congress sought to safeguard.”392 The court found significant the fact 
that “[n]o other party in the evidentiary proceeding shares these interests 
to the extent that they might be viewed as a champion of the victim’s 
rights.”393 The court found that “congressional intent . . . will be 
frustrated if rape victims are not allowed to appeal an erroneous 
evidentiary ruling.”394
The court then turned to the law governing review of final decisions 
from trial courts, a prerequisite to appeal,395 and reviewed United States 
Supreme Court precedent holding that the requirement of finality in the 
statute be “given a ‘practical rather than a technical construction.’”396 
Furthermore, “[t]he [Supreme] Court . . . instructed that the most 
important considerations for determining whether an order is final are 
‘the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and 
 388. 666 F.2d 43, 45 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. at 46. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. 
 393. Id. 
 394. Id. 
 395. Id.  
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of 
the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the 
District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a 
direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in 
sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title. 
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2004)). 
 396. Doe, 666 F.2d at 46 (quoting Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 
(1964)). 
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the danger of denying justice by delay on the other.’”397 The Doe court 
balanced these factors, noting that “[t]he inconvenience and costs 
associated with permitting the victim to appeal are minimal . . . [and] no 
greater than those resulting from government appeals of suppression 
orders.”398 Furthermore, “[b]ecause the [rape shield] rule provides for 
pre-trial evidentiary hearings, appeals are unlikely to involve significant 
postponements of criminal trials.”399 The court noted that in the instant 
case, the appeal was heard with no delay of the criminal trial.400 The 
court observed that on the other side of the balance was the manifest 
“injustice to rape victims in delaying an appeal until” final judgment.401 
Absent “immediate appeal, victims aggrieved by the court’s order will 
have no opportunity to protect their privacy from invasions forbidden by 
the [rape shield] rule.”402 The court observed that “[a]ppeal following 
[judgment] is no remedy, for the harm that the rule seeks to prevent 
already will have occurred.”403 Having concluded that appeal was in 
keeping with congressional intent to safeguard rape victims’ privacy 
interests, that no other party could “champion . . . the victim’s rights,”404 
and that the test of practical finality was met, the court granted the victim 
standing to bring an interlocutory appeal, ultimately reversing the trial 
court order allowing disclosure of prior sexual conduct at trial.405
A central function of constitutionalizing rights is to ensure their 
enforcement. In our hierarchy of laws, constitutional rights possess a 
greater status than statutes. It makes little sense to deny standing, 
remedy, and review for constitutional rights violations when they are 
available to victims for violations of statutory victim laws. 
 397. Id. (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)). 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id.; see also State v. Johnson, 944 P.2d 869, 871 (N.M. 1997). The court granted the 
state’s petition for writ of certiorari to examine the trial court’s order disclosing information 
allegedly protected by the rape shield law. The court found the evidence inadmissible and issued the 
writ. 
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C. No Standing Corrupts Adversity 
Without victim standing, victims’ rights can only be contested on 
review by parties that have no personal stake in the right.406 Yet, only 
victims can predictably be truly adverse to those infringing upon their 
rights. In Doe, a context analogous to victims’ rights, the Fourth Circuit 
Court granted a rape victim an appeal from an adverse ruling under 
federal rape shield laws and opined that “[n]o other party in the 
evidentiary proceeding shares these interests to the extent that they might 
be viewed as a champion of the victim’s rights.”407 Victims are the only 
ones personally interested in their rights. As a result, the adversarial 
system will never work properly unless victims are granted standing, 
remedy, and review to enforce their rights. 
 406. Victims’ rights have been contested between defendants and prosecutors in a variety of 
contexts. Burden of Proof: The defendant has the burden to prove that his rights are violated when 
victims’ rights are exercised. See State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30, 33 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(noting that the defendant has the burden of proof to demonstrate that rights are violated). Due 
Process: In allowing defendants access to the victim’s medical records, an Arizona appellate court 
ruled that the state victim’s rights amendment must give way to the requirements of the federal 
constitution. Landon v. State, No. A-6479, 1999 WL 46543, *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1999) 
(holding that federal due process is not violated by a victim’s attendance at trial because there is no 
constitutional right to exclude witnesses); State v. Fulminante, 975 P.2d 75, 92 (Ariz. 1999) (holding 
that due process rights were not violated when victim’s mother was allowed to attend trial and that 
there could be no violation absent prejudice of constitutional magnitude); State ex rel. Romley v. 
Superior Court, 836 P.2d 445, 449 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992);  Wheeler v. State, 596 A.2d 78, 88–89 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (ruling that a victim could only be excluded upon a showing of good 
cause and that because the victim testified first, the court had no good cause to exclude). In 
California, allowing the victim to attend the trial did not violate defendant’s fair trial or 
confrontation rights. Rules of sequestration are legislative, not constitutional. People v. Huber, 227 
Cal. Rptr. 113, 132–33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), aff’d on other grounds, 5 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1993). 
Presumption of Innocence: There was no violation of the presumption of a defendant’s innocence 
when the victim was allowed to attend proceedings prior to conviction. Bellamy v. State, 594 So. 2d 
337, 338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). Speedy Trial for Victim: A trial court could properly balance the 
victim’s right to a speedy trial and the court’s prerogative to control its own docket to deny a 
continuance to facilitate the defendant’s preparation when the defendant had fired his lawyer and 
chosen to represent himself. State v. Lamar, 72 P.3d 831, 836 (Ariz. 2003). Pretrial Interviews: The 
Arizona Constitution gives the crime victim a right to decline a pretrial interview. The court of 
appeals held that the defendant has no constitutional right to a pretrial interview under the 
Confrontation Clause because a defendant has no general constitutional right to pretrial discovery. 
State ex rel. Romley v. Hutt, 987 P.2d 218, 222 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). Ex Post Facto: The restriction 
against ex post facto laws is not violated when the law granting victims the right to speak at 
sentencing or at parole hearings was passed after the defendant committed the crime. Huber, 227 
Cal. Rptr. at 133. When a crime is committed, and then the victim’s right to speak at sentencing is 
created, a victim impact statement does not violate ex post facto laws. Forsythe v. Walters, No. 00-
3352, 2002 WL 1283400, *2 (3d Cir. May 3, 2002) (finding that because a victim’s right to speak is 
not a right to punishment, there was no ex post facto violation). 
 407. Doe, 666 F.2d at 46. 
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Absent standing for victims, the defendant and prosecutor are vested 
with control over the existence and the scope of the victims’ rights 
controversy. The parties may not be interested in defending victims’ 
rights or may take a position that denies the rights their full potential. For 
example, if the parties agree that victims’ rights violations do not 
concern them, the rights issue will die regardless of whether appellate 
courts would ultimately agree with victims’ concerns. Furthermore, there 
are circumstances in which the state and defendants are both adverse to 
victims’ interests, like a victim’s right to speak in opposition to plea 
agreements. The parties may act to prevent or circumscribe the exercise 
of victims’ rights by refusing to provide notice of a right or of a hearing 
date. 
Furthermore, prosecutorial control of victims’ rights provides fertile 
ground for ethical conflicts of interest. It is a mistake to define the state 
and victims as nonadversaries simply because both are harmed by the 
criminal act and share an interest in punishment. Adversariness exists 
when prosecutors violate victims’ rights. Moreover, the public prosecutor 
is obligated to the public interest. When the public interest and victims’ 
rights coincide, perhaps no conflict exists. However, when there is 
conflict, the prosecution cannot reasonably be expected to defend 
victims’ rights. Absent provisions for victim standing when there is a 
conflict, a rights violation will go unredressed. In recognition of this 
reality, Arizona law provides that “[i]n any event of any conflict of 
interest . . . the prosecutor shall have the responsibility to direct the 
victim to the appropriate legal referral, legal assistance, or legal aid 
agency.”408 When in conflict, the prosecutor cannot serve two masters, 
and the victim necessarily becomes the odd man out. Without standing 
and remedy, victims are powerless to enforce their rights to oppose the 
plea bargain, and such powerlessness eliminates the potential for true 
adversity. 
D. No Standing Cripples Rights Enforcement 
Denying victims standing to enforce their rights means that only the 
state can litigate rights violations. However, the state is far from a 
consistent advocate for crime victims’ rights.409 First, the state itself may 
 408. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 39(c)(3) (2004). 
 409. See, for example, supra notes 263–72 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ford v. 
State, and the discussion in the previous section, Part III.C, about how the state’s and victim’s 
interests are often in opposition. Indeed, state courts would benefit by soliciting amicus briefs from 
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be the violator. Thus, in state after state where the prosecution has 
violated victims’ rights to be heard at a disposition, prosecutors have 
taken the position that victims cannot seek to void the plea or 
sentence.410 On the other hand, if the state is not the violator, it will 
typically defend victims’ rights against defendants’ attempts to reverse 
convictions because the state has an interest in upholding convictions.411  
In any other context, the state cannot consistently be relied on to 
defend victims’ rights because the state’s decisions to defend victims’ 
rights are frequently based on other priorities. Whether the state will 
choose to defend the right is only predictable when the other priorities of 
the state are known. Changing priorities may lead the state to take 
diametrically opposed positions concerning the same victims’ rights 
issue. Thus, the state will support the right if convictions are thereby 
defended and oppose victims’ rights if judicial denial of the rights is of 
minimal consequence to the prosecution.412
Whether there is conflict or not, the state is under no legal obligation 
to defend victims’ rights and can decline to defend the rights simply out 
of indifference. In the context of defendants’ rights, the state could not be 
such an exclusive gatekeeper over review of rights violations. The state 
should not have such authority over victims’ rights. Instead, victims 
should be able to enforce their rights independently of the state. This is 
the only way to obtain enforcement of rights when the state faces a 
conflict, has other priorities, or is simply disinterested. 
local and national victim organizations, such as the National Crime Victim Law Institute at Lewis 
and Clark Law School. 
 410. Cf. Ex parte Littlefield, 540 S.E.2d 81, 84–85 (S.C. 2000); State v. Sistrunk, 142 S.W.3d 
497, 502 (Tex. App. 2004); State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756, 760 (Utah 2002). 
 411. E.g., State v. Landon, No. A-6479, 1999 WL 46543, *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1999). 
 412. Ironically, victims in general may be better off by choosing only to defend their rights 
when the state is defending a conviction (and thus certain to defend victims’ rights) than victims who 
attempt to assert their rights when the state is the violator. While this may be a sound tactical choice 
given present reality, any need for such a tactic is completely contrary to constitutional conventions. 
Individuals should be able to defend their constitutional rights regardless of the government’s 
position. This routine state emphasis on preserving a ruling or conviction made sense in a two party 
criminal process. Without victim participants, rulings not adverse to the state were usually adverse to 
the defendant. Now, rulings can be made that are adverse to the victim, and may or may not be 
adverse to the state or defendant. Certainly, the state should be more circumspect than to reflexively 
defend trial court denials of victims’ rights when the chances of conviction are unaffected by the 
denial. Exercising its discretion, the state can weigh public policy. The state might consciously 
recognize that victims’ rights across all prosecutions are more advantageous to the state than 
opposing the right in a particular case. 
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E. Victims’ Advocacy in Favor of Defendants Is Constrained 
Absent victim standing and with the state in control of rights 
enforcement, victims’ rights are artificially framed as rights conflicting 
with defendants’ rights, even though victims’ rights are centrally rights 
against the government.413
Though they have rights against the government, victims cannot look 
to defendants to make up for the victims’ standing deficit, even if the 
victim intends to exercise his right for the benefit of the defendant. 
Defendants do not have standing to contest denials of victims’ rights 
because victims’ rights are not personal to defendants. For example, in 
the Illinois case of People v. Richardson,414 the defendant was denied 
review under the victims’ rights language of the Illinois Constitution 
because the provisions serve “as a shield to protect the rights of victims 
[not to be] used as a sword by criminal defendants seeking appellate 
relief.”415 As a result, defendants can only challenge the granting of 
victims’ rights when it conflicts with their rights. Even if defendants 
could defend victims’ rights, defendants as a whole could not be relied 
upon to advocate for victims’ rights. To be sure, in many cases, victims 
speak against defendants’ positions. Nevertheless, a victims’ rights 
process that precludes appellate court scrutiny when victims intend to 
speak for defendants and are denied the right is fundamentally corrupt 
and exemplifies why the government should never be so exclusively in 
charge of individual constitutional rights. 
F. No Standing Degrades Constitutional Rights 
Legal rights without standing are destructive to the conventional 
model of constitutional civil liberties. Standing accompanying legal 
rights is a tradition as old as the constitution itself. The seminal case of 
Marbury v. Madison reasoned: 
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every 
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an 
injury . . . . The government of the United States has been emphatically 
termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to 
 413. Beloof, supra note 10, at 295 n.32 (citing authorities). 
 414. 751 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. 2001). 
 415. Id. at 1108 (quoting People v. Benford, 692 N.E.2d 1285, 1289 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)); see 
also Herrera v. State, 24 S.W.3d 844, 846 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding that a defendant who assaulted 
his wife could not assert his wife’s rights as a victim). 
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deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the 
violation of a vested legal right.416
Since that time “[t]he law is clear that injuries to . . . constitutional . . 
. rights are sufficient for standing.”417 The interest of the state in 
preserving its control over victims’ rights through denial of standing, 
remedy, and review should live in the shadow of the dominating value 
enshrined in constitutional rights—preservation of “a government of 
laws, and not of men.” 
Of course, arguments can be made that denying victims standing to 
defend victims’ rights has its benefits. For example, denying appellate 
court standing to victims may be efficient. Absent such standing, trial 
court denial of victims’ rights cannot be challenged by the victim on 
review, and leaving the decisions in trial courts alone is more efficient 
because there is no chance that a trial-level proceeding will be delayed 
while an appellate court determines whether to correct the rights 
violation. Moreover, appellate courts benefit because they do not expend 
resources reviewing victims’ rights violations. Furthermore, the 
prosecutor and defendant benefit by maintaining complete control over 
the review of victims’ rights. This control increases the parties’ influence 
over the development of victims’ rights law in appellate courts. Without 
victims defending their rights on review, parties who are not victims are 
the exclusive litigants of the meaning and scope of victims’ rights. 
Moreover, denying victims standing prevents conflicts with defendants’ 
rights. For example, delay on review could potentially conflict with a 
defendant’s speedy trial rights.418 In addition, ordering a resentencing 
would unsettle defendants’ interest in certainty and finality. However, 
these arguments, and arguments like them, are more appropriately 
reasons for not constitutionalizing victims’ rights in the first place, not 
against allowing standing for already granted constitutional rights. 
Rights in constitutional bills of rights are important enough to be 
accompanied by standing, the remedy of voiding, and nondiscretionary 
review. The very reason to constitutionalize rights is to enforce the rights 
against government.419 The two sound alternatives remaining are either 
 416. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 417. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 69 (2d ed. 2002) (citing Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152–53 (1951)). 
 418. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2004). 
 419. Beloof, supra note 10, at 295 n.32 (citing sources for the proposition that victims’ rights 
are rights against government). 
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to remove illusory victims’ rights from constitutions altogether or to 
make victims’ rights real by providing standing, remedy, and review. In 
state after state, the people have already decided in favor of victims’ 
constitutional rights.420 Victims’ rights are the most recent state 
constitutional rights and have been approved at the polls by 
overwhelming margins.421 Victims’ rights will likely remain in state 
constitutions. As Professor Tobolowsky has accurately observed:  
The relevant inquiry is no longer whether victims should have 
participatory rights in the criminal justice process . . . . The relevant 
current focus [is] to ensure that these victim participatory rights are 
appropriate and meaningful in the context of the varied and societal 
interests involved in criminal prosecutions.422  
As a practical matter, there is no way to proceed but to change victims’ 
illusory rights into real rights. 
IV. THE THIRD WAVE OF VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 
Following the very successful first two waves of victims’ rights 
work—first enacting victims’ rights statutes and then enacting victims’ 
rights amendments—a third wave is necessary to give real meaning to 
these rights. To become real, rights must be accompanied by victim 
standing, meaningful remedy, and review as a matter of right. Changing 
the legal culture is difficult and movements do not overcome obstacles 
all at once. The victims’ rights movement is no exception. As victim 
participation has become more familiar and accepted, greater 
achievements are now possible. Victim standing, remedy, and review are 
 420. See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text for a list of states with Victims’ Rights 
Amendments and for a discussion of the victims’ rights movement. 
 421. Alabama (70%); Alaska (87%); Arizona (58%); Colorado (86%); Connecticut (79%); 
Florida (90%); Idaho (79%); Illinois (77%); Indiana (89%); Kansas (84%); Louisiana(68%); 
Maryland (92%); Michigan (80%); Mississippi (93%); Missouri (84%); Nebraska (78%); Nevada 
(74%); New Jersey (85%); New Mexico (68%); North Carolina (78%); Ohio (77%); Oklahoma 
(91%); Oregon (58%); Rhode Island (N/A); South Carolina (90%); Tennessee (89%); Utah (68%); 
Virginia (84%); Wisconsin (84%). National Victims’ Constitutional Amendment Passage, State 
Victim Rights Amendments, at http://nvcap.org (last visited Apr. 4, 2005). 
 422. Peggy Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years 
After the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 21, 103 (1999). To be sure, the argument could be made that including standing to 
assert rights could alter the public opinion concerning the wisdom of victims’ rights. This argument 
is unlikely to carry the day. The idea that victims have been denied needed “real rights” in a present 
constitution is more likely to resonate with the electorate than the idea that no real victims’ 
constitutional rights are needed. 
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now within reach. To achieve victim standing, the problems of 
discretionary rights, lack of remedy, and discretionary review must be 
solved. 
Congressional action provides a solution to the problem of victim 
standing. In 2004, the United States Senate moved a bill423 to the House 
that provides for real, albeit statutory, victims’ rights in the federal 
criminal process. The Senate vote was 96 to 1 in favor of the bill. 
Ultimately, the bill became H.R. 5107 and has since, with a 393 to 14 
margin in the House, the unanimous consent of the Senate, and the 
President’s signature, become law.424 The broad rights guaranteed by the 
legislation include “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect 
for the victims’ dignity and privacy” and the right to “reasonable 
protection.”425 Specific rights include the rights: (1) to notice; (2) not to 
be excluded from public proceedings; (3) to be reasonably heard at 
public proceedings involving release, plea, or sentencing; (4) to confer 
with the government’s attorney; (5) to restitution; and (6) to proceedings 
free from unreasonable delay.426
This new law repeals the preexisting federal discretionary victims’ 
rights characterized by the “best efforts” language, which the court found 
to be unenforceable in McVeigh.427 The law provides that “[t]he crime 
victim, the crime victim’s lawful representative, and the attorney for the 
Government may assert the rights established in this chapter.”428 The 
victim clearly has ultimate enforcement authority because, in cases of 
conflict, the Government attorney must yield defense of the rights to the 
victim.429 The bill expressly allows for a writ of mandamus that is 
nondiscretionary in nature: “The court of appeals shall take up and 
decide such application forthwith and shall order such relief as may be 
necessary to protect the crime victim’s ability to exercise the rights.”430 
The only restriction on voiding is prohibiting a retrial: “In no case shall a 
failure to afford a right under this chapter provide grounds for a new 
 423. S. 2329, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004) (enacted). 
 424. Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 425. S. 2329, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004) (enacted). 
 426. Id. 
 427. See supra notes 101–06 and accompanying text for a discussion of McVeigh. 
 428. S. 2329, 108th Cong. (2d Sess., 2004). 
 429. Id. 
 430. Id. 
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trial.”431 The new federal law represents the cutting edge of the third 
wave of victims’ rights. The unanimous consent of the Senate and the 
393 to 14 favorable House vote reveal that the relevant question is not 
whether there will be a third wave of real victims’ rights adopted by 
states or imposed on the states, but when. 
A. Establishing Standing in the States 
1. Solving the discretion problem 
As discussed in Part II.B, courts have often held that victims’ rights 
are discretionary, ignoring and sometimes foreclosing victims’ assertions 
of their rights. In Kansas, for example, the court in Holt dubiously 
concluded that the rights are discretionary and thus illusory.432 Unless 
the court reverses itself, for there to be real victims’ rights, Kansas will 
need to pass an entirely new amendment that plainly declares that 
victim’s rights are mandatory. In other states, enabling legislation could 
provide for victim standing.433 Legislatures should enact comprehensive 
procedural schemes to implement victims’ rights to avoid any chance 
that a court will hold that a victims’ rights amendment is not self-
enabling. Moreover, the creation of trial-level and appellate court 
procedures will help signal to courts that the rights are believed by the 
legislature to be mandatory. 
Victims’ rights are meaningless when they depend on judicial 
findings that the exercise of rights is “in the interest of justice” or 
similarly vague tests. Constitutions should be amended to eliminate 
judicial discretion in rights. Victim standing is better assured if the rights 
are not compromised by these discretionary loopholes. If there must be 
an exception to a right, three things must accompany the right. First, 
authority to limit the right must be narrowly circumscribed in order for 
victims to have standing. Second, victims must have standing on review 
to challenge adverse rulings. And third, on review there must be a 
standard that gives appellate courts meaningful oversight of trial court 
decisions that deny victims the exercise of their rights. 
Victims’ broad constitutional rights are vague rights. Even where 
narrowly interpreted by courts, these rights provide a tremendous 
 431. Id. 
 432. See supra notes 107–21 and accompanying text for a discussion of Holt. 
 433. See supra notes 144–52 and accompanying text for a list and discussion of these states. 
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opportunity to serve as foundations upon which legislatures may enact 
more specific rights for victims. For example, victims’ broad right to 
privacy could result in procedures that allow victims to be formally 
notified of, and to move to quash, subpoenas duces tecum that seek 
victims’ private records kept by third parties. Victims’ right to be treated 
with dignity could be the basis, for example, of statutes allowing a 
support person for the victim in the courtroom. Victims’ right to due 
process could support notice and the right to be heard in contexts, such as 
dismissal hearings, which may not expressly be provided for in 
constitutional provisions. 
Solving the discretion problem alone is not enough to secure real 
victims’ rights. The remedy of voiding and reconsideration procedures 
must also be available to victims. 
2. Solving the remedies problem 
Unfortunately, some states have expressly limited voiding remedies 
when victims’ rights have been violated. Even more troubling, some 
victims’ rights amendments foreclose any remedy. For example, the 
Oregon Constitution provides that the “section [may not] be used to 
invalidate . . . [a] ruling of a court, conviction or adjudication.”434 The 
Virginia Constitution provides, “[t]his section does not confer upon any 
person a right to appeal or modify any decision in a criminal 
proceeding.”435 These constitutions provide for illusory, unenforceable 
rights. Victims in Oregon and Virginia will not be able to achieve the 
superior remedies of voiding and reconsideration under their state 
constitutions until these constitutions are amended. 
In some state constitutions, the remedy of voiding has been severely 
curtailed, particularly with regard to pleas and sentences.436 Until these 
provisions are amended to allow the voiding of pleas and sentences that 
have been taken in violation of victims’ rights, victims will be without 
remedy and, as a result, without standing to obtain review. In other 
states, it is advisable to expressly provide for remedy in enabling 
legislation. Providing for a remedy is, theoretically, at least, not 
necessary because courts have the inherent authority to void proceedings 
and reconsider results when constitutional rights are violated. In practice, 
however, the unprincipled judicial resistance towards remedying victims’ 
 434. OR. CONST. art. I, § 42(2). 
 435. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 8-A. 
 436. See supra Part II.C.2.b and accompanying notes. 
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rights violations demonstrated in this article argues for expressly 
legislated voiding remedy and reconsideration procedures. 
3. Solving the review problem 
Finally, establishing a review mechanism available to victims as a 
matter of right is essential to consistent enforcement of victims’ rights 
violations. An effective means of securing appellate review—assuming a 
constitution does not preclude it—is expressly to provide a means of 
review in constitutions or enabling statutes. There are some state laws 
that expressly provide for review mechanisms.437 Two state constitutions 
explicitly provide for actions to compel government officials to obey 
victims’ rights. The Constitution of South Carolina provides that the 
mechanism for enforcing victims’ rights is mandamus.438 The Nevada 
Constitution provides that an action to compel the government to comply 
with a victim’s right is available.439 Utah law specifically provides that 
victims may use mandamus to enforce their rights.440 Arizona has 
abolished the old form of writs and in its place created “special actions,” 
which crime victims may bring to enforce their rights.441 In Maryland, a 
victim has the right to appeal from an interlocutory or final order that 
denies or fails to consider the victim’s right.442 Utah statutes also provide 
 437. See supra Part II.D.2 and accompanying notes for a discussion of states’ review 
mechanisms. 
 438. South Carolina’s Constitution provides, “The rights created in this section may be subject 
to a writ of mandamus, to be issued by any justice of the Supreme Court or circuit court judge to 
require compliance of government officials.” S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(B). “A victim, as defined in 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1510 (supp. 1997), possesses no rights in the appellate process. . . . 
Additionally, the rights granted by the South Carolina Constitution and statutes are enforceable by a 
writ of mandamus, rather than direct participation at the trial level.” Reed v. Becka, 511 S.E.2d 396, 
399 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999). 
 439. NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8(4). 
 440. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-11(1)–(2)(a)(i) (1999); see State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756, 766 
n.14 (Utah 2002). 
 441. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4437(A) (2004) provides, “The victim has standing to seek an 
order or to bring a special action mandating that the victim be afforded any right or to challenge an 
order denying any right guaranteed to victims under the victims’ bill of rights, article II, § 2.1, 
Constitution of Arizona, any implementing legislation or court rules.” 
 442. See MD. CODE ANN, CRIM. PROC. § 11-103(b) (2004) (“[A] victim of the violent crime 
for which the defendant is charged may file an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Special 
Appeals from an interlocutory or final order that denies or fails to consider a right secured to the 
victim.”); see also Cianos v. State, 659 A.2d 291, 293 (Md. 1995) (quoting MD. CODE ANN CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. § 12-303.1(c) (1994)) (“Although not a party to a criminal proceeding, the victim of the 
violent crime for which the defendant is charged has a right to file an application for leave to appeal 
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for declaratory judgment actions, mandamus, and appeal.443 Michigan 
statutes allow a victim to appeal to a circuit court judge the parole 
board’s granting of parole.444 By granting victims standing to enforce 
their rights, the Texas constitution implicitly provides for a review 
procedure.445 Florida and Indiana statutes grant victims “standing.”446 In 
these eight jurisdictions review of some sort is expressly available.447 
Such provisions facilitate courts’ understanding of their authority. The 
state courts of at least two of these states, Arizona and Utah,448 are 
vigorously engaged in enforcing victims’ rights. Absent other restrictions 
in victims’ state constitutional rights, writs are implicitly available. Even 
in the states that have expressly banned appeals, writs are available.449
Thus, when victims’ rights are constitutionally protected, the 
problem in review of victims’ rights is not the unavailability of writ 
review, but rather the discretionary nature of writs. The solution to the 
review problem is to provide for nondiscretionary review of victims’ 
rights violations. When victims were merely third parties defending 
to the Court of Special Appeals from an interlocutory or final order that denies or fails to consider a 
right secured to that victim . . . .” (alteration in original)) .  
 443. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-11(2)(a)(i) provides that the victim may “bring an action for 
declaratory relief or for a writ of mandamus defining or enforcing the rights of victims and the 
obligations of government entities under [the Rights of Crime Victims Act].” 
 444. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.234(9) (“The action of the parole board in granting a parole is 
appealable by . . . the victim of the crime for which the prisoner was convicted. The appeal shall be 
to the circuit court in the county from which the prisoner was committed, by leave of the court.”). 
 445. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(e). 
 446. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.001(7) (West 2004) (“The victim of a crime . . . ha[s] standing to 
assert the rights of a crime victim which are provided by law . . . .”); IND. CODE § 35-40-2-1 (2004) 
(“A victim has standing to assert the rights established by this article.”). 
 447. There is, perhaps, a down side to expressly providing for a particular review mechanism. 
When a review method is expressly authorized by statute, other review mechanisms may be 
foreclosed. For example, Arizona courts have interpreted a provision for “special action” to exclude 
review on appeal. See State v. Lamberton, 899 P.2d 939, 942 (Ariz. 1995). South Carolina courts 
have reached a similar conclusion: “A victim . . . possesses no rights in the appellate process. 
Nothing in our Constitution or statutes provides the ‘victim’ standing to appeal the trial court’s 
order. Additionally, the rights granted by the South Carolina Constitution and statutes are 
enforceable by a writ of mandamus . . . .” Reed v. Becka, 511 S.E.2d 396, 399 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999). 
 448. See, e.g., Romley v. Schneider, 45 P.3d 685, 688 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Casey, 
44 P.3d 756 (Utah 2002). 
 449. The use of writs also solves the potential problem of open-ended time limits on 
challenging pleas and sentences. Writs are limited by the doctrine of laches. If victims sleep on their 
rights, mandamus will not be available. In United States v. Carter, 270 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1959), the 
court held that even when mandamus is available to the federal prosecutor, a delay of four months in 
challenging a court’s order suspending the sentence and putting the defendant on probation meant 
the action was barred by laches. See also Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Propriety of Issuing Writ 
of Mandamus in Federal Criminal Proceedings, 29 A.L.R. FED. 218 (2004). 
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evidentiary privileges or moving to quash subpoenas, the argument that 
discretionary review was sufficient was perhaps stronger. Today crime 
victims are participants with constitutional rights. Unlike third parties, 
victims have due process rights in the criminal process. Unlike third 
parties, victim harm and victims’ rights legitimize victims’ interest in 
punishment. Procedures should be established to grant victims the right 
to nondiscretionary review of rights violations. One could not credibly 
suggest that criminal defendants’ constitutional rights are to be reviewed 
only in the discretion of the court. Crime victims’ rights should be 
similarly respected. The solution of Congress in H.R. 5107 is excellent, 
providing for a nondiscretionary writ of mandamus.450 Writs of 
mandamus can remedy a broad range of victims’ rights violations, from 
the undue delay that violates the right to prompt disposition, to voiding 
pleas and sentences when victims’ rights to notice and to be heard are 
violated. Moreover, H.R. 5107 does not prohibit stays pending review of 
the writ. 
However, the new federal law does not solve the double bind of 
ripeness and mootness.451 Prosecutors and defendants should be required 
to bring any objection to victims’ exercise of their rights well before 
trial. Courts should also be mandated to rule on these objections 
sufficiently before trial for the victim to achieve pretrial review. For 
example, victims’ rights to attend trial, which if violated are presently 
unredressable because of double jeopardy, should be the subject of 
pretrial rulings and pretrial writ review. 
A model for such pretrial proceedings can be found in rape shield 
laws. For example, the federal rape shield procedure requires a party to 
“file a written motion at least 14 days before trial” if the party intends to 
offer evidence of the victim’s prior sexual behavior or sexual 
predisposition.452 In similar fashion, parties objecting to the victim’s 
exercise of victim rights could be required to make their objection well in 
advance of trial to allow time for review. Such a procedure worked well 
in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals case of United States v. Doe.453 
 450. See supra notes 423–31 and accompanying text for a discussion of H.R. 5107. 
 451. See supra Part II.D.1 for a discussion of the problems that ripeness and mootness pose to 
victims. 
 452. FED. R. EVID. § 412. 
 453. 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981). Doe involved an interlocutory appeal by the rape victim 
from an erroneous trial court denial of rape shield protections. Id. at 45. Interlocutory appeals are 
creatures of statute and generally provide for pretrial review. See, e.g., Bayless v. Bayless, 580 
N.E.2d 962, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“An appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed unless 
1BEL-FIN 8/9/2005 2:18:25 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
344 
 
Operating within the procedure that required two weeks advance notice, 
the court found the pretrial review process quite workable: 
The inconvenience and costs associated with permitting the victim to 
appeal are minimal. Certainly, they are no greater than those resulting 
from government appeals of suppression orders that are authorized by 
18 U.S.C. § 3731. Because the rule provides for pre-trial evidentiary 
hearings, appeals are unlikely to involve significant postponements of 
criminal trials. Indeed, in this case, we heard the appeal and filed an 
order resolving the issues without any delay of the criminal trial.  
 On the other hand, the injustice to rape victims in delaying an 
appeal until after the conclusion of the criminal trial is manifest. 
Without the right to immediate appeal, victims aggrieved by the court’s 
specific authority is granted by the Indiana Constitution, statutes or rules of the court.”). These 
appeals are also typically discretionary. See, e.g., Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 
2576, 2601 n.9 (2004) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“I note that the decision whether to allow such an 
[interlocutory] appeal lies in the first instance in the District Court’s sound discretion.”). Because 
interlocutory appeal is not available to obtain review from final judgment, and assuming writs were 
unavailable, the right to appeal would also be necessary to obtain review from final judgments. Only 
one state has expressly provided for interlocutory appeals of denials of victims’ rights. Maryland law 
gives victims the right to appeal from an interlocutory or final order. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. 
§ 11-103 (2004). Statutes expressly providing for nondiscretionary interlocutory appeal are a 
promising way to expand review of victims’ rights violations. New Hampshire law provides for 
nondiscretionary interlocutory appeal in a different context: “The victim shall have a right to 
interlocutory appeal to the supreme court from any decision by a court to require the disclosure of 
records or testimony of a rape crisis or domestic violence center or sexual assault or domestic 
violence counselor.” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-C:9 (2003). Some states and federal courts allow 
for appeal under the collateral order doctrine. To be appealable, the order “must determine claims of 
right separate from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action.” 4 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review 
§ 113 (2003). The order “must be the final disposition of the collateral issue.” Id. Finally, the order 
will “immediately affect the rights of the parties, and if review is deferred,” rights will probably be 
irreparably lost. Id. Relying on the collateral order doctrine, an intermediate appellate court in 
Pennsylvania held that an order requiring a rape crisis center to produce privileged communications 
is a final and appealable order. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 593 A.2d 1308 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). 
Citing United States Supreme Court and Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent, the Miller court 
ruled that an order which appears to be interlocutory can be final and appealable “if: 1) it is separate 
from and collateral to the main cause of action; 2) the right involved is too important to be denied 
review; and 3) the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the 
case, the claimed right will be irreparably lost.” Id. at 1309. Applying these factors, the court held 
that the order involving the records was “separate from and collateral to the underlying criminal 
action.” Id. at 1310. The court stated that the “victim’s right to privacy and confidentiality in her 
relationship with the rape center were too important to be denied review” on appeal. Id. Moreover, if 
the appeal was denied, confidentiality would be lost irreparably since “once the information is 
divulged, the privilege is lost.” Id. While the Miller case involved a third party record holder, there is 
little doubt that appeal under the collateral order doctrine would extend to the victim in Pennsylvania 
if she possessed her own privileged records. 
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order will have no opportunity to protect their privacy from invasions 
forbidden by the rule. Appeal following the defendant’s acquittal or 
conviction is no remedy, for the harm that the rule seeks to prevent 
already will have occurred.454
The inconvenience and costs of pretrial review of victims’ 
constitutional rights violations would also be minimal. Should pretrial 
hearings be required on objections to victims’ rights, as rape shield 
objections are now, review of rights denials is unlikely to involve 
significant delays of criminal trials. Moreover, the injustice to victims in 
delaying review of many of their constitutional rights is apparent because 
review after final judgment is no remedy. States provide constitutional 
rights that are, borrowing from the language of the Doe opinion, “for the 
special benefit of . . . victims.”455 Requiring pretrial rulings solves 
mootness problems because a remedy can still be achieved on review 
before it is forever precluded by attachment of double jeopardy at trial. 
The appellate court can order the trial court to comply with the right 
before the opportunity is foreclosed. The ripeness problem is also cured 
by the timing deadlines that force trial courts to rule pretrial. Finally, 
putting the burden on the parties to object pretrial is appropriate because 
victims typically have fewer legal advocacy resources than parties. 
While some courts have been principled in their interpretation of 
victims’ rights, others have not. In some jurisdictions, where rights 
schemes have the potential of real rights, court opinions interpret any 
vagueness or ambiguity against victims’ standing. Even worse, these 
courts neglect constitutional canons to achieve results adverse to victims’ 
rights. The solutions set forth above should go a long way to eliminating 
aberrant judicial opinions because they bring rights into conformity with 
constitutional rights canons. Nevertheless, experience shows that the 
assumption should not be made that the same analytical rules that apply 
to other rights will be applied to victims’ rights. Enabling language 
providing remedy and review should be as explicit as possible to 
overcome the real problem of double standards.  
B. Establishing Standing by Federal Constitutional Amendment 
An effort is underway to refer the Crime Victims’ Rights 
Amendment to the United States Constitution to the states for ratification 
 454. Doe, 666 F.2d at 46. 
 455. Id. 
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and, ultimately, incorporation into the Bill of Rights.456 A recurrent 
argument against the amendment is that it is not needed because the 
states already have adequate constitutional and statutory laws.457 But this 
argument is refuted by the states’ consistent denial of victim standing. 
Ultimately, if state constitutional rights remain illusory, the most 
effective solution is a federal constitutional amendment, applicable to the 
states. 
Professor Laurence Tribe, a noted liberal constitutional law scholar, 
wrote to Senators in support of the federal amendment: “despite the 
[statutory] Massachusetts Victims’ Bill of Rights,” which explicitly 
contained a right to prompt disposition,458 “the Massachusetts Attorney 
General . . . took the position that the victim of the rape did not even 
 456. S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States to protect the rights of crime victims). The proposed amendment reads: 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 
Congress assembled, (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following 
article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States: 
SECTION 1. The rights of victims of violent crime, being capable of protection 
without denying the constitutional rights of those accused of victimizing them, are 
hereby established and shall not be denied by any State or the United States and 
may be restricted only as provided in this article. 
SECTION 2. A victim of violent crime shall have the right to reasonable and timely 
notice of any public proceeding involving the crime and of any release or escape of 
the accused; the rights not to be excluded from such public proceeding and 
reasonably to be heard at public release, plea, sentencing, reprieve, and pardon 
proceedings; and the right to adjudicative decisions that duly consider the victim’s 
safety, interest in avoiding unreasonable delay, and just and timely claims to 
restitution from the offender. These rights shall not be restricted except when and to 
the degree dictated by a substantial interest in public safety or the administration of 
criminal justice, or by compelling necessity. 
SECTION 3. Nothing in this article shall be construed to provide grounds for a new 
trial or to authorize any claim for damages. Only the victim or the victim’s lawful 
representative may assert the rights established by this article, and no person 
accused of the crime may obtain any form of relief hereunder. 
SECTION 4. Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the 
provisions of this article. Nothing in this article shall affect the President’s authority 
to grant reprieves or pardons. 
SECTION 5. This article shall be inoperative unless it has been ratified as an 
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several 
States within 7 years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress. 
This article shall take effect on the 180th day after the date of its ratification. 
Id. 
 457. But see Parts II and III for an explanation of why a third wave of victims’ rights is 
necessary. 
 458. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258B, § 3 (West 2003). 
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have legal standing to appear in the courts of this state.”459 Tribe 
observed that Massachusetts’ denial of standing “left the victim a 
quintessential outsider to the State’s system of criminal prevention and 
punishment.”460 It is just this kind of ill-advised state judicial ruling that 
argues strongly for a federal amendment. 
In congressional testimony on an earlier version of the amendment, 
Tribe was persuaded “that attempts to protect the rights of victims at the 
state level . . . have proved insufficient.”461 A conservative former law 
professor, now federal judge, Paul Cassell, agreed with Tribe that a 
federal amendment is necessary.462 Even candid testimony in opposition 
to the amendment is in accord with the professors’ views. Ellen 
Greenlee, when she was the President of the National Legal Aid and 
Defender Association, recognized that the state victims’ amendments “so 
far have been treated as mere statements of principle that victims ought 
to be included and consulted more by prosecutors and courts. A state 
constitution is far . . . easier to ignor[e] than the federal one.”463 These 
observations are supported by a study that reveals that in states with 
strong victim laws only 63.3% of white victims, and merely 42.5% of 
nonwhite victims, received mandatory notice of plea bargains.464
Should the Amendment be enacted, the United States Supreme Court 
would likely provide victims with standing in federal and state appellate 
courts. The Supreme Court, attuned to the concept of victim harm 
originating in the criminal act, the potential for further harm from the 
criminal process, and the inclusion of victim participation in the states’ 
criminal proceedings, has shown increasing respect for the legitimate 
interests of crime victims. The Court recognizes that a criminal 
defendant’s rights should not be applied in a manner that unnecessarily 
harms the crime victim.465 Furthermore, in Payne v. Tennessee, the Court 
 459. Letter from Laurence Tribe to Senators Diane Feinstein and Jon Kyl (Apr. 8, 2003) (on 
file with author). 
 460. Id. 
 461. Laurence H. Tribe, Statement on Victims’ Rights (1997), reprinted in DOUGLAS E. 
BELOOF, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 722 (1999). 
 462. See Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims’ 
Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH. L. REV. 479. 
 463. The Proposed Victims’ Rights Constitutional Amendment: Hearing on H.R.J. Res. 173 
and H.J. Res. 174 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 147 (1996). 
 464. See supra note 7. 
 465. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1983). 
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recognized a murder victim’s “uniqueness as an individual human being” 
for sentencing purposes.466  
Recently, the Supreme Court noted the legitimacy of victim harm in 
the capital case of Calderon v. Thompson.467 In Calderon, the Court 
addressed the seemingly endless delay in the postconviction process, 
explaining that to unsettle expectations in the execution of moral 
judgment “is to inflict a profound injury to the ‘powerful and legitimate 
interest in punishing the guilty,’ an interest shared by the State and the 
victims of crime alike.”468 Moreover, it is far less likely that the Supreme 
Court would abandon canons of constitutional analysis that it has created 
to deny standing to crime victims, as some state appellate courts have 
done. The prospect of victim standing in both state and federal courts 
under the proposed federal amendment, contrasted with state denial of 
victim standing, lends considerable credibility to the amendment effort. 
 
C. Congressional Strategies for the Third Wave 
 
A federal constitutional amendment to the Bill of Rights providing 
victims rights, accompanied by standing, meaningful remedy, and review 
is the best option from the perspective of providing consistent national 
rights. It is also the best option from the perspective of ensuring that 
courts interpret victims’ rights as mandatory and enabled. Moreover, it 
improves the chances that state courts will interpret and enforce the 
rights in a consistent manner, because the Supreme Court will be the 
ultimate arbiter of rights. As a practical matter, however, an amendment 
is the most difficult solution to attain.  
A federal constitutional amendment has been debated on the floor of 
the Senate. Nevertheless, some Senators wanted to see if the states could 
be encouraged to provide meaningful standing, remedy, and review 
before turning to the passage of a federal amendment that would impose 
such enforcement devises upon the states. Ultimately, the result of this 
experiment of Congress is H.R. 5107.469 This bill creates incentives for 
states to provide meaningful enforcement provisions and funds these 
incentives over a five year period.470 Essentially the bill has three 
 466. 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991). 
 467. 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998). 
 468. Id. (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 421 (1993)) (citation omitted). 
 469. Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime 
Victims’ Rights Act, H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2004). For a copy of this Act, see Appendix I. 
 470. Id. 
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different projects to positively impact state victims’ rights. First, the bill 
establishes programs such as those run by the National Crime Victim 
Law Institute (NCVLI), which manages legal clinics in states across the 
country, presently under grants from the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
Office for Victims of Crime.471 Second, the law provides expert legal 
consultation to the states concerning legal changes necessary to bring the 
state law into substantial similarity with the federal statute’s rights and 
enforcement provisions. And third, the law provides funds for 
compliance initiatives.  
Should this experiment fail to achieve adequate progress in the 
states, the victims’ rights amendment will most certainly be resurrected 
in the Senate. In agreeing to this plan, the sponsors of the amendment, 
Senator Diane Feinstein of California (D) and Senator Jon Kyl of 
Arizona (R), were clear that the amendment would be reintroduced in 
Congress absent significant progress in the states.472 But at least for the 
next five years, assuming the projects are funded, it is safe to say that the 
federal constitutional amendment has been placed on the back burner. 
Moving to the front burner are efforts like H.R. 5107 to help the states 
ride the third wave of victims’ rights. In the next five years, focused 
victim law reform efforts should be on state enabling legislation and on 
amending state constitutions to provide standing, meaningful remedy, 
and review. Equally significant is the need for impact litigation to 
determine state judicial commitment to constitutional canons in the 
victims’ rights context. Should the state effort fail, the federal 
amendment effort will have dramatically increased chances of success 
because it will be the only remaining legal mechanism with which to 
practically achieve real victims’ rights across the states. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The absence of victim standing, remedy, and review corrupts 
victims’ rights in important ways, including de-personalization of the 
right, corruption of the adversary process in victims’ rights litigation, 
limitation of the procedural context of rights litigation, creation of a 
rights context in which the government can essentially ignore the rights, 
and the establishment of precedent corrosive to constitutional 
 471. 150 CONG. REC. S10,910-13 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). See 
Appendix II for a copy of Senator Kyl’s statement. 
 472. See id.; S. REP. No. 108-191 (2003). 
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conventions. Most importantly, however, victims simply cannot defend 
their rights. 
The victims’ rights movement has made great efforts to change the 
legal culture of the criminal justice system. The movement has worked 
hard to enact laws that are, by modern measure, new and innovative. The 
new laws challenge the modern paradigm that only the state and the 
defendant have an interest in the criminal process and punishment. The 
first wave brought statutory victims’ rights, the second wave brought 
constitutional rights, but neither wave has ensured that victims have real 
rights. 
State crime victims’ constitutional rights remain illusory. Victims 
will achieve real rights in the third wave when they get standing to 
directly defend their rights, when appellate courts can void results 
reached in violation of victims’ rights, and when review of violations is a 
matter of right. 
1BEL-FIN 8/9/2005 2:18:25 PM 
255] The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights 
 351 
APPENDIX I 
H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2004) 
 
TITLE I—SCOTT CAMPBELL, STEPHANIE ROPER, WENDY 
PRESTON, LOUARNA GILLIS, AND NILA LYNN CRIME 
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS ACT 
 
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE. 
 
This title may be cited as the “Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy 
Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims’ Rights Act.” 
 
SEC. 102. CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS. 
 
(a) Amendment to Title 18—Part II of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following: 
 
 CHAPTER 237—CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 
 
 Sec. 3771. Crime victims’ rights. 
 
(a) Rights of Crime Victims—A crime victim has the 
following rights: 
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the 
accused. 
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice 
of any public court proceeding, or any parole 
proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or 
escape of the accused. 
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public 
court proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear 
and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by 
the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard 
other testimony at that proceeding. 
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public 
proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, 
sentencing, or any parole proceeding. 
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(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for 
the Government in the case. 
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in 
law. 
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable 
delay. 
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect 
for the victim’s dignity and privacy. 
(b) Rights Afforded—In any court proceeding involving an 
offense against a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the 
crime victim is afforded the rights described in subsection 
(a). Before making a determination described in subsection 
(a)(3), the court shall make every effort to permit the fullest 
attendance possible by the victim and shall consider 
reasonable alternatives to the exclusion of the victim from 
the criminal proceeding. The reasons for any decision 
denying relief under this chapter shall be clearly stated on 
the record. 
(c) Best Efforts to Accord Rights— 
(1) GOVERNMENT—Officers and employees of the 
Department of Justice and other departments and 
agencies of the United States engaged in the detection, 
investigation, or prosecution of crime shall make their 
best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and 
accorded, the rights described in subsection (a). 
(2) ADVICE OF ATTORNEY—The prosecutor shall 
advise the crime victim that the crime victim can seek 
the advice of an attorney with respect to the rights 
described in subsection (a). 
(3) NOTICE—Notice of release otherwise required 
pursuant to this chapter shall not be given if such notice 
may endanger the safety of any person. 
(d) Enforcement and Limitations— 
(1) RIGHTS—The crime victim or the crime victim’s 
lawful representative, and the attorney for the 
Government may assert the rights described in 
subsection (a). A person accused of the crime may not 
obtain any form of relief under this chapter. 
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(2) MULTIPLE CRIME VICTIMS—In a case where the 
court finds that the number of crime victims makes it 
impracticable to accord all of the crime victims the rights 
described in subsection (a), the court shall fashion a 
reasonable procedure to give effect to this chapter that 
does not unduly complicate or prolong the proceedings. 
(3) MOTION FOR RELIEF AND WRIT OF 
MANDAMUS—The rights described in subsection (a) 
shall be asserted in the district court in which a 
defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no 
prosecution is underway, in the district court in the 
district in which the crime occurred. The district court 
shall take up and decide any motion asserting a victim’s 
right forthwith. If the district court denies the relief 
sought, the movant may petition the court of appeals for 
a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals may issue the 
writ on the order of a single judge pursuant to circuit 
rule or the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The 
court of appeals shall take up and decide such 
application forthwith within 72 hours after the petition 
has been filed. In no event shall proceedings be stayed or 
subject to a continuance of more than five days for 
purposes of enforcing this chapter. If the court of appeals 
denies the relief sought, the reasons for the denial shall 
be clearly stated on the record in a written opinion. 
(4) ERROR—In any appeal in a criminal case, the 
Government may assert as error the district court’s 
denial of any crime victim’s right in the proceeding to 
which the appeal relates. 
(5) LIMITATION ON RELIEF—In no case shall a 
failure to afford a right under this chapter provide 
grounds for a new trial. A victim may make a motion to 
re-open a plea or sentence only if— 
(A) the victim has asserted the right to be heard 
before or during the proceeding at issue and such 
right was denied; 
(B) the victim petitions the court of appeals for a 
writ of mandamus within 10 days; and 
(C) in the case of a plea, the accused has not pled to 
the highest offense charged. 
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This paragraph does not affect the victim’s right to 
restitution as provided in title 18, United States Code. 
(6) NO CAUSE OF ACTION—Nothing in this chapter 
shall be construed to authorize a cause of action for 
damages or to create, to enlarge, or to imply any duty or 
obligation to any victim or other person for the breach of 
which the United States or any of its officers or 
employees could be held liable in damages. Nothing in 
this chapter shall be construed to impair the 
prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any 
officer under his direction. 
(e) Definitions—For the purposes of this chapter, the term 
“crime victim” means a person directly and proximately 
harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or 
an offense in the District of Columbia. In the case of a crime 
victim who is under 18 years of age, incompetent, 
incapacitated, or deceased, the legal guardians of the crime 
victim or the representatives of the crime victim’s estate, 
family members, or any other persons appointed as suitable 
by the court, may assume the crime victim’s rights under this 
chapter, but in no event shall the defendant be named as such 
guardian or representative. 
(f) Procedures To Promote Compliance— 
(1) REGULATIONS—Not later than 1 year after the 
date of enactment of this chapter, the Attorney General 
of the United States shall promulgate regulations to 
enforce the rights of crime victims and to ensure 
compliance by responsible officials with the obligations 
described in law respecting crime victims. 
(2) CONTENTS—The regulations promulgated under 
paragraph (1) shall— 
(A) designate an administrative authority within the 
Department of Justice to receive and investigate 
complaints relating to the provision or violation of 
the rights of a crime victim; 
(B) require a course of training for employees and 
offices of the Department of Justice that fail to 
comply with provisions of Federal law pertaining to 
the treatment of crime victims, and otherwise assist 
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such employees and offices in responding more 
effectively to the needs of crime victims; 
(C) contain disciplinary sanctions, including 
suspension or termination from employment, for 
employees of the Department of Justice who 
willfully or wantonly fail to comply with provisions 
of Federal law pertaining to the treatment of crime 
victims; and 
(D) provide that the Attorney General, or the 
designee of the Attorney General, shall be the final 
arbiter of the complaint, and that there shall be no 
judicial review of the final decision of the Attorney 
General by a complainant.’. 
 
(b) Table of Chapters—The table of chapters for part II of title 18, 
United States Code, is amended by inserting at the end the following: 
3771. 
 
(c) Repeal—Section 502 of the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 
1990 (42 U.S.C. 10606) is repealed. 
 
SEC.103. INCREASED RESOURCES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF 
CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS. 
 
(a) Crime Victims Legal Assistance Grants—The Victims of Crime Act 
of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10601 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
1404C the following: 
 
SEC. 1404D. CRIME VICTIMS LEGAL ASSISTANCE 
GRANTS. 
(a) In General—The Director may make grants as 
provided in section 1404(c)(1)(A) to State, tribal, and 
local prosecutors’ offices, law enforcement agencies, 
courts, jails, and correctional institutions, and to 
qualified public and private entities, to develop, 
establish, and maintain programs for the enforcement of 
crime victims’ rights as provided in law. 
(b) Prohibition—Grant amounts under this section may 
not be used to bring a cause of action for damages. 
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(c) False Claims Act—Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, amounts collected pursuant to sections 
3729 through 3731 of title 31, United States Code 
(commonly known as the “False Claims Act”), may be 
used for grants under this section, subject to 
appropriation. 
(b) Authorization of Appropriations—In addition to funds made 
available under section 1402(d) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 
there are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this title— 
(1) $2,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 and $5,000,000 for each 
of fiscal years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 to United States 
Attorneys Offices for Victim/Witnesses Assistance 
Programs; 
(2) $2,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 and $5,000,000 in each 
of the fiscal years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, to the Office 
for Victims of Crime of the Department of Justice for 
enhancement of the Victim Notification System; 
(3) $300,000 in fiscal year 2005 and $500,000 for each of 
the fiscal years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, to the Office for 
Victims of Crime of the Department of Justice for staff to 
administer the appropriation for the support of organizations 
as designated under paragraph (4); 
(4) $7,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 and $11,000,000 for each 
of the fiscal years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, to the Office 
for Victims of Crime of the Department of Justice, for the 
support of organizations that provide legal counsel and 
support services for victims in criminal cases for the 
enforcement of crime victims’ rights in Federal jurisdictions, 
and in States and tribal governments that have laws 
substantially equivalent to the provisions of chapter 237 of 
title 18, United States Code; and (5) $5,000,000 for fiscal 
year 2005 and $7,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2006, 
2007, 2008, and 2009, to the Office for Victims of Crime of 
the Department of Justice, for the support of— 
(A) training and technical assistance to States and tribal 
jurisdictions to craft state-of-the-art victims’ rights laws; 
and  
(B) training and technical assistance to States and tribal 
jurisdictions to design a variety of compliance systems, 
which shall include an evaluation component. 
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(c) Increased Resources To Develop State-of-the-Art Systems for 
Notifying Crime Victims of Important Dates and Developments—
The Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10601 et seq.) is 
amended by inserting after section 1404D the following: 
SEC. 1404E. CRIME VICTIMS NOTIFICATION 
GRANTS. 
(a) In General—The Director may make grants as 
provided in section 1404(c)(1)(A) to State, tribal, and 
local prosecutors’ offices, law enforcement agencies, 
courts, jails, and correctional institutions, and to 
qualified public or private entities, to develop and 
implement state-of-the-art systems for notifying victims 
of crime of important dates and developments relating to 
the criminal proceedings at issue in a timely and efficient 
manner, provided that the jurisdiction has laws 
substantially equivalent to the provisions of chapter 237 
of title 18, United States Code. 
(b) Integration of Systems—Systems developed and 
implemented under this section may be integrated with 
existing case management systems operated by the 
recipient of the grant. 
(c) Authorization of Appropriations—In addition to 
funds made available under section 1402(d), there are 
authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section— 
(1) $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2005; and 
(2) $5,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2006, 
2007, 2008, and 2009. 
(d) False Claims Act—Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, amounts collected pursuant to sections 
3729 through 3731 of title 31, United States Code 
(commonly known as the “False Claims Act”), may be 
used for grants under this section, subject to 
appropriation. 
SEC. 104. REPORTS. 
 
(a) Administrative Office of the United States Courts—Not later than 1 
year after the date of enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, for each Federal court, 
shall report to Congress the number of times that a right established in 
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chapter 237 of title 18, United States Code, is asserted in a criminal case 
and the relief requested is denied and, with respect to each such denial, 
the reason for such denial, as well as the number of times a mandamus 
action is brought pursuant to chapter 237 of title 18, and the result 
reached. 
 
(b) Government Accountability Office— 
 
(1) STUDY—The Comptroller General shall conduct a study 
that evaluates the effect and efficacy of the implementation 
of the amendments made by this title on the treatment of 
crime victims in the Federal system. 
(2) REPORT—Not later than 4 years after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall prepare 
and submit to the appropriate committees a report containing 
the results of the study conducted under subsection (a). 
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APPENDIX II 
Statement of Senator Jon Kyl 
150 CONG. REC. S10,910-13 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004)
 
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, as the primary drafter of Title I of H.R. 
5107, I would like to make a few comments. After extensive consultation 
with my colleagues, broad bipartisan consensus was reached and the 
language in Title I was agreed to. 
I would like to make it clear that it is not the intent of this bill to limit 
any laws in favor of crime victims that may currently exist, whether 
these laws are statutory, regulatory, or found in case law. I would like to 
turn to the bill itself and address the first section, (a)(1), the right of the 
crime victim to be reasonably protected. Of course the government 
cannot protect the crime victim in all circumstances. However, where 
reasonable, the crime victim should be provided accommodations such as 
a secure waiting area, away from the defendant before and after and 
during breaks in the proceedings. The right to protection also extends to 
require reasonable conditions of pretrial and postconviction relief that 
include protections for the victim’s safety. 
I would like to address the notice provisions of (a)(2). The notice 
provisions are important because if a victim fails to receive notice of a 
public proceeding in the criminal case at which the victim’s right could 
otherwise have been exercised, that right has effectively been denied. 
Public court proceedings include both trial level and appellate level court 
proceedings. It does not make sense to enact victims’ rights that are 
rendered useless because the victim never knew of the proceeding at 
which the right had to be asserted. Simply put, a failure to provide notice 
of proceedings at which a right can be asserted is equivalent to a 
violation of the right itself. 
Equally important to this right to notice of public proceedings is the 
right to notice of the escape or release of the accused. This provision 
helps to protect crime victims by notifying them that the accused is out 
on the streets. 
For these rights to notice to be effective, notice must be sufficiently 
given in advance of a proceeding to give the crime victim the opportunity 
to arrange his or her affairs in order to be able to attend that proceeding 
and any scheduling of proceedings should take into account the victim’s 
schedule to facilitate effective notice.  
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Restrictions on public proceedings are in 28 CFR Sec. 50.9 and it is 
not the intent here today to alter the meaning of that provision.  
Too often crime victims have been unable to exercise their rights 
because they were not informed of the proceedings. Pleas and 
sentencings have all too frequently occurred without the victim ever 
knowing that they were taking place. Victims are the persons who are 
directly harmed by the crime and they have a stake in the criminal 
process because of that harm. Their lives are significantly altered by the 
crime and they have to live with the consequences for the rest of their 
lives. To deny them the opportunity to know of and be present at 
proceedings is counter to the fundamental principles of this country. It is 
simply wrong. Moreover, victim safety requires that notice of the release 
or escape of an accused from custody be made in a timely manner to 
allow the victim to make informed choices about his or her own safety. 
This provision ensures that takes place. 
I would like to turn to (a)(3), which provides that the crime victim 
has the right not to be excluded from any public proceedings. This 
language was drafted in a way to ensure that the government would not 
be responsible for paying for the victim’s travel and lodging to a place 
where they could attend the proceedings. 
In all other respects, this section is intended to grant victims the right 
to attend and be present throughout all public proceedings. 
This right is limited in two respects. First, the right is limited to 
public proceedings, thus grand jury proceedings are excluded from the 
right. Second, the government or the defendant can request, and the court 
can order, judicial proceedings to be closed under existing laws. This 
provision is not intended to alter those laws or their procedures in any 
way. There may be organized crime cases or cases involving national 
security that require procedures that necessarily deny a crime victim the 
right not to be excluded that would otherwise be provided under this 
section. This is as it should be. National security matters and organized 
crime cases are especially challenging and there are times when there is a 
vital need for closed proceedings. In such cases, the proceedings are not 
intended to be interpreted as “public proceedings” under this bill. In this 
regard, it is not our intent to alter 28 CFR Sec. 50.9 in any respect. 
Despite these limitations, this bill allows crime victims, in the vast 
majority of cases, to attend the hearings and trial of the case involving 
their victimization. This is so important because crime victims share an 
interest with the government in seeing that justice is done in a criminal 
case and this interest supports the idea that victims should not be 
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excluded from public criminal proceedings, whether these are pretrial, 
trial, or posttrial proceedings. 
When “the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, 
determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the 
victim heard other testimony at that proceeding,” a victim may be 
excluded. The standards of “clear and convincing evidence” and 
“materially altered” are extremely high and intended to make exclusion 
of the victim quite rare, especially since (b) says that “before making a 
determination described in subsection (a)(3), the court shall make every 
effort to permit the fullest attendance possible by the victim and shall 
consider reasonable alternatives to the exclusion of the victim from the 
criminal proceeding.” It should be stressed that (b) requires that “the 
reasons for any decision denying relief under this chapter shall be clearly 
stated on the record.” A judge should explain in detail the precise reasons 
why relief is being denied. 
This right of crime victims not to be excluded from the proceedings 
provides a foundation for (a)(4), which provides victims the right to 
reasonably be heard at any public proceeding involving release, plea, or 
sentencing. This provision is intended to allow crime victims to directly 
address the court in person. It is not necessary for the victim to obtain the 
permission of either party to do so. This right is a right independent of 
the government or the defendant that allows the victim to address the 
court. To the extent the victim has the right to independently address the 
court, the victim acts as an independent participant in the proceedings. 
When a victim invokes this right during plea and sentencing proceedings, 
it is intended that the he or she be allowed to provide all three types of 
victim impact: the character of the victim, the impact of the crime on the 
victim, the victims’ family and the community, and sentencing 
recommendations. Of course, the victim may use a lawyer, at the 
victim’s own expense, to assist in the exercise of this right. This bill does 
not provide victims with a right to counsel but recognizes that a victim 
may enlist a counsel on their own. 
It is not the intent of the term “reasonably” in the phrase “to be 
reasonably heard” to provide any excuse for denying a victim the right to 
appear in person and directly address the court. Indeed, the very purpose 
of this section is to allow the victim to appear personally and directly 
address the court. This section would fail in its intent if courts 
determined that written, rather than oral communication, could generally 
satisfy this right. On the other hand, the term “reasonably” is meant to 
allow for alternative methods of communicating a victim’s views to the 
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court when the victim is unable to attend the proceedings. Such 
circumstances might arise, for example, if the victim is incarcerated on 
unrelated matters at the time of the proceedings or if a victim cannot 
afford to travel to a courthouse. In such cases, communication by the 
victim to the court is permitted by other reasonable means. In short, the 
victim of crime, or their counsel, should be able to provide any 
information, as well as their opinion, directly to the court concerning the 
release, plea, or sentencing of the accused. This bill intends for this right 
to be heard to be an independent right of the victim. 
It is important that the “reasonably be heard” language not be an 
excuse for minimizing the victim’s opportunity to be heard. Only if it is 
not practical for the victim to speak in person or if the victim wishes to 
be heard by the court in a different fashion should this provision mean 
anything other than an in-person right to be heard. 
Of course, in providing victim information or opinion it is important 
that the victim be able to confer with the prosecutor concerning a variety 
of matters and proceedings. Under (a)(5), the victim has a reasonable 
right to confer with the attorney for the government in the case. This 
right is intended to be expansive. For example, the victim has the right to 
confer with the government concerning any critical stage or disposition 
of the case. The right, however, it is not limited to these examples. This 
right to confer does not give the crime victim any right to direct the 
prosecution. Prosecutors should consider it part of their profession to be 
available to consult with crime victims about concerns the victims may 
have which are pertinent to the case, case proceedings or dispositions. 
Under this provision, victims are able to confer with the government’s 
attorney about proceedings after charging. I would note that the right to 
confer does impair the prosecutiorial discretion of the Attorney General 
or any officer under his direction, as provided (d)(6). 
I would like to turn now to restitution in (a)(6). This section provides 
the right to full and timely restitution as provided in law. We specifically 
intend to endorse the expansive definition of restitution given by Judge 
Cassell in U.S. v. Bedonie and U.S. v. Serawop in May 2004. This right, 
together with the other rights in the act to be heard and confer with the 
government’s attorney in this act, means that existing restitution laws 
will be more effective. 
I would like to move on to (a)(7), which provides crime victims with 
a right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay. This provision does 
not curtail the government’s need for reasonable time to organize and 
prosecute its case. Nor is the provision intended to infringe on the 
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defendant’s due process right to prepare a defense. Too often, however, 
delays in criminal proceedings occur for the mere convenience of the 
parties and those delays reach beyond the time needed for defendant’s 
due process or the government’s need to prepare. The result of such 
delays is that victims cannot begin to put the criminal justice system 
behind them and they continue to be victimized. It is not right to hold 
crime victims under the stress and pressure of future court proceedings 
merely because it is convenient for the parties or the court. 
This provision should be interpreted so that any decision to schedule, 
reschedule, or continue criminal cases should include victim input 
through the victim’s assertion of the right to be free from unreasonable 
delay. 
I would add that the delays in criminal proceedings are among the 
most chronic problems faced by victims. Whatever peace of mind a 
victim might achieve after a crime is too often inexcusably postponed by 
unreasonable delays in the criminal case. A central reason for these rights 
is to force a change in a criminal justice culture which has failed to focus 
on the legitimate interests of crime victims, a new focus on limiting 
unreasonable delays in the criminal process to accommodate the victim is 
a positive start. 
I would like to turn to (a)(8). The broad rights articulated in this 
section are meant to be rights themselves and are not intended to just be 
aspirational. One of these rights is the right to be treated with fairness. Of 
course, fairness includes the notion of due process. Too often victims of 
crime experience a secondary victimization at the hands of the criminal 
justice system. This provision is intended to direct government agencies 
and employees, whether they are in executive or judicial branches, to 
treat victims of crime with the respect they deserve and to afford them 
due process. 
It is not the intent of this bill that its significance be whittled down or 
marginalized by the courts or the executive branch. This legislation is 
meant to correct, not continue, the legacy of the poor treatment of crime 
victims in the criminal process. This legislation is meant to ensure that 
cases like the McVeigh case, where victims of the Oklahoma City 
bombing were effectively denied the right to attend the trial and to avoid 
federal appeals courts from determining, as the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals did, that victims had no standing to seek review of their right to 
attend the trial under the former victims’ law that this bill replaces. 
I would also like to comment on (b), which directs courts to ensure 
that the rights in this law be afforded and to record, on the record, any 
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reason for denying relief of an assertion of a crime victim. This provision 
is critical because it is in the courts of this country that these rights will 
be asserted and it is the courts that will be responsible for enforcing 
them. Further, requiring a court to provide the reasons for denial of relief 
is necessary for effective appeal of such denial. 
Turning briefly to (c), there are several important things to point out. 
First, this provision requires that the government inform the victim that 
the victim can seek the advice of the attorney, such as from the legal 
clinics for crime victims contemplated under this law, such as the law 
clinics at Arizona State University and those supported by the National 
Crime Victim Law Institute at the Law School at Lewis and Clark 
College in Portland, Oregon. This is an important protection for crime 
victims because it ensures the independent and individual nature of their 
rights. Second, the notice section immediately following limits the right 
to notice of release where such notice may endanger the safety of the 
person being released. There are cases, particularly in domestic violence 
cases, where there is danger posed by an intimate partner if the intimate 
partner is released. Such circumstances are not the norm, even in 
domestic violence cases as a category of cases. This exception should not 
be relied upon as an excuse to avoid notifying most victims. 
I would now like to address the enforcement provisions of the bill in 
(d). This provision allows a crime victim to enter the criminal trial court 
during proceedings involving the crime against the victim, to stand with 
other counsel in the well of the court, and assert the rights provided by 
this bill. This provision ensures that crime victims have standing to be 
heard in trial courts so that they are heard at the very moment when their 
rights are at stake and this, in turn, forces the criminal justice system to 
be responsive to a victim’s rights in a timely way. Importantly, however, 
the bill does not allow the defendant in the case to assert any of the 
victim’s rights to obtain relief. This prohibition prevents the individual 
accused of the crime from distorting a right intended for the benefit of 
the individual victim into a weapon against justice. 
The provision allows the crime victim’s representative and the 
attorney for the government to go into a criminal trial court and assert the 
crime victim’s rights. The inclusions of representatives and the 
government’s attorney in the provision are important for a number of 
reasons. First, allowing a representative to assert a crime victim’s rights 
ensures that where a crime victim is unable to assert the rights on his or 
her own for any reason, including incapacity, incompetence, minority, or 
death, those rights are not lost. The representative for the crime victim 
1BEL-FIN 8/9/2005 2:18:25 PM 
255] The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights 
 365 
can assert the rights. Second, a crime victim may choose to enlist a 
private attorney to represent him or her in the criminal case--this 
provision allows that attorney to enter an appearance on behalf of the 
victim in the criminal trial court and assert the victim’s rights. The 
provision also recognizes that, at times, the government’s attorney may 
be best situated to assert a crime victim’s rights either because the crime 
victim is not available at a particular point in the trial or because, at 
times, the crime victim’s interests coincide with those of the government 
and it makes sense for a single person to express those joined interests. 
Importantly, however, the provision does not mean that the government’s 
attorney has the authority to compromise or co-opt a victim’s right. Nor 
does the provision mean that by not asserting a victim’s right the 
government’s attorney has waived that right. The rights provided in this 
bill are personal to the individual crime victim and it is that crime victim 
that has the final word regarding which of the specific rights to assert and 
when. Waiver of any of the individual rights provided can only happen 
by the victim’s affirmative waiver of that specific right. 
In sum, without the ability to enforce the rights in the criminal trial 
and appellate courts of this country any rights afforded are, at best, 
rhetoric. We are far past the point where lip service to victims’ rights is 
acceptable. The enforcement provisions of this bill ensure that never 
again are victim’s rights provided in word but not in reality. 
 
